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In the classic Frank Capra film from which this article borrows its
name,' "John Doe" began as a fictional character created by a re-
porter, played by Barbara Stanwyck, but eventually became the pseu-
donym of an actual person, a character played by Gary Cooper, who
spoke for the common man and woman. This article traces a similar
evolution of John Doe in civil litigation. Like the character in the
movie, John Doe began his legal career as a purely fictional character.
However, he too later became a pseudonym for actual persons who oth-
erwise would not be heard.
In fact, John Doe parties have become an essential part of federal
civil practice. Although they rarely appeared in federal court thirty
years ago, "John Doe" and his pseudonymous relations, such as "Jane
and Richard Roe" and the "unknown police officer," today regularly
help plaintiffs bring civil suits in federal court.2 These fictitiously
1. MEET JOHN DOE (Warner Brothers 1941).
2. The results of a Westlaw computer search of "John Doe" cases illustrate the significant
increase in Doe cases over the last 30 years. After eliminating criminal cases and multiple deci-
sions in a single civil case, the search revealed nearly 200 federal district court decisions in 1993
in which "John Doe" served as the formal title for either the plaintiff or the defendant. Search of
Westlaw, DCT database (April 11, 1996) (search terms: TI ("John Doe") and DA (1993)). By
contrast, only seven decisions (excluding three non-civil cases) by federal district courts in 1963
had "John Doe" in the title. Search of Westlaw, DCT database (April 11, 1996) (search terms:
TI ("John Doe") and DA (1963)). This difference represents an increase of approximately
2700%. Over the same approximate period, the total number of civil cases commenced in the
district courts increased by only 350%, from 63,630 in 1963 to 228,600 in 1993. See BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 211
(1994) (for the year ending June 30, 1993); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, US. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 155 (1964) (for year ending June 30, 1963).
These numbers provide only a rough measure, however. First, the Westlaw database consists
of decisions actually rendered in that particular year as opposed to complaints filed in that year. A
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named parties are often crucial to a plaintiff's pursuit of privacy and
civil rights litigation. Despite their growing importance and popularity,
codified federal civil procedure all but ignores John Doe parties.3 With-
out guidance from formal rules, federal courts have gone in opposite
directions and set widely conflicting standards for Doe parties. These
new standards distort the existing rules and cause the wrong results
even in non-Doe cases. It is time to stop the confusion. Federal civil
procedure must face the reality of modern Doe practice and formally
recognize John Doe parties.
I. INTRODUCTION
The popularity of John Doe as a substitute litigant is not unique to
modern federal civil practice. More than three centuries ago, litigants
in English courts created a fictional John Doe to avoid the technicali-
ties in common law writ pleading; since then, John Doe has evolved
from a purely fictional character to a pseudonym for actual persons.
The modem John Doe helps civil litigants, primarily plaintiffs, in two
ways. In some civil cases, John Doe protects the plaintiff's anonymity
by acting as the plaintiff's pseudonym. More commonly, John Doe pre-
serves the plaintiff's claim by standing in for an unknown defendant
while the plaintiff tries to determine the defendant's actual name.
particular John Doe case may have more than one opinion in a given year, while another has none.
Second, not all plaintiffs choose to use "John Doe." Many plaintiffs use other fictitious designa-
tions, such as "Jane Roe" and "unknown police officer." Finally, Westlaw's district court database
is far more inclusive for 1993 than for 1963. More than half of the 1993 decisions in the district
court database are otherwise "unpublished" opinions; conversely, the 1963 district court database
has relatively few unreported cases. Telephone Interview with Sue Schway, Westlaw representa-
tive (Aug. 11, 1995). However, even if one were to compensate by splitting the difference between
the 1963 and 1993 decisions in half, the increase would remain one of well over 1000%.
3. See FaD. R Civ. P. 1-86. Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, other federal
procedural provisions expressly address fictitious name practice. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide for the issuance of a "John Doe warrant," a practice which recently came to
national prominence following the April 19, 1995 bombing in Oklahoma City. See FED. R. CRIM.
P. 4(c)(1) ("The warrant... shall contain the name of the defendant or, if the defendant's name
is unknown, any name or description by which the defendant can be identified with reasonable
certainty."). Similarly, the Internal Revenue Code allows the IRS to issue a "John Doe summons"
under certain specified conditions in order to obtain information concerning an unidentified tax-
payer. See I.R.C. § 7609(f) (1994). A pseudonym also is used to protect the identity of juveniles
in federal juvenile delinquency proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. § 5038(e) (1994).
4. Webster's entry for "John' Doe" aptly describes the pseudonym's evolution: "John Doe
and Richard Roe were originally fictitious plaintiff and defendant in a form of ejection action [and
John Doe now is] a name ... used in law courts, legal papers, etc. to refer to any person whose
name is unknown." WEBSTER'S NEw WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AmERIcAN LANGUAGE (college
ed. 1966); see also authorities cited infra note 20.
1996]
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The new John Doe is not a mere procedural formality. He provides
the plaintiff in many cases with the only means to pursue important
substantive rights. Some of the most momentous cases of the last quar-
ter century might not have been brought without the ability to desig-
nate a party by a fictitious name. For example, Norma McCorvey used
the pseudonym "Jane Roe" to challenge abortion laws in Roe v.
Wade.5 She had real privacy concerns. Even today, more than 20 years
later, controversy- sometimes lethal-still surrounds the case." As new
privacy concerns arise, such as those associated with AIDS and the
HIV virus, the need for pseudonymity grows.7
Although the pseudonymous plaintiff is perhaps the more well
known use of John Doe, it is John Doe as the unknown defendant who
more frequently helps plaintiffs. The most noted use of an unknown
defendant is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics," which established, for the first time, a victim's right
to seek a civil remedy against federal officers for violation of civil liber-
ties.9 The unknown defendant designation was essential. Webster Biv-
ens, like many other victims of civil rights violations, apparently could
not identify the specific officers who had arrested and assaulted him.
5. See 410 U.S. 113, 120 n.4 (1973). Norma McCorvey remained anonymous for more than
a decade following the Supreme Court's decision. In 1984, she began to use her name in public
support of abortion rights. See Steve Waldman & Ginny Carroll, Roe v. Roe, NEWSWEEK, Aug.
21, 1995, at 22, 22. In August 1995, her name again made headlines as she switched sides and
advocated restrictions on abortion. Id. at 22-24.
6. In 1994, for example, anti-abortion extremists shot and killed abortion clinic workers in
Pensacola, Fla., and Brookline, Mass. See Tamar Lewin, A Cause Worth Killing For? Debate
Splits Abortion Foes, N.Y. TIMEs, July 30, 1994, at 1, 26; Tamar Lewin, Abortion Providers
Attempt to Handle Growing Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1994, at 8.
7. See, e.g., Doe v. Mercy Health Corp. of Southeastern Pa., 150 F.R.D. 83 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (protecting plaintiff in HIV discrimination suit); Doe v. Prudential Ins. Co., 860 F. Supp.
243 (D. Md. 1993) (protecting plaintiff in suit for wrongful failure to reveal HIV-positive diagno-
sis); Doe v. Vanderbilt Univ., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 746 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (protecting plaintiff's
identity in AIDS-tainted blood product liability suit).
8. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The title to the action is misleading, however. Despite the ti-
tle-"Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics"-plaintiff Bivens did not
actually name the defendants in the caption of his complaint. He did not know their names. See
id. at 390 n.2.
9. Id. at 395-97. Bivens established a private cause of action against federal officers for
violations of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Id. Biv-
ens could not bring a claim under Section 1983 of the civil rights statutes because that section
only applies to unconstitutional acts by state, as opposed to federal, authorities. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1994) ("Every person who under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects.. . any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law .... ").
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Only by filing suit against "unknown" defendants was Bivens able to
identify, through court order, his alleged wrongdoers by their proper
names.
10
The new uses of John Doe parties took federal courts by surprise.
Neither the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure nor the Judiciary Code
give courts guidance on the proper procedure for the use of Doe par-
ties."1 If anything, codified federal procedure is inconsistent with John
Doe practice, particularly the use of the Doe defendant. The Rules sim-
ply do not contemplate the case where a plaintiff does not know the
true identity of the defendant. For example, the rules require the plain-
tiff to plead the "names of all of the parties. ' 2 The plaintiff cannot
plead the defendant's name if he does not know it. Furthermore, the
plaintiff also cannot set proper jurisdiction and venue in some Doe de-
fendant cases. When the plaintiff seeks to rely upon the court's diver-
sity jurisdiction, he must allege the state of citizenship of each party.13
Similarly, to use one of the two primary bases of venue, the plaintiff
must know where each defendant resides.14 Thus, forum selection is
difficult, if not impossible, where the plaintiff does not know the actual
identity of the John Doe defendant.
Even if the plaintiff succeeds in filing a complaint against a John
10. After Bivens filed suit against the unknown defendants, the district court ordered that
the complaint be served on "those federal agents who it is indicated by the records of the United
States Attorney participated in the [arrest of plaintiff Bivens]." 403 U.S. at 390 n.2.
11. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1-481, 1330-68 (1994) (setting forth statutory provisions relating to
the organization of federal courts, jurisdiction of the district courts, and civil litigation); FED. R.
Civ. P. 1-86.
12. FED. R_ Civ. P. 10(a) provides as follows:
(a) Captions; Names of Parties. Every pleading shall contain a caption setting forth
the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, and a designation as in Rule
7(a). In the complaint the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties, but
in other pleadings it is sufficient to state the name of the first party on each side with an
appropriate indication of other parties.
13. "[W]hen jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, the pleader must allege the
existence of both diversity and the requisite amount in controversy .... If a party is a natural
person, the complaint should allege that he is a citizen of a particular state." 5 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1208, at 100 (2d ed.
1990); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994) (stating that the "district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$50,000 ...and is between (1) citizens of different states. ... ); 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b)
(1994) (providing for removal of actions from state court that meet the section 1332 criteria if no
defendant is a citizen of the state in which the action is brought).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1), (b)(1) (providing that in both diversity and federal question
actions, for purposes of venue, a civil action may be brought in the district where any defendant
resides, if all of the defendants reside in the same state).
19961
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Doe defendant, the plaintiff confronts yet another procedural obstacle
when he tries to substitute the actual defendant for the John Doe. If
the statute of limitations deadline has passed, which usually is the case,
the plaintiff must invoke the doctrine of "relation back" to save the
claim. Relation back is a fiction by which courts treat an amendment
to a complaint as if it were part of the original timely complaint. Fed-
eral Rule 15(c), which governs relation back of federal pleadings, lim-
its amendments changing defendants after the limitations period to
cases where the plaintiff initially made a "mistake" in naming the de-
fendant.15 Therefore, under the literal language of the rule, the plaintiff
cannot substitute the true defendant for the John Doe after the limita-
tions period because the plaintiff's naming of the Doe in the first place
was not a mistake.le Yet, most plaintiffs who use John Doe defendants
must try to rely on the doctrine of relation back because the limitations
period will expire before they can properly identify the Doe defendant.
Since the mid-1960s, federal litigants, with increasing frequency,
have named John Doe parties in civil complaints 17 forcing federal
courts to try to reconcile Doe practice with the inconsistent provisions
of federal civil procedure. Their efforts have failed. Courts have set
conflicting standards for Doe practice. For example, the Seventh Cir-
cuit forbids relation back of Doe substitutions under Rule 15(c), but
the Third Circuit allows it.18 Thus, civil rights plaintiffs in Philadelphia
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) provides that:
An amendment of a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when
(1) relation back is permitted by the law that provides the statute of limitations appli-
cable to the action, or
(2) the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, or
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a
claim is asserted if the foregoing provision (2) is satisfied and, within the period provided
by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by
amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will
not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and (B) knew or should have
known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would
have been brought against the party.
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or United States
Attorney's designee, or the Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer
who would have been a proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of subpara-
graphs (A) and (B) of this paragraph (3) with respect to the United States or any agency
or officer thereof to be brought into the action as a defendant.
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(B).
17. See supra note 2.
18. Compare Wood v. Worachek, 618 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that lack of
knowledge reflected in Doe allegations is not a mistake within the meaning of Rule 15(c));
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may file suit in federal court against unknown police officers, use civil
discovery to identify them, and then formally name the officers as de-
fendants after the limitations period has expired, while civil rights
plaintiffs in Chicago may not. This is not a trivial procedural differ-
ence. Federal litigants in Chicago lose claims that litigants in other
courts may pursue. Moreover, the ill effects of this distinction are not
limited to Doe cases. By redefining Rule 15(c) to fit Doe practice,
courts on both extremes have distorted the rule and diluted its effec-
tiveness in all cases, even non-Doe suits.19
This article offers a solution to the relation back conflict and the
other problems facing Doe practice in federal court: incorporate John
Doe parties into the procedural rules. Candid recognition of the reality
of Doe practice will eliminate the current state of confusion and pre-
serve the integrity of existing rules. In advocating this reform, the arti-
cle first puts John Doe practice in context. Part II traces the origin of
John Doe and explains how two independent developments in federal
practice in the mid-1960s, relaxation of federal relation back standards
and recognition of federal privacy rights, coincided to cause an explo-
sion of Doe practice in federal court. Next, part III details how federal
courts have tried-without success-to reconcile the new Doe parties
with a procedural scheme not equipped to handle Doe practice. Finally,
part IV of this article proposes specific rule and code changes that will
cure these problems and give federal courts the guidance they need on
Doe party practice.
II. THE MODERN JOHN DOE: His EMERGENCE AND DUAL
FUNCTIONS IN FEDERAL COURT
The precise date that John Doe first appeared in civil litigation is
not known, but he was firmly entrenched in the English common law
by the 17th century. 0 Then, as today, he helped parties bring actions
that they might not otherwise pursue. When common law litigants did
not fit neatly into one of the prescribed writs of action, they sidestepped
Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1977) (allowing relation back of Doe
substitution so long as other elements of Rule 15(c) are met); see also discussion infra part
III.C.1.
19. See generally discussion infra part III.C.
20. See 7 SIR WILLA.M HoswoRTM. A HIMSTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 10-15 (2d ed. 1937);
Mitchell Dawson, The Lives and Adventures of John Doe and Richard Roe, Ci. BAR RECORD,
reprinted in Frank W. Grinnel, John Doe and Richard Roe-Their Portraits, Their History,
Their Services in the Advancement of Justice Through the Rulemaking Power of the Courts,
MASS. L.Q., Aug. 1935, at 26, 27.
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the problem by creating an entirely fictional character, typically named
John Doe,21 to bring or defend suits on their behalf.22 This tradition
continued in the United States until the mid-19th century, when re-
formers began to simplify pleading. In 1848, David Field revamped the
New York Code of Civil Procedure,28 and his "Field Code" became the
model for "code pleading" reform throughout the country.2' The Field
Code abolished all existing forms of pleading,2 5 but John Doe did not
21. Common law pleaders used other names as well, but they most frequently chose "John
Doe." See Dawson, supra note 20, at 28. One legal historian notes that Doe was a "relatively rare
surname in old England" and speculates that the fictional "John Doe" was an outgrowth of the
verb "do," which the Elizabethan English variably spelled as "doo," "do," or "doe." David Mel-
linkoff, Who is John Doe?, 12 UCLA L. REv. 79, 84-85 (1964). The oath "I do" also may have
been a source because John was spelled often with an "I" rather than "J," and "John Doe"
therefore was abbreviated as "I. Doe." See id. at 86. The pleaders also may have delighted in
employing John Doe as a pun on the use of the verb "do" as a term for copulate, or on the name
of a Dutch coin called a "doit," which had no value. Id.
22. Landowners, for example, frequently used John Doe in ejectment actions brought to
quiet title. 7 HOLuSWORTH, supra note 20, at 10-15. Under the writ system, only tenants could
use ejectment actions. See id. at 10-12. A landowner who wanted to quiet title had to use the
"real" form of action that was slower than an ejectment action and did not allow a jury trial. See
Larry L. TEPLEY & RALPH U. WmTrEN, CIVIL PROCEDURE 381-82 (1991). Landowners got
around this bar by creating a mythical tenant, John Doe, to bring the ejectment action on their
behalf. See Craft v. Lathrop, 6 F. Cas. 702, 704-05 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (discussing John Doe
ejectment action procedure). John Doe also served as security for civil defendants. See Dawson,
supra note 20, at 28, 33-34 (John Doe and Richard Roe "did not rest content with the reputation
gained from their sham battles in ejectment actions but adventured into other fields of the law
offering themselves as pledges or bail in all manner of actions" and they foreshadowed "a most
important era in English history and English law" that marked "the boundary line of barbarism
and modem civilization.").
23. Act of April 12, 1848, ch. 379, §§ 1-391, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497. The Field Code was
amended in 1849 and then again in 1851, the latter of which returned some parts of the code back
to the 1848 form. 1851 N.Y. CODE OF PRATICE 10 (Voorhies ed.); see Mildred V. Coe & Lewis
W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q.
238, 242-44 (1942).
24. Within 25 years of the original enactment of the Field Code, 24 states and territories
had adopted it as their code of procedure. See Comment, Unknown Parties: The John Doe De-
fendant, 1970 LAW & Soc. ORD. 256, 258 n.14 [hereinafter The John Doe Defendant] (citing
these jurisdictions by date of enactment).
25. "All the forms of pleading heretofore existing are abolished. Act of April 12,
1848, ch. 379, § 118, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 521. The abolition of the ancient practice of Doe
ejectment prompted one poet to prematurely proclaim the death of John Doe and Richard Roe:
Well I know them; naught I owe them;
Off, in ejectment (blow them!)
Roe I have cursed and Doe have damned;
Law that made doth o'er throw them,
And now to die they are condemned.
Dawson, supra note 20, at 29 (quoting an anonymous poet from Punch). Not all states joined in
the code pleading reform, so the mythical John Doe survived for many years in some states in his
common law "pre-code" form. See, e.g., Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643, 643 n.1 (1962) (eject-
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die under code pleading. The Field Code created another use for him.
If the plaintiff did not know the complete and correct name of an ac-
tual defendant " he could designate that defendant by a fictitious name,
ment action begun in federal court in which the original pleading used the common law John Doe
form of pleading still in use in Georgia in the 1960s).
26. The previous common law practice did not permit the plaintiff to designate an actual
person by anything other than his true and complete name. See Ehnendorf v. DeLancey, 1 Hopk.
Ch. 555, 556 (N.Y. Ch. 1825) ("When it is uncertain who are complainants, or who are the
persons called to answer, the suit is fundamentally defective; and if the parties are not clearly
designated, it is the fault of him who instituted the suit."); The John Doe Defendant, supra note
24, at 256-57 ("If the plaintiff stated incorrectly any part of the defendant's legal name, the
action was subject to a plea in abatement, and a default judgment would be void.") (citation
omitted).
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such as John Doe.2 7 The Field Code thus transformed John Doe from a
pure legal fiction into a pseudonym for actual persons.2
Early John Doe practice developed principally in the state courts,
not federal courts. Before the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
"conformity" statutes required each federal court hearing cases at law
27. "When the plaintiff shall be ignorant of the name of a defendant, such defendant may
be designated in any pleading or proceeding, by any name; and when his true name shall be
discovered, the pleading or proceeding may be amended accordingly." Act of April 12, 1848, ch.
379, § 150, 1848 N.Y. Laws 497, 526; The John Doe Defendant, supra note 24, at 258. Today,
the majority of states have unknown defendant provision's that are similar or identical to this
Field Code provision. Some states incorporate Doe pleading in their statutory codes. See CAL CiV.
PROC. CODE § 474 (West 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-10(a)(1993); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 651; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223 § 19 (West 1990); MONT. CODE ANN. § 25-5-103
(1995); NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-321 (1984); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 509:7 (1983); N.Y. Cv.
PRtc. L. & R. § 1024 (McKimey 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-166 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-
5-20 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 807.12 (West 1977). Others put Doe pleading in their Rules of
Civil Procedure. See ALA. R. Civ. P. 9(h); ARIz. R Civ. P. 10(f); HAW. R. Civ. P. 17(d); IDAHO
R. Civ. P. 10(a)(4); IND. R. TRIAL P. 17(F); MINN. R. Civ. P. 9.08; Miss. R. Civ. P. 9(h); Nav. R.
Civ. P. 10(a); N.D. R. Civ. P. 9(h); OHIO R. Civ. P. 15(D); OR. R. Civ. P. 20(h); P.R1R. Civ. P.
15.4; S.C. R. Cv. P. 10(a)(1); S.D. R. Civ. P. 15-6-9(h); UTAH R. Civ. P. 9(a)(2); WASH. SUPER.
CT. R. Civ. P. 10(a)(2); Wyo. R. Civ. P. 17(d). Some states have no statutory or rule authority at
all but instead endorse Doe defendant pleading by judicial decree. See, e.g., Farmer v. Alaska,
788 P.2d 43 (Alaska 1990); Maddux v. Gardner, 192 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945); DeVargas
v. State, 640 P.2d 1327 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981), cert. granted, 642 P.2d 166 (N.M. 1982); Goolsby
v. Papanikolau, 637 A.2d 707 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 651 A.2d 493 (Pa. 1995).
Only a very few states expressly reject Doe pleading. See Kerr v. Doe, 1994 WL 146649, at 1
(Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 1994) (noting that Connecticut practice does not permit actions
against John Doe defendants); Hutchison v. Fish Eng. Corp., 153 A.2d 594, 595 (Del. Ch. 1959)
("[D]efendants have attacked the inclusion of the Doe defendants and under our practice I do not
think it is permissible."), appeal dismissed, 162 A.2d 722 (Del. Super. Ct. 1960); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Bringol, 262 So. 2d 532, 536 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that the pleading
rules contemplate "real persons" and therefore do not permit fictitious party pleading). A few
states do not allow general Doe defendant pleading but allow unknown heirs or claimants as par-
ties in actions in rem. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-413 (Michie 1993) (providing
for service by publication of "unknown owners, or unknown heirs or legatees" upon affidavit that
the names are unknown); see also MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.201(D). Finally, the remaining states have
no express declaration either way, but Doe parties occasionally appear in their courts with little or
no published commentary by the court. See Kansas ex rel. Ferguson v. Kansas Super Motels, Inc.,
398 P.2d 331 (Kan. 1965) (action to enjoin named and unnamed defendants); M.R. v. Cox, 881
P.2d 108 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) (both anonymous plaintiff and Doe employee defendants), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1365 (1995); Lebovitz v. Bearden, 1993 WL 471479, at 4 n.1 (Tenn. App.
Nov. 16, 1993) (noting presence of unknown employee defendant whose identity "was to be sup-
plied when ascertained" but who was never identified); Rollo v. State, 421 A.2d 1298 (Vt. 1980)
(negligence action against unknown state employee); Padon v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 411 S.E.2d
245 (W. Va. 1991) (defamation claim against unknown Sears employee).
28. However, the Field Code John Doe provision applied only to defendants unknown to the
plaintiff, not to known parties who wanted to remain anonymous. See supra note 27. With rare
exceptions, the pseudonymous plaintiff is a modem phenomenon that grew out of federal privacy
right litigation in the mid-1960s. See infra notes 77-88 and accompanying text.
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to use the local procedures of the state where the federal court sat. 9
Therefore, to the extent that state courts used John Doe parties,
whether the mythical John Doe of common law or the unknown de-
fendant of code pleading, the federal courts did also.30 On the equity
side, none of the formal federal Equity Rules addressed Doe parties,"'
but federal equity courts tended to follow the equitable prohibition
against making an unknown person a defendant to an action.32 In 1938,
29. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93 (providing that in actions at law, federal
courts must use the procedure of the state in which the federal court sits).
30. Even under the conformity statutes, federal courts did not immediately follow the state
code pleading reforms of the mid-19th century. Federal law originally required "static conform-
ity" whereby federal courts followed state procedure as of a date certain, often causing the federal
court to use outdated procedure. See generally CHARLES A. WmGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§ 61, at 399-400 (4th ed. 1991). For example, when New York state courts began to follow the
Field Code in 1848, a federal court in New York was bound to follow the old New York common
law procedure. Id. at 400-01. In 1872, Congress finally provided for dynamic conformity by which
federal courts could follow modern state procedure as it evolved. Id. at 401; Conformity Act of
June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197 (mandating that federal procedure in cases at law con-
form to the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding existing in the courts of the
state within which the circuit or district court is located). Only then were most federal courts
sitting at law able to use the code pleading form of the unknown Doe defendant in actions at law.
Because of this "static conformity," John Doe ejectment actions greatly outnumber the Doe de-
fendant cases in early federal case reporters. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Dickens v. Mahan, 62 U.S. (21
How.) 276 (1858) (common law ejectment action begun in federal court in the name of the myth-
ical tenant "John Doe") (same); Doe ex rel. McCall v. Carpenter, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 297 (1855)
(same); Doe ex rel. Clark v. Braden, 56 U.S. (16 How.) 327 (1853) (same); Drake v. Found
Treasure Mining Co., 53 F. 474 (C.C.D. Nev. 1892) (noting that John Doe and Richard Roe
were listed as defendants but that plaintiff made "no personal claims against them").
31. Three different sets of codified Federal Equity Rules governed federal equity practice
until 1938. The first, the 1822 set, had 33 rules. Fed. Equity R.P. 1-33, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat) v-xiil
(1822). The 1842 set had 92 rules. Fed. Equity R.P. 1-92, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xli-lxx (1842). The
final Federal Equity Rules, adopted in 1912, had 81 rules. Fed. Equity R.P. 1-81, 226 U.S. 629
(1912). None of the rules expressly addressed John Doe parties, one way or the other. Rule 20 of
the 1842 rules, however, required every bill of complaint to include "the names, places of abode,
and citizenship, of all parties, plaintiffs and defendants." Fed. Equity R.P. 20, 42 U.S. (I How.)
xlvii (1842). Rule 25 of the 1912 set replaced Rule 20 and provided that every bill of complaint
must contain "the full name, when known, of each plaintiff and defendant, and the citizenship and
residence of each party." Fed. Equity R.P. 25, 226 U.S. 629, 655 (1912). No court seems to have
relied upon the "when known" clause to justify or reject fictitious name pleading. The clause
qualified "full name" and likely referred to the case where plaintiff did not know the entire name
of the defendant. See, e.g., Wilson v. Robinson, 17 F.2d 1023 (9th Cir. 1927) ("Jane Doe" Robin-
son and "John Doe" Robinson).
32. Kentucky Silver Mining Co. v. Day, 14 F. Cas. 351 (C.C.D. Nev. 1873) (No. 7719), is
one of the few federal cases to directly address the propriety of Doe pleading under the Federal
Equity Rules. There, the court rejected a bill of complaint that named 147 John Doe defendants:
[N]o book of acknowledged authority... [permits] designating [unknown defend-
ants] in the bill by a fictitious name. I speak, of course, of the chancery practice unchanged
by statute. But the books do show us how to proceed when proper parties are unknown.
The difficulty is not overcome by making the unknown ones parties under a false name, but
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the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did little to clarify the status
of Doe practice; like the Equity Rules before them, the new Rules were
silent on the subject of Doe parties. 83 Without rule authority, courts
were initially hostile to the practice," but John Doe nevertheless con-
tinued to appear, sometimes unchallenged, in at least some federal civil
cases.3
In the mid-1960s, two separate developments in federal courts
took John Doe forever off the sidelines of civil litigation. Creative liti-
gants began to use John Doe in federal civil cases in two new ways.
First, plaintiffs used the John Doe defendant as a means to avoid a
limitations deadline. This use of John Doe depended on an expanded
form of the relation back doctrine that was not available until 1966
when rulemakers revised Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). Coin-
cidentally, at almost the same time, federal plaintiffs began to use John
Doe to hide their own identity. This new use was part of the bur-
geoning federal right-to-privacy litigation that began in 1965 when the
Supreme Court first recognized the privacy right under the U.S.
Constitution.
by dispensing with them altogether, if the suit can proceed without them, or by praying a
discovery for the purpose of bringing them before the court.
Id. at 352; see also United States v. Doe, 44 F.2d 850 (E.D.N.Y. 1930) (dismissing bill for
injunction against named owner of building and John Doe occupant on grounds that Doe was an
indispensable party who could not be identified and served without prior bill in discovery); Inman
v. New York Interurban Water Co., 131 F. 997 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1904) (praying for discovery of
John Doe defendant). Despite the general prohibition, some equitable bills of complaint in federal
court named John Doe as a defendant. See Tacoma Ry. & Power Co. v. Pacific Traction Co., 155
F. 259, 260 (1907) (bill of complaint named John Doe and Richard Roe and court noted only that
it never "acquired jurisdiction over the mythical John Doe and Richard Roe"); see also Surpass
Leather Co. v. Winters, 23 F. Supp. 776 (W.D.N.Y. 1938) (dismissing bill for injunction against
NLRB and John Doe police officers on grounds that district court lacked power to restrain the
NLRB and its officials without comment on propriety of Doe pleading); Shainwald v. Davids, 69
F. 701, 703-04 (N.D. Cal. 1895) (finding no personal jurisdiction over the new defendant, substi-
tuted for a John Doe defendant, but not questioning the propriety of the initial Doe designation).
33. See 308 U.S. 653 (1939).
34. See, e.g., Molnar v. National Broadcasting Co., 231 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1956).
35. Parties continued to name Doe parties, almost exclusively as defendants, at a slowly
increasing rate. A Westlaw computer search of all federal decisions, excluding bankruptcy cases
and criminal cases, from 1945 to 1966 shows 74 district court, 36 appellate court and 5 Supreme
Court decisions in which "John Doe" appears in the title. Search of Westlaw, Allfeds database
(April 11, 1996) (search terms: TI ("John Doe") & DATE AFT (1/1/45) & BEF (12/31/66)).
A search of the old federal case database reveals that only one decision with John Doe in the title
was rendered between the years 1938 and 1945. Search of Westlaw, Allfeds-old database (April
11, 1996) (search term: TI ("John Doe")).
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A. John Doe Defendant as a Form of Statute of Limitations Relief
Use of the John Doe defendant to avoid a statute of limitations
bar is a relatively modem phenomenon. Under most previous forms of
Doe defendant practice, in both state and federal courts, plaintiffs had
to timely serve the John Doe defendant just like any other defendant.36
Plaintiffs, however, could not serve a defendant whom they could not
identify. In 1966, federal rulemakers relaxed the requirement of timely
formal service when they expanded the federal relation back doctrine
by amending Rule 15(c).3 7 Under the new rule, the plaintiff, in certain
specified circumstances, can add a defendant after the limitations pe-
riod, even if he had not yet formally served that defendant. This
change opened the door for the new form of John Doe defendant prac-
tice in federal court.
1. Doe Defendants Under Traditional Statute of Limitations
Doctrine
Although John Doe defendants help some plaintiffs who do not
have time constraints, the Doe defendant is far more useful when cou-
pled with some form of relief from statutes of limitation. Civil rights
cases against unknown law enforcement officers, the most frequent use
of the Doe defendant in federal courts,3 8 best illustrates this reality.
Doe pleading enables the plaintiff to start a lawsuit even though he
36. See infra notes 45-52.
37. See supra notes 53-57.
38. Of the nearly 200 district court decisions rendered in 1993 which listed a John Doe
defendant in the title, approximately one-third involved civil rights suits. Search of Westlaw, DCT
database (April 11, 1996) (search terms: TI ("John Doe") and DA (1993)). Many more civil
rights plaintiffs do not use "John Doe" but instead follow the Bivens example and name "unknown
police officers" as their defendants. The evolution of civil rights actions may account, at least in
part, for the growing popularity of John Doe defendant suits. See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL
RIGHTs & CIVIL LiBERTiEs LITIGATION: A GUIDE TO SECTION 1983 § 2.02, at 35 (1979) (noting
early restrictive interpretations of Section 1983 that limited the ability to bring Section 1983 suits
from the time of the provision's enactment to the year 1961). Civil rights litigation expanded in
1978 when the Supreme Court overruled its prior reading of Section 1983 and held that munici-
palities were "persons" within the meaning of the statute and therefore subject to at least some
claims under Section 1983. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663
(1978). The ability to name the city likely made Doe defendant practice more desirable to civil
rights plaintiffs. Before Monell, when a plaintiff did not know the names of the police officers, he
had to file a Section 1983 claim solely against Doe defendants and not against their municipal
employer. Plaintiffs bringing such "phantom" actions would undoubtedly have found judicial hos-
tility. After Monell, the plaintiff, in at least some cases, could name both the city and the un-
known police officer as defendants and gain faster discovery of the officer's identity because the
entity with such knowledge-the city-was a named party to the suit. But see infra note 40.
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does not know the full and correct name of the officer or which specific
officer violated his rights. Otherwise, the plaintiff would be in a "Catch
22" situation. He cannot get the court's help in identifying the officer
until he files suit, but he cannot file suit without naming at least one
defendant.39 Plaintiff cannot just pick any officer at random to sue as
defendant. 40 Federal Rule 11, as well as standards of professional re-
sponsibility, mandate that the plaintiff have some basis for naming a
39. Filing suit is a prerequisite to the ability to conduct discovery. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure allow pre-filing discovery only in extraordinary circumstances to preserve evidence
but not to conduct general discovery to support a complaint. See FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a) (requiring
verified petition for leave to take pre-filing discovery); Nevada v. O'Leary, 151 F.R.D. 655, 657-
58 (D. Nev. 1993) (explaining that Rule 27 "was intended to apply to situations where, for one
reason or another, testimony might be lost to a prospective litigant unless taken immediately,
without waiting until after a suit or other legal proceeding is commenced," but was not designed
"for discovering grounds for bringing an action"), af'd, 63 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 1995). Some states
provide special discovery devices when a plaintiff does not know the identity of all of the defend-
ants. For example, Illinois' Respondents in Discovery statute permits plaintiffs in civil actions to
designate as "respondents in discovery" individuals or other entities in their pleadings whom the
plaintiff believes to have information essential to determining those who should be named as addi-
tional defendants in the action. See ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. ch. 735, para. 512-402 (Michie 1993).
But see Bogseth v. Emanuel, 655 N.E.2d 888, 892 (Ill. 1995) (holding that "since the common
law prohibits filing lawsuits against fictitious defendants, and since [the Respondents in Discovery
statute] does not provide clear, affirmative indication that . . . [John Doe] suits are permissible,
we cannot conclude that [the statute] permits suits to be brought against fictitious persons or
entities").
40. Suing the governmental employer of the officer is not always an option either. Although
the Supreme Court in Monell allowed claims against a city or other local government, see supra
note 38, a Section 1983 claim against the city cannot be based vicariously on the wrongs of the
officers. Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (holding that a municipality cannot be held liable under Section
1983 on a respondeat superior theory). Instead, civil rights plaintiffs must allege and prove that
the municipality itself violated the plaintiff's civil rights by establishing some form of policy or
practice that caused the violation. See id. at 694.
A plaintiff in a Bivens action also is constrained in whom he can sue. In the Bivens case itself,
the plaintiff could not have brought any claim against the United States or its official agencies due
to their sovereign immunity. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("However desirable a direct remedy against the Government
might be as a substitute for individual official liability, the sovereign still remains immune to
suit."). In 1975, Congress amended the Federal Torts Claim Act ("FTCA") to waive sovereign
immunity for suits arising from certain state law torts by federal law enforcement officers. 28
U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994) (allowing suits that arise out of "acts or omissions of investigative or
law enforcement officers of the United States Government" and claim "assault, battery, false,
imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution"). Even with this expansion,
however, Bivens claims against the individual officer and FTCA claims against the United States
government are not always coexistent. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 20, 22-23 (1980) (rec-
ognizing availability of suit against the federal government but noting that FTCA claims, unlike




particular person as a defendant.41 John Doe pleading provides the eth-
ical alternative to this dilemma.42 With Doe pleading, the plaintiff gets
to begin his lawsuit and start discovery while candidly acknowledging
that he does not yet know the correct identity of the defendant.
As a practical matter, however, the statute of limitations in most
cases restricts the plaintiff's ability to discover the identity of the un-
known officer.43 In Bivens, the trial court issued an order directing the
United States Attorney to immediately identify and serve the unnamed
federal agents." Most plaintiffs do not get this much help from the
court. They have to conduct their own discovery to identify the defend-
ants, and discovery takes time. The running of the statute of limitations
does not await the plaintiff's identification of the proper defendant.'5
41. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct mandate that a "lawyer shall not bring
... a proceeding ... unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.1 (1983). Federal Rule 11 similarly requires that the plaintiff
both conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry and certify that his complaint allegations "have evi-
dentiary support." FED. R. Civ. P. ll(b)(3). In Albright v. Upjohn Co., 788 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th
Cir. 1986), the court sanctioned the plaintiff under the 1983 version of Rule 11 for filing suit
against Upjohn without having any evidentiary basis that Upjohn had made the drug that was the
subject of the plaintiff's product liability suit. See also Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (finding violation of pre-1983 version of Rule 11
where plaintiffs selected defendants from the Philadelphia phone book). Rulemakers relaxed Rule
11 somewhat in 1993, but the plaintiff still cannot simply guess about the proper defendant. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1993 Amendment). In some extraordinary cases,
such as DES claims, a few courts do not require plaintiffs to prove the identity the particular
wrongdoer, but these courts only do so by modifying the substantive law of causation. See, e.g.,
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 170 (Mich.) (allowing plaintiff to use alternative liabil-
ity theory to avoid "the threshold requirement of any products liability action [to identify the]
manufacturer"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 833 (1984).
42. Cf. Wells v. HBO & Co., 813 F. Supp. 1561, 1567 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (sympathizing with
plaintiffs having to "steer a course between naming individuals in [a lawsuit] prematurely and
risking sanctions, and naming them too late and having an action foreclosed by the statute of
limitations").
43. Civil rights suits do not have their own statute of limitations, so federal courts must
borrow the state limitations period for personal injury claims. See, e.g., Wilson v. Garcia, 471
U.S. 261 (1985) (holding that federal courts must characterize Section 1983 claims as personal
injury actions for purposes of borrowing a state statute of limitation). These limitations periods
tend to be short. See Burgos Martinez v. Rivera Ortiz, 715 F. Supp. 419, 420 (D.P.R. 1989)
(applying Puerto Rico's one-year limitation period to Section 1983 claim).
44. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 390 n.2.
45. "There is a plethora of case law holding that the statute of limitations is not tolled
pending discovery of the identity of the alleged tortfeasor where all the other elements of the
cause of action exist." Thomas v. Process Equip. Corp., 397 N.W.2d 224, 228 (Mich. Ct. App.
1986) (quoting Reiterman v. Westinghouse, Inc., 308 N.W.2d 612, 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)
(finding that once plaintiff knew that her decedent's death was caused by faulty machinery, "it
was incumbent upon her to discover, within [the limitation period], the various manufacturers of
the possible faulty mechanisms.")).
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The discovery rule postpones accrual of the cause of action only for the
late discovery of the plaintiff's injury, not the identity of the
tortfeasor.4 6 Likewise, equitable tolling does not help a plaintiff who
simply does not know the identity of the alleged wrongdoer. Such toll-
ing requires some form of affirmative duty of, or active misdeed by, the
defendant. A defendant, even a law enforcement officer, generally has
no obligation to assist the plaintiff in learning his identity.47
Nor did traditional relation back doctrine help plaintiffs who had
to name the defendant officer as John Doe. Relation back is a fiction
that saves an otherwise late amendment to a pleading.48 The means by
46. As the Illinois Appellate Court stated:
[The discovery rule] represents the judiciary's attempt to alleviate the harsh results from
the literal application of statutes of limitations where plaintiffs are ignorant of their inju-
ries, such as in medical malpractice cases. The rule postpones the starting of the period of
limitations until the injured party knows of or should have known of his injury. However,
our courts have refused to extend the discovery rule to apply to cases where the undeter-
mined fact is not the existence of the injury, but rather the identity of the tortfeasor.
Jackson v. Village of Rosemont, 536 N.E.2d 720, 722 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (citations omitted),
appeal denied, 537 N.E.2d 810 (Ill. 1989); see also Jordan v. Tapper, 143 F.R.D. 575, 585-86
n.14 (D.N.J.) ("[T]he discovery rule is intended to toll the limitations period where plaintiff lacks
knowledge of a cause of action, not the identity of potential defendants."), appeal denied, 143
F.R.D. 567 (D.N.J. 1992).
47. See Messelt v. Security Storage Co., 14 F.R.D. 507, 513 (D. Del. 1953) ("Waiving
consideration of moral or ethical standards, I know of no legal principle compelling the [defend-
ant] to insist on being joined as a party before the statute of limitations had barred its legal
liability."). In Davis v. Frapolly, 742 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Ill. 1990), a Section 1983 suit, the court
explained what the defendant police officer can and cannot do to keep his identity secret:
Those who may benefit from a statute of limitation can have no part in preventing a poten-
tial claimant from learning their identity. Of course, unless under an affirmative duty, they
need not come forward voluntarily, unmasked. They may hide in the darkness caused by
the potential plaintiff's lack of knowledge of their identity. But they cannot, through acts or
omissions, in any way perpetuate the darkness.
Id. at 975. In Davis, the plaintiff tried to write down the officers' badge numbers at the time of
the arrest, but one of the officers took away his pen and paper. Id. The court held that this
"questionable conduct" justified equitable tolling even though attribution of the acts of one police
officer to another was a "novel" application of the doctrine. Id. at 974 -75. Similarly, the court in
Fludd v. United States Secret Serv., 102 F.R.D. 803 (D.D.C. 1984) tolled the limitations period
in a Bivens action because the Secret Service refused to supply the names of its agents even after
Fludd filed both a request and a lawsuit under the Freedom of Information Act: "[w]hile to be
sure, the government's deletion of the agents' names in response to plaintiff's FOIA request was
not fraudulent, it does constitute the kind of deliberate concealment of material facts which a
court of equity would be justified in regarding as tolling the statute of limitations." Id. at 806.
48. Relation back in federal courts is governed by Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See supra note 15 for the entire text of the current Rule 15(c). Unlike the discovery
rule for accrual or the equitable tolling doctrine, relation back neither postpones the start of limi-
tations period nor tolls it, but instead tests whether the plaintiff has otherwise met the limitations
deadline. See Kansas Reins. Co. v. Congressional Mortgage Corp. of Tex., 20 F.3d 1362, 1367
(5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the " 'relation back' doctrine 'does not extend the limitations period,
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which the plaintiff substitutes the defendant's real name for John Doe
is an amendment. If that amendment meets the criteria for relation
back, the court will consider it part of the original timely pleading,
even if the amendment itself came after the limitations period.49 Under
traditional relation back doctrine, the plaintiff could not make an
amendment changing the defendant after the limitations period had ex-
pired if he had not served that defendant before the limitations period
expired. 0 The plaintiff, therefore, could not substitute the real name of
but merely recognizes that, the purposes of the statute [of limitations] are accomplished by the
filing of the initial pleading.' ") (citations omitted). Nevertheless, commentators and courts often
confuse the concepts and, when considering relation back, rely on factors such as a defendant's
deception that are relevant to other doctrines such as equitable tolling. See, e.g., Hafferman v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 423, 429 (D.D.C. 1986) ("[P]laintiffs' amendment of the
complaint is deemed to relate back since it appears Westinghouse misled plaintiffs.").
49. Relation back is a "defense" to a defense; it saves a plaintiff's claim against a defense
based on a statute of limitation. The issue may arise on the plaintiff's original motion to amend or
in response to the defendant's motion to dismiss the new claim on limitations grounds. Techni-
cally, whether an amendment relates back and avoids a statute of limitations defense is a separate
question from whether the amendment itself is proper. Federal Rule 15(a) governs amendments to
federal pleadings generally, and in many circumstances, such as when defendant already has an-
swered, requires the plaintiff to seek leave of court in order to amend his complaint. FED. R. Civ.
P. 15(a). The following considerations influence whether the court will grant leave to amend:
Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires;"
this mandate is to be heeded .... In the absence of any apparent or declared reason-such
as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to
cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party
by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.-the amendment
sought should, as the rules require, be "freely given."
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Under this analysis, relation back is relevant to
whether the amendment would be futile, but that is just one factor in the Rule 15(a) analysis.
Moreover, where the amendment adds a new defendant, relation back may not even be at issue on
the motion to amend because the new defendant is not present to oppose the motion on limitations
grounds.
50. See Mellon v. Arkansas Land & Lumber Co., 275 U.S. 460, 463 (1928) (holding that
where substitution of the defendant was "not the correction of an error in the name of the defend-
ant, but the bringing in of a different defendant, [it] was in effect the commencement of a new
and independent proceeding against him."); Annotation, Amendment of Process or Pleading by
Changing or Correcting Mistake in Name of Party, 124 A.L.R. 86, 87 (1940) (summarizing early
state law permitting amendments to cure misnomer of party after the limitations period and con-
cluding that if the right party is before the court but under a wrong name, the plaintiff will be
permitted to amend and cure the misnomer). Originally, relation back was a case law doctrine and
was not codified, but in 1938, federal rulemakers put relation back into Rule 15(c). See FED. R
Civ. P. 15(c), 308 U.S. 683 (1939) (allowing relation back when the new claim arose out of the
same "conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading"). The 1938 rule effected a subtle change in relation back standards, by shifting the
focus to the "operative facts" asserted in the original complaint, but otherwise, the new rule codi-
fied the conventional common law relation back doctrine. See Harold S. Lewis, Jr., The Excessive
History of Federal Rule 15(c) and Its Lessons for Civil Rules Revision, 85 MICH. L. Rav. 1507,
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the defendant for John Doe unless he had already timely served that
defendant. 51 In most cases, the plaintiff did not know enough about a
1513 (1987) (noting that prior to the promulgation of Rule 15(c), federal and state courts tended
to look to whether the amendment stated a "new cause of action," which was subject to "a great
deal of definitional litigation involving the concept of 'cause of action.' "). Under the new rule, as
under the preceding judicial doctrine, any amendment that "added" a defendant whom plaintiff
had not already timely served created a new cause of action and did not relate back. See
Oliefabrik v. A.O. Smith Corp., 22 F.R.D. 33, 36 (E.D. Wis. 1958) ("[A]mendment with relation
back is generally allowed in order to correct a misnomer of defendant where the proper defendant
is already in court and the effect is merely to correct the name under which he is sued. But a new
defendant cannot normally be substituted or added by amendment after the statute of limitations
has run."); Messelt v. Security Storage Co., 14 F.R.D. 507, 512 (D. Del. 1953) ("It has often
been held that an 'amendment' bringing in new parties, as contrasted with one correcting a misno-
mer of a party already before the court, does not relate back in time to the filing of the original
complaint but is akin to the institution of a new action against the new parties."); Note, Federal
Rule 15(c) and the Doctrine of Substantive Conformity, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 648, 655 n.48 (1959)
("Where a rule 15 amendment seeks to change the name of the defendant after the statute of
limitation has run, the courts generally have stated that the amendment will relate back if it
merely corrects the name of a party already before the court, but will not relate back if it would
add a new party.").
51. Prior to the late 1960s, very few federal cases addressed relation back of a Doe substitu-
tion. See Phillip v. Sam Finley, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 292, 294 (W.D. Va. 1967) (applying pre-1966
Rule 15(c) relation back standards and holding that plaintiff could not toll the running of the
statute of limitations by filing a complaint against "some fictional character"); Fematt v. Nedlloyd
Line, 191 F. Supp. 907, 910 (S.D. Cal. 1961) (denying Doe substitution in action removed from
California state court because "the use of fictitious parties in the federal courts is not recognized"
and because plaintiff had not met the pleading requirements of the California Doe defendant
statute); National Nut Co. of Cal. v. Kelling Nut Co., 61 F. Supp. 76, 79 (N.D. l. 1945) ("If
the plaintiff can subsequently join any additional defendants by name, the fact that there are
certain fictitious defendants named herein will not assist the plaintiff nor will it serve as any basis
for not serving with process any additional defendants herein."). One of the most expansive dis-
cussions of the issue was in Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1959). There, the plaintiff
charged that certain named and unnamed (John Doe, Jane Doe and Richard Roe) defendants
conspired to incarcerate him in a mental hospital and deprive him of his civil rights. Id. at 286-87.
When the plaintiff eventually named two of the unknown defendants, the court held that the
amended claims were barred by the statute of limitations:
The general rule is that amendment of a complaint dates back to the filing of the
original complaint. Where the same defendant named in an amended complaint was named
in the original complaint, no problem is ordinarily presented. But where new defendants
are brought in after the running of the statute of limitations, the situation is entirely differ-
ent. Where a defendant has been sued in a wrong capacity in an original complaint, an
amended complaint filed beyond the statute of limitations has been held good, as against
the plea of the statute.
But where new defendants are brought into the action, without previous notice or ser-
vice of process, a different situation exists. This is like the institution of a new action
against the new parties.
Id. at 304 (citations omitted). This holding was consistent with the practice under the Field Code,
whereby the plaintiff had to serve every defendant, including Doe defendants, within the limita-
tions period. Cf Green v. County of Fulton, 511 N.Y.S.2d 150, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (hold-
ing that plaintiff's adherence to "the procedure for naming unknown parties as set forth in CPLR
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John Doe defendant to timely serve him, so plaintiffs had little incen-
tive to name John Doe defendants.
52
2. Doe Defendant Substitutions Under the 1966 Expanded Rela-
tion Back Rule
By the early 1960s, critics began to attack the strict relation back
standards. Their concern came from cases where plaintiffs had mistak-
enly named the wrong defendant, especially the wrong governmental
defendant.53 Strict adherence to prior formal service as the criteria for
adding "new" defendants caused inequitable results in some cases of
mistake. The plaintiff could lose his claim against a potential defendant
even though that defendant, through means other than formal service,
knew all along that the plaintiff meant to sue him but had made a
mistake in naming him as defendant.5
4
In 1966, federal rulemakers amended Rule 15(c) and alleviated
the harshness of the old rule.5 5 The changed Rule 15(c) allows an
§ 1024 [New York's successor statute to the original Field Code unknown defendant provision]..
does not serve to toll the Statute of Limitations" and that claims were time-barred where plain-
tiff failed to timely and formally serve the deputies that plaintiff later sought to substitute for Doe
defendants). See generally Stephen D. Easton, Note, Doe Defendants and Other State Relation
Back Doctrines in Federal Diversity Cases, 35 STAN. L. Rav. 297, 301 (1983) ("The plaintiff
must serve the 'fictitiously named defendant,' thereby identifying him and notifying him that he is
a party to the suit. In this situation, subsequent amendment of the complaint, substituting the
defendant's name for 'John Doe,' does not really add a defendant. Rather, it states the name of a
defendant who had been a party to the suit from the beginning.").
52. Doe defendant pleading gave plaintiffs a narrow form of relief from statutes of limita-
tion under traditional relation back doctrine. It gave such relief to plaintiffs who could identify,
but not name, the defendant. If the plaintiff could sufficiently identify John Doe so that he could
serve John Doe with process, even though he did not know the defendant's proper name, the
plaintiff got relation back once he determined the defendant's true name.
53. Professor Clark Byse wrote a leading article critical of traditional relation back stan-
dards as applied to plaintiffs who made mistakes in naming governmental defendants. See Clark
Byse, Suing the "Wrong" Defendant in Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Pro-
posals for Reform, 77 HARV. L. Rav. 40, 40 (1963). Professor Byse cited cases where plaintiffs
seeking judicial review of denials of social security benefits had not correctly named the incum-
bent Secretary of Health Education & Welfare as defendant. Id. Even though the correct defend-
ant had adequate notice of the suits, the courts denied relation back of plaintiffs' amendments
naming the Secretary because the plaintiffs had not timely named and served him in particular.
Id. at 41. Thus, in these cases, the plaintiffs lost their claims altogether.
54. In some cases, courts fashioned their own relief to this dilemma. They created an often
confusing doctrine of "identity of interest," whereby a party that was sufficiently related to the
named defendant, such as a related corporate entity, could be added to the suit even without prior
service. See Lewis, supra note 50, at 1514.
55. In reforming Rule 15(c), rulemakers expressly credited the concerns raised by Professor
Byse. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note (1966 Amendment, 39 F.R.D. 83); see also
Byse, supra note 53, at 45-52. Professor Byse proposed a special relation back rule for actions
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amendment changing defendants if the claims asserted against the new
defendant arose out of the same transaction as the original claim, and
if "within the period provided by law for commencing an action against
him,"581 the new defendant:
(1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not
be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and
(2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the iden-
tity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against him.5
7
These two clauses relaxed the timely service requirements for defend-
ants added by amendment.58 In the cases that meet the criteria of the
against the United States, its agencies, or officers in which service on one was effective notice as to
the correct governmental entity. Id. at 55-56. He also suggested more liberal relation back for
private parties. Id. at 56 n.42. The drafters adopted both of his suggestions. See FED. I Civ. P.
15(c) advisory committee's note (1966 Amendment, 39 F.R.D. 82, 83) (citing Professor Byse and
noting that "Rule 15(c) has been amplified to provide a general solution" to his other concerns);
see also Paul D. Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989
DUKE LJ. 281, 311 (1989) ("The 1966 addition served the specific purpose of terminating the
Justice Department's practice of invoking time limitations against plaintiffs who commenced
timely actions against the wrong officer or agency [and served] the general purpose of liberalizing
the availability of relation back for plaintiffs who timely commenced suits against the wrong de-
fendants and whose mistakes were known to the intended defendants.").
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), 39 F.R.D. 82, 82 (1966). The meaning of this new timing provi-
sion caused much confusion, and in 1991, rulemakers redefined the notice period. See infra notes
169-71 and accompanying text.
57. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c), 39 F.R.D. 82, 82 (1966). Rule 15(c), as amended in 1966, read in
full:
(c) Relation Back of Amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or at-
tempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading. An amendment changing the parties against whom a claim is as-
serted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by
law for commencing an action against him, the party to be brought in amendment (1) has
received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in main-
taining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a
mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought
against him.
The delivery or mailing of process to the United States Attorney, or his designee, or
the Attorney General of the United States, or an agency or officer who would have been a
proper defendant if named, satisfies the requirement of clauses (1) and (2) hereof with
respect to the United States or any agency or officer thereof to be brought into the action
as a defendant.
In 1991, rulemakers repackaged Rule 15(c) and moved the notice and mistake clauses to new
subsections (A) and (B) of Rule 15(c)(3). See infra note 167. To review the current text of Rule
15(c), see supra note 15.
58. Rulemakers did not eliminate the requirement of formal service altogether. At some
point, the plaintiff has to formally name the defendant in an amended complaint and serve the
defendant with that amended complaint, unless the defendant waives service. Otherwise, the plain-
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notice and mistake clauses, the plaintiff can add a new defendant after
the limitations period even if the plaintiff had not previously served
that defendant."'
The new rule did not abrogate statutes of limitation. To the con-
trary, rulemakers carefully crafted the notice and mistake clauses of
new Rule 15(c) to protect the two primary substantive aims of statutes
of limitation-notice and repose.60 Limitations statutes require timely
tiff cannot get a binding personal judgment against that defendant. See generally RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) ON JUDG MENTS § 34 (1980) (stating that only a "party" is bound by judgments and
only a person "who is named" and "subjected to the jurisdiction of the court is a party to the
action").
59. In some very select cases, whether new Rule 15(c) relaxes the requirement of timely
formal service presents a difficult question of conflict between state and federal law. See generally
discussion infra notes 212-14, 225. Like any form of relation back, the plaintiff under the 1966
version of Rule 15(c) must first file a timely complaint to which the amendment can relate back.
See supra note 57. In many states, filing the complaint alone stops the limitations period from
running. See, e.g., ILL Comp. STAT. ch. 735, § 5/2-201 (1993); ARK. R. Civ. P. 3; ALASKA R.
Civ. P. 3; ARiz. R. Civ. P. 3; IND. R. TRIAL P. 3; IowA R. Civ. P. 48; Mo. R. Civ. P. 53.01; MASS.
R. Civ. P. 3. However, some states still follow the original Field Code model and provide that an
action is not commenced until the plaintiff both files the complaint and serves it on the defendant.
E.g., Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01; see also supra note 51. Although the federal rules take the former
approach and define commencement as filing only, see FED. 1. Civ. P. 3, the Supreme Court has
directed that a federal court must apply the state rule when determining whether the claim is
timely under that state's statute of limitations. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740,
748-51 (1980) (finding that Federal Rule 3 did not govern tolling of limitations period and apply-
ing Oklahoma service commencement rule to bar claim that plaintiff filed but did not serve within
the limitations period). Whether that deference to the state service-commencement rule also ex-
tends to application of relation back is an open question. See Florence v. Krasucki, 533 F. Supp.
1047, 1051 (W.D.N.Y. 1982) (acknowledging lack of other cases examining impact of Walker on
Federal Rule 15(c) and holding that federal notice and mistake standards should apply in lieu of
service-triggered New York statute). See also infra note 229.
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note (1966 Amendments, 39 F.R.D. 82, 83)
("[t]he policy of the statute limiting the time for suit... [is] not offended by allowing relation
back in the situations" allowed by new Rule 15(c)). The court in Yorden v. Flaste, 374 F. Supp.
516 (D. Del. 1974), explained the relationship between Rule 15(c) and statute of limitations
policies:
Rule 15 had been carefully drafted to defer to the policies underlying such statutes [of
limitations]. Those statutes compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable
time so that: (1) a defendant will have a fair opportunity to prepare an adequate defense;
(2) the defendant will be protected from the insecurity generated by the fear of litigation
pending in perpetuity; (3) the judicial system will be free from stale claims; and (4) the
marketplace will be free from the uncertainty of long pending and unsettled claims. Theo-
retically, once the person has adequate notice that someone is attempting to set up a claim
against him, the policy interests behind the statute of limitations are served and strict ap-
plication of the statutory provisions is unwarranted.
Id. at 520; see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 103, 106 (10th Cir. 1967)
(noting that the purpose of the 1966 amendment to Rule 15(c) was to protect the added party's
rights "by enumeration of the conditions that must be satisfied before relation back of the amend-
ment will be allowed").
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notice of a lawsuit in order to ensure that a defendant can protect
against lost or stale evidence and not suffer prejudice at trial due to the
plaintiff's delay.61 For the same reasons, the notice prong of Rule 15(c)
also requires that the new defendant have adequate and timely notice
of the suit. But that notice need not be formal service. Instead, under
the notice clause of Rule 15(c), the court inquires as to whether the
informal notice protected the defendant from being "prejudiced in
maintaining a defense on the merits"6 2 - precisely the goal of statutes
of limitation.
The mistake clause of Rule 15(c) safeguards the second aim of
statutes of limitation -repose -by ensuring not only that the new de-
fendant know of the lawsuit but also that he appreciates that he is an
intended defendant in that action.63 Even if defendant has notice of the
suit and has carefully preserved all potential evidence, statutes of limi-
tation provide the added benefit of certainty. Unless he knows that
61.
Statutes of limitations find their justification in necessity and convenience rather than in
logic. They represent expedients rather that principles. They are practical and pragmatic
devices to spare the courts from litigation of stale claims, and the citizen from being put to
his defense after memories have faded, witnesses have died or disappeared and evidence
has been lost.
Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(A). The sufficiency of notice under Rule 15(c) has developed
its own body of law. For example, most courts hold that the notice requirement of Rule 15(c)
necessitates knowledge of the actual filing of the lawsuit, rather than notice merely of the underly-
ing incident giving rise to the suit. See, e.g., Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854, 858 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969). An area of intense debate is whether the defendant can be
sufficiently protected even if he personally did not receive the notice. The Second Circuit imputes
notice from an original defendant to the new defendant if they shared counsel or have other simi-
larity of interests. See, e.g., Gleason v. McBride, 869 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
court may impute notice through attorney if attorney understood that the new defendant would be
added); Hodge v. Ruperto, 739 F. Supp. 873, 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (imputing notice through city
attorney). The Seventh Circuit does not impute notice even where the new defendant and original
defendant share the same attorney. See, e.g., Jones v. Wysinger, 815 F. Supp. 1127, 1129-30
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (denying relation back on notice grounds even though the new defendant in Sec-
tion 1983 claim shared counsel with original defendants who were fellow police officers). The
question of whether imputation of notice is consistent with the aims of Rule 15(c) is beyond the
scope of this article.
63. 19 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4509, at 150
(1982) ("The condition that an added defendant must not only have known about the suit within
the limitations period but also have had reason to know that he escaped suit only because of a
mistake minimizes the possibility that application of the Rule will disturb any secure sense of
repose .. ").
64. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980) ("The statute of
limitations establishes a deadline after which the defendant may legitimately have peace of mind
.... "); John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 730-31 (1974)
[Vol. 57:883
MEET JOHN DOE
the plaintiff intended to sue him in particular, he may assume that he
will not be sued in the future. This standard is met when a potential
defendant has notice of a suit in which plaintiff has made an obvious
mistake in identity, such as calling the defendant by a similar but
wrong name. 5 The test is whether a reasonable person would under-
stand that plaintiff made such a mistake in identifying him as defend-
ant. 8 Absent such an obvious mistake, a potential defendant does not
have to speculate why he was not named in a particular suit. He is
entitled to repose.
Although the notice and mistake standards of Rule 15(c) protect a
defendant's rights under the applicable statute of limitations, they also
give the plaintiff much-needed flexibility. This flexibility was the key to
the new federal Doe defendant practice. The 1973 civil rights case of
Ames v. VavreCk 7 demonstrates the impact of expanded relation back
in John Doe cases. Ames and several other plaintiffs claimed that they
were unlawfully arrested for political speech, and filed a Section 1983
complaint against the City of Minneapolis, the prosecutor, and several
John Doe officers whom the plaintiffs described as the Minneapolis po-
lice officers who participated in their arrest. The plaintiffs then deposed
a number of police officers, some of whom admitted that they were the
arresting officers. Before the two-year limitations period ran, the plain-
tiffs moved to substitute the officers for the John Does in the complaint,
("Statutes of limitation have several purposes, but one of them, which cannot be dismissed as
procedural, is to permit potential defendants to breath easy after the passage of the designated
period."). Repose achieves societal benefits beyond the defendant's personal peace of mind. It
fosters commerce by giving potential defendants the certainty they need to enter into new transac-
tions unfettered by lingering questions based on past events. The repose element also may work to
the benefit of the plaintiff. Certainty helps a defendant settle claims. He can fully assess his liabil-
ity as of a specific date and not hold back for fear that the settlement will spur future suits based
on the same event. Likewise, the certainty enables a defendant to more easily obtain insurance
coverage, thus protecting prospective plaintiffs in claims based on future events. See Lewis, supra
note 50, at 1511-12 (policies supporting statutes of limitations include "alleviating a potential
defendant's economic or psychological insecurity, often styled a 'policy of repose' "and "avoiding
the disruptive effect of aged, unsettled claims may have on commercial intercourse").
65. See, e.g., Davis v. Krauss, 93 F.R.D. 580, 582 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding that where
Section 1983 complaint named "Joseph Souton" and "McGuiness" as defendants, it "hardly re-
quired much imagination" to suppose that plaintiff was intending to sue Josef Boutin and Karl
Mogenis, who were police officers in the same precinct in which the complaint alleged that Souton
and McGuiness were officers).
66. See 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1498, at
137-39 (2d ed. 1990) ("[In analyzing the mistake clause], the courts probably will apply some-
thing akin to a reasonableness test to determine whether the party 'should have known' he was the
one intended to be sued.").
67. 356 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1973).
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but the court did not grant the motion until one month after the limita-
tions period expired. 8 The new police officer defendants argued that
the statute of limitations barred any claim against them.
Without expanded relation back, the plaintiffs would have lost
their claims against the officers. The action against the officers did not
commence until the plaintiffs filed the amended complaint, which first
required leave of court.6 9 That the plaintiffs filed their motion to amend
before the limitations period did not save their complaint.70 Under
traditional relation back, the informal notice provided by the motion
was insufficient. Indeed, that is the point of the new relation back
rule-informal notice short of formal service will sometimes satisfy the
aims of statutes of limitation. Nor could accrual and equitable tolling
doctrines help the plaintiffs in Ames. Even though they alleged a gen-
eral conspiracy and concealment by the original named defendants, the
court found no basis to toll the statute of limitations against the new
defendants.
7 1
Only the doctrine of relation back, as expanded by the 1966 rule
change, saved the claims against the individual officers.72 The court al-
lowed the claims because the officers had sufficient knowledge that
plaintiffs intended to bring them in as defendants:
68. Id. at 936, 941-42.
69. Rule 15(a) requires leave of court to amend a complaint after a responsive pleading is
served. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also supra note 49. Although the record in Ames is not explicit,
it appears that at least some of the defendants had answered by the time the plaintiffs moved to
amend. Plaintiffs, for example, took a number of depositions prior to moving for leave to make the
Doe substitutions. See 356 F. Supp. at 936.
70. Cf. Sitarz v. Bucher, 652 F. Supp. 95, 97 (D.N.M. 1986) (holding that newly added
defendants were not parties until after plaintiffs were granted leave to amend and fied the
amended complaint); Swartz v. Gold Dust Casino, 91 F.R.D. 543, 547 (D. Nev. 1981) (discussing
relation back effect of Doe substitution proposed in a motion to amend filed before, but not
granted until after, the running of the limitations period).
71. The Ames court explained:
Plaintiffs' argument that fraudulent concealment by defendants has tolled the running of
the statute of limitations has no merit. That doctrine cannot be applied against the defend-
ants added by the first amended complaint because there are no allegations that those
defendants engaged in any conduct to conceal plaintiff's claim against them. Plaintiffs
would have the court apply fraudulent concealment principles to them based on alleged
activities of the original defendants. Even though a conspiracy is alleged to have existed,
that allegation alone will not allow the inference of fraudulent concealment to be drawn
into this case.
356 F. Supp. at 941; see also Roberts v. Dillon, 15 F.3d 113 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting alternative of
Doe pleading where plaintiff does not know identity of wrongdoer but defendant's actions do not
rise to level of affirmative concealment).
72. 356 F. Supp. at 942.
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[T]he original complaint contained a clearly expressed intent to add individual
officers as defendants as soon as they could be identified. ... [I]t is inconceiv-
able that the additional defendants have been prejudiced in their defense or that
they had no reason to believe that suit might be brought against them.78
This informal notice was insufficient under traditional concepts of rela-
tion back. The 1966 version of Rule 15(c), however, allowed the court
to look beyond technical filing and service requirements and evaluate
the informal notice received by the officers.7'
The Ames court glossed over whether the original Doe allegations
qualified as a mistake under the literal language of Rule 15(c) . 5 Sub-
sequent courts have done no better. The issue continues to plague fed-
eral and state courts. As this article details below, the problem is not
merely a question of semantics. It impacts the substantive policies of
statutes of limitations in both Doe and non-Doe cases. But such issues
do not deter plaintiffs. Civil rights and other plaintiffs regularly name
John Doe defendants in the hope that they too can identify the true
defendants and add them to the suit after the limitations period. All
these plaintiffs needed was a chance to save their claims, and the ex-
pansion of Rule 15(c) gave them that chance.76 Thus, modern Doe de-
fendant practice in federal court was born.
73. Id. at 942. The court appeared to rely at least in part on notice given to an assistant city
attorney who represented both the City, an original defendant, and the "unnamed" police officers
in their depositions. The attorney, for example, got a copy of the motion to make the Doe substitu-
tion prior to the expiration of the limitation period. Id. Whether imputed notice by itself is proper
under Rule 15(c) is subject to debate, see supra note 62, but even without imputed notice, the
officers in Ames apparently would have had actual and personal notice of the suit during their
depositions.
74. When the court finally reached the merits, it found that the officers' behavior was so
egregious that it warranted punitive damages against them. See Lykken v. Vavreck, 366 F. Supp.
585, 596 (D. Minn. 1973) (noting that the policemen's actions were "inexcusable").
75. The court twice acknowledged the mistake requirement of Rule 15(c) but never recon-
ciled its language with the Doe allegations. 356 F. Supp. at 942. The court, however, echoed the
intent of the mistake clause when it found that the complaint "clearly expressed intent to add
individual police officers as defendants." Id.
76. In the non-Doe mistake cases, which were at the heart of the 1966 rule revision, the
change in Rule 15(c) may cause different results (i.e., more late amendments allowed to cure
mistakes), but it would not have a great impact on how the plaintiff chooses to draft his complaint
in the first place. In non-Doe cases, the plaintiff's amendment of the complaint and his ultimate
resort to Rule 15(c) is unintended. He assumes when he files his complaint that he has correctly
identified the defendants. He only later realizes his mistake. Therefore, unlike in a Doe case,
where the plaintiff knows he must amend his complaint, the 1966 relaxation of the relation back
rule would have little impact on how the plaintiff initially frames his non-Doe complaint.
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B. John Doe as Pseudonym to Shield a Party's Identity
Since the 1960s, federal litigants have used John Doe for another
purpose-to hide their own identity.77 Here, the plaintiff is not con-
cerned with a pending limitations cut off. Instead the plaintiff's own
privacy interests are paramount. Some defendants may seek pseudony-
mous protection, 8 but usually the plaintiff himself wants to keep his
own identity secret.79 The plaintiff may want to remain anonymous for
any number of reasons; he may fear public stigma, personal safety, and
economic retribution, or the issues may simply be too intimate to dis-
close publicly. Unlike the Doe defendant, whose widespread use grew
out of a change in procedural rules, the modern Doe plaintiff became
popular due to change in substantive law-the recognition of privacy
rights under the federal constitution.8"
The pseudonymous plaintiff made national headlines in the 1960s
as part of the new and controversial federal privacy right litigation. 81
77. For a thoughtful discussion of the use of a pseudonym to protect a party's identity, see
Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants Be Permitted to
Keep Their Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTInGS L.J. 1 (1985).
78. In rare cases, a defendant will seek and obtain permission to seal the record and proceed
under a pseudonym. See, e.g., Doe v. A. Corporation, 709 F.2d 1043, 1044 n.1 (5th Cir. 1983)
(granting anonymity to defendant corporation in benefits suit by former in-house lawyer). In some
types of proceedings, such as professional disciplinary actions, it is not uncommon for the "defend-
ant" to appear under a pseudonym. See, e.g., Doe v. Federal Grievance Comm., 847 F.2d 57 (2d
Cir. 1988). But see Coe v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Colo., 676 F.2d 411 (10th
Cir. 1982) (denying pseudonymous protection for doctor seeking to enjoin state medical board
action against him for alleged professional and sexual misconduct due to strong public interest in
full disclosure of medical disciplinary proceedings). See generally Adam Milani, Doe v. Roe: An
Argument for Defendant Anonymity When a Pseudonymous Plaintiff Alleges a Stigmatizing In-
tentional Tort, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1659 (1995) (arguing for use of John Doe pseudonym for
defendants in John Doe plaintiff cases).
79. In many pseudonymous cases, the plaintiff keeps his identity secret from only the
outside world, not the court and defendant, who know his identity. In some cases, especially where
the plaintiff is concerned about reprisals from the defendant himself, only the court may know the
plaintiff's identity. As a middle ground, the plaintiff may withhold his name but offer limited
identifying characteristics to the defendant. See Steinman, supra note 77, at 42.
80. Eugene Fidell described the growing popularity of Doe plaintiffs:
With the evolution of a right of privacy, the increasing intrusion of the state on matters
traditionally thought to be private and the growing willingness of litigants to assert rights
and ventilate disputes relating to matters that can only be described as intimately private,
the worthy Mr. Doe and his equally monosyllabically surnamed-and equally litig-
ious-friends have become familiar plaintiffs in the nation's courthouses.
Eugene R. Fidell, The Strange Case of John Doe: Getting Anonymity in Federal Court, NAT. LJ.,
Mar. 5, 1984, at 20; see also Steinman, supra note 77, at 2 ("[B]efore parties could use pseud-
onyms to shield their rights to privacy, those rights had to be legally recognized.").
81. Although the modern popularity of Doe plaintiffs is tied to federal privacy rights litiga-
tion, state courts have used pseudonyms in isolated cases for years. For example, adoption pro-
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The Supreme Court first recognized the right to privacy in the 1965
case of Griswold v. Connecticut,82 in which the Court overturned legis-
lation prohibiting use of contraceptives by married persons. Griswold
did not use a fictitious name, but the plaintiffs in a predecessor case,
challenging the same birth control law, used the pseudonyms "Paul,"
"Pauline," and "Jane Poe."8 8 When this earlier "Poe" case got to the
United States Supreme Court, the Court simply acknowledged the use
of pseudonyms without condemning the practice." Then, in one of the
most publicized cases ever, the 1973 abortion decision in Roe v.
ceedings traditionally have used pseudonyms to shield a minor child's identity. See, e.g., Doe v.
Doe, 30 N.Y.S.2d 141 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1941) (child support proceeding in which parents are
designated as "Doe" and children are called only "Walter" and "Bettina"); In re Adoption of
Doe, 56 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1949); In re Adoption of Baby Girl Doe, 277 P.2d 321 (Wash. 1954).
Such privilege of anonymity was not set forth in the general pleading codes but was instead stated,
if at all, in specific substantive provisions. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-25 (1994) (provid-
ing for confidentiality of adoption proceedings). More often, courts just handled the issue on a
case-by-case basis. Indeed, Doe plaintiffs today appear almost as regularly in state court as they
do in federal court, largely as a matter of judicial discretion. See, e.g., Doe v. Red & Black
Publishing Co., 437 S.E.2d 474 (Ga. 1993); In re Doe, 843 P.2d 735 (Kan. Ct. App. 1992); Doe
v. Medical Ctr. of La., 612 So. 2d 1050 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Doe v. Office of Professional Medi-
cal Conduct, 611 N.E.2d 294 (N.Y. 1993); Doe v. American Natl Red Cross, 500 N.W.2d 264
(Wis. 1993).
82. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives
unconstitutionally intruded upon marital right of privacy).
83. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961). The plaintiffs attacked the same Connecticut birth
control law at issue in Griswold, but the Supreme Court denied their challenge on the ground that
the plaintiffs had not shown that the statute would be enforced against them. Id. at 501.
84. The Court noted: "Plaintiffs . . . sue under fictitious names. The Supreme Court of
Errors of Connecticut approved this procedure in the special circumstances of the cases." 367 U.S.
at 498 n.1. In particular, the Connecticut high court stated the following on the novel use of
pseudonyms:
[The Connecticut pleading statute] provides in part, that writs in civil actions shall de-
scribe the parties, presumably by their real names, so that they may be identified. [A
Connecticut Practice Book] states, among other things, that "[i]n the captions of pleas,
answers, etc., the parties may be described as John Doe v. Richard Roe et al., but this will
not be sufficient in a judgment file, which must give all the data necessary for use in draw-
ing the execution." Because of the intimate and distressing details in these complaints, it is
understandable that the parties who are allegedly medical patients would wish to be anony-
mous. To obviate any possibility that the parties and the issues raised are fictitious and that
the jurisdiction of the court is being invoked to decide moot questions, a plaintiff who
desires to use a name other than his own should, before the case is presented in court,
acquaint the court of his desires, establish the fact that the parties and issues are real
although the names used are fictitious, and secure the court's consent, as was done in this
case. The privilege of using fictitious names in actions should be granted only in the rare
case where the nature of the issue litigated and the interest of the parties demand it and no
harm can be done to the public interest.
Buxton v. Ullman, 156 A.2d at 508, 514-15 (Conn. 1959).
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Wade,85 the plaintiff again used a pseudonym. As before, the Court
noted Jane Roe's use of a pseudonym but did not criticize it.86 Liti-
gants took these cases8 7 as implicit endorsement of the practice and
began to designate themselves by pseudonyms with unprecedented
frequency. 88
Whether the plaintiff may shield his identity behind the John Doe
moniker is not simply a question of whether the plaintiff desires ano-
nymity. The plaintiff's interest in privacy often confficts with, and is
outweighed by, the needs of both the public and the defendant. When
the plaintiff's name is hidden, the public cannot as closely scrutinize
the workings of its courts. Full disclosure of court proceedings, even in
civil cases, is a basic tenet of the Anglo-American legal system. It is so
deeply rooted that the First Amendment may guarantee public access
to civil proceedings. 89 In addition, basic fairness to the defendant ar-
85. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Likewise, the plaintiffs in a companion case to Roe v. Wade,
which challenged a Georgia abortion statute, also used the pseudonyms "John Doe" and "Mary
Doe." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
86. In Roe v. Wade, the Court noted that the plaintiff's name was a pseudonym and held
that despite the pseudonym, she presented a justiciable controversy. 410 U.S. at 120 n.4, 121 n.5.
The Court made the same notation in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 184 n.6 & 187.
87. The Supreme Court continues to entertain pseudonymous suits with little or no com-
ment on the propriety of the Doe designation. For example, in John Doe Agency v. John Doe
Corp., 493 U.S. 146 (1989), a FOIA action, the Court noted that although all of the names in the
caption were pseudonyms, the Court would use the real names of each of the agencies involved
because the Solicitor General's office had no objection to the disclosure of their names. Id. at 148
n.1. As to the plaintiff private corporation, however, the Court said it would "adhere . . . to the
use of [the] . . . pseudonym." Id.; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977) (pseudonymous
plaintiffs challenged constitutionality of New York state central computer system that stored
names of persons taking certain types of prescription drugs). See generally Milani, supra note 78,
at 1678-79 n.80 (listing pseudonymous party cases decided by the Supreme Court).
88. "While federal decisions concerning Doe plaintiffs or known Doe defendants are rare
prior to 1969, such cases are common now." Steinman, supra note 77, at 1 n.2.
89. The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question of public access to civil
suits, but it repeatedly has affirmed the public right of access to criminal trials. See, e.g., Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (finding First Amendment right of the
press and public to attend criminal trials). In the criminal context, the Court bases the right to
public trial on both the defendant's individual Sixth Amendment rights and the general First
Amendment protections of the press and public. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI (guaranteeing the
accused the right to a speedy and public trial); U.S. CoNsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no
law. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the people to peaceably assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."). Although the Sixth Amendment
applies exclusively to criminal trials, the First Amendment has no such limit. See Steinman, supra
note 77, at 3-18 (surveying First Amendment right to access cases and concluding that their
rationale applies to criminal and civil trials); cf. United States v. Bateman, 805 F. Supp. 1058,
1061 (D.N.H. 1992) (distinguishing the "civil context, where the importance of confrontation is




gues against the plaintiff's unfettered use of pseudonyms. In most
cases, the defendant will be hampered in preparing his defense, at least
to some degree, when he does not know the plaintiff's identity.90
These competing concerns are best reconciled by using a balancing
test.91 The Fourth Circuit recently directed that its trial courts weigh
the following factors to determine if a plaintiff may proceed as John
Doe:
- whether the justification asserted by the requesting party is merely to avoid the
annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation or is to preserve privacy
in a matter of sensitive and highly personal nature;
e whether identification poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm to the
requesting party or even more critically to innocent non-parties;
- the ages of the persons whose privacy interests are sought to be protected;
* whether the action is against a governmental or private party; and
- relatedly, the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from allowing an action
against to proceed anonymously.
2
90. Professor Steinman further explained these concerns:
In some situations, information about a plaintiff other than identity or identifying traits
would suffice to enable a defendant to defend effectively. When the issues raised by a case
are purely legal, for example, defendants do not need information about a plaintiff beyond
that which determines whether plaintiff has standing and whether a case or controversy
exists. In cases in which the claims are dependent on factual issues peculiar to plaintiff's
case, however, the defendant's need to know his adversary's name may be such that refusal
to surrender that information would deny the defendant procedural due process.
Steinman, supra note 77, at 42 (footnotes omitted); see also Scott L. Winkelman, Closing Open
Court to "Doe" Plaintiffs, LEGAL TIMs, Aug. 21, 1995, at 26, 26 (arguing that a grant of ano-
nymity for plaintiff is unfair to defendant because it is "tantamount to a judicial endorsement of
the plaintiff's claims on the merits" and "invites erroneous charges of wrongdoing"). Determining
res judicata is also a problem. The defendant and court must be able to determine if the claim
already has been brought by this plaintiff. See Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536, 541 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (noting "inherent problems" in fictitious name procedure, including the possible
inability to fix res judicata effect).
91. Most legal commentators advocate a balancing test. See Steinman, supra note 77, at
35-43; William S. Kleinman, Note, Who is Suing You?: John Doe Plaintiffs in the Federal
Courts, 61 TEx. L. REv. 547, 561 (1982); Wendy M. Rosenberger, Note, Anonymity in Civil
Litigation: The "Doe" Plaintiff, 57 NOTRE DAME L. Rav. 580, 592 (1982); cf. Mark A. Mesler,
Comment, Doe v. Frank: Determining the Circumstances Under Which a Plaintiff May Proceed
Under a Fictitious Name, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 881 (1993) (noting that as of the summer of
1993, the "First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits cases have
failed to even address this issue" of proper balancing).
92. James v. Jacobson, 6. F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993). The "James" plaintiffs were vic-
tims of the now infamous scheme of a Virginia fertility doctor who used his own sperm to artifi-
cially inseminate his patients. The plaintiffs sought anonymity primarily to protect their two chil-
dren who were the biological children of the defendant. The district court allowed the plaintiffs to
file a complaint and proceed through discovery under the fictitious names "John and Mary James"
but would not let them testify anonymously at trial. Id. at 236. The Fourth Circuit reversed,
holding that the trial court abused its discretion in applying a strict rule that "party-anonymity at
trial is simply not permissible." Id. at 239. In forming its list of the proper factors, the Fourth
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Although the cases that require such balancing do not lend themselves
to categorization, courts typically allow pseudonymity in cases that
raise a substantive right-to-privacy issue and often involve intimate is-
sues.93 AIDS and HIV patients now commonly seek and receive ano-
nymity." In some cases, a pseudonym is essential to preserve the very
right that the plaintiff is trying to enforce-his own privacy." Finally,
plaintiffs recently have tried, with mixed results, to extend pseudonym-
Circuit relied upon Doe pleading cases, even though James concerned anonymity at trial. Id. at
238-39.
93. The Fifth Circuit in Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v.
Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1979) tried to summarize the common characteristics of
the pseudonymous cases:
"[W]here the issues involved are matters of a sensitive and highly personal nature," such
as birth control, abortion, homosexuality or the welfare rights of illegitimate children or
abandoned families, the normal practice of disclosing the parties' identities yields "to a
policy of protecting privacy in a very private matter." . . . [T]he cases affording plaintiffs
anonymity all share several characteristics. . . . The plaintiffs in those actions, at the least,
* . . admit that they either had violated state laws or government regulations or wished to
engage in prohibited conduct. . . . Furthermore, all of the plaintiffs previously allowed in
other cases to proceed anonymously were challenging the constitutional, statutory or regu-
latory validity of government activity.
Id. at 712-13 (citations omitted) (quoting Doe v. Deschamps, 64 F.R.D. 652, 653 (D. Mont.
1974)); see also Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 794 F. Supp. 72, 74 (D.R.I. 1992) (cases
allowing pseudonymity usually involve "abortion, mental illness, personal safety, homosexuality,
transsexuality and illegitimate or abandoned children") (citing Doe v. Rostker, 89 F.R.D. 158,
161 (N.D. Cal. 1981)). But see Steinman, supra note 77, at 75 ("The Fifth Circuit [in SMV]
overstated the shared characteristics of the cases allowing pseudonymity. They did not all involve
disclosure of personal information of the utmost intimacy, and many did not involve an admission
that plaintiff had engaged, or wished to engage, in prohibited conduct. The fact that similarly
situated plaintiffs in other cases were less fearful and therefore dared to sue under their own
names, has not been determinative. Almost all of the cases allowing pseudonymity, however, have
involved challenges to a governmental body or activity.").
94. See cases cited supra note 7.
95. For example, in Roe v. Ingraham, 364 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the court allowed
prescription drug users to use fictitious names to challenge a New York statute that required
computerized records of their names: "[I]f plaintiffs are required to reveal their identity prior to
the adjudication on the merits of their privacy claim, they will already have sustained the injury
which by this litigation they seek to avoid." Id. at 541 n.7. In Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320 (11th
Cir. 1992), the Eleventh Circuit distinguished Ingraham and noted that the type of relief sought
by plaintiff may impact whether he will be afforded pseudonymous protection:
The plaintiff in Ingraham was allowed to proceed under a fictitious name not because he
would have had to disclose information of the utmost intimacy-his use of controlled sub-
stances; but rather, because he was challenging a state statute that regulated disclosure of
such information. The plaintiff in Ingraham, therefore, was granted his request for ano-
nymity because the injury litigated against-disclosure of plaintiff's name-would be in-
curred as a result of the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity in the complaint.




ity beyond traditional privacy issues to suits in which the plaintiff
merely raises unpopular claims, such as challenges to school prayer,96
or in which he fears economic harm or reprisals.9
These expanding uses of the Doe doctrine underscore the propriety
of the underlying procedure."' Yet the practice still suffers setbacks.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, for instance, re-
cently sharply criticized the use of Doe pseudonyms, calling it an "ex-
traordinary break with precedent." 99 Although the suitable cases for
pseudonymity must remain fluid and open to challenge, the propriety of
the practice itself need not.
III. FAILURE OF CURRENT FEDERAL PROCEDURE TO ADEQUATELY
ADDRESS JOHN DOE PARTIES
The John Doe defendant and plaintiff have become an essential
96. See, e.g., Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1981) (permitting Doe protection for
parents and minors challenging school prayer).
97. For the most part, courts have denied plaintiffs pseudonymity in economic harm cases.
See Southern Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707
(5th Cir. 1979) (denying anonymity to female law students charging sex discrimination in law
firm hiring). But see Steinman, supra note 77, at 73-77 (questioning holding in SMU and arguing
that economic and professional concerns are proper factors in deciding pseudonymity).
98. The authority to allow the plaintiff to proceed as John Doe appears to be one of the
inherent powers of the court. See James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The
decision whether to permit parties to proceed anonymously at trial is one of many involving man-
agement of the trial process that for obvious reasons are committed in the first instance to trial
court discretion."). To the extent that courts cite any specific rule, they rely on Rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which grants the court broad power to issue protective orders in
discovery. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). See, e.g., Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 184-86 (5th Cir. 1981)
(holding that the district court had power to issue protective order under Rule 26(c) to shield the
identity of plaintiffs challenging school prayer).
99. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448, 1464 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (per curiam). In
this celebrated antitrust case, the district court let three computer industry companies file amid
briefs under John Doe pseudonyms due to their claimed fear of retaliation from Microsoft. Id. at
1453. In reversing the lower court's refusal to enter a consent decree, the Court of Appeals or-
dered that the case be assigned on remand to another district judge. Id. at 1465. The appellate
judges were "deeply troubled" by many aspects of the proceedings below, including the John Doe
amid filings:
We are similarly distressed by the district judge's decision to allow the Doe Companies to
proceed anonymously. We are not aware of any case in which a plaintiff was allowed to sue
a defendant and still remain anonymous to that defendant. Such proceedings would, as
Microsoft argues, seriously implicate due process.
Id. at 1463. Although the court later acknowledged the "rare" cases allowing Doe proceedings, id.
at 1464, its hostile reaction highlights that Doe practice is not yet a fully accepted part of civil
litigation; see also Winkelman, supra note 90, at 26 (defending the Microsoft rejection of Doe
practice).
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part of civil practice in federal court,100 but codified federal procedure
has not caught up to this practice. In 1988, Congress officially recog-
nized Doe defendants in the removal statute-a first in codified proce-
dure. This is a step in the right direction, but it does not go far enough.
Courts have failed to reach a workable solution to three significant pro-
cedural issues confounding Doe practice in federal court: first, the
proper pleading of a Doe party in a federal complaint; second, the im-
pact of an unknown Doe defendant on the forum selection criteria for
diversity jurisdiction and venue; and third, application of the mistake
clause of the federal relation back rule to Doe defendant substitutions.
A. Pleading: Inconsistent Rules and Lack of Standards for Pleading
John Doe Parties
Despite widespread use of Doe pleading, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure undermine it. Unlike most state court systems, the Federal
Rules do not expressly provide for any form of fictitious name parties,
and some procedural provisions are arguably inconsistent with Doe
pleading. Rule 10(a), for instance, requires plaintiff to plead "the
names of all the parties."101 In Roe v. New York, 0 2 the court relied on
Rule 10(a) to dismiss a pseudonymous complaint filed by four teenage
boys who sought to challenge the adequacy of their care in a state juve-
nile school and who designated themselves in their complaint only by
the pseudonyms "Roe," "Moe," "Soe," and "Joe." The court held that
the complaint was ineffective to commence the action because it did not
comply with the mandate that every complaint contain the name of "at
least one plaintiff."' 03 The lawsuit was a nullity, and the plaintiffs
would have to begin the process again.' 0 '
The Roe v. New York court was wrong.'0 5 Although at first glance
100. "Does and their... relations appear prominently in the [federal] reporters." Scheetz
v. Morning Call, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 34, 36 (E.D. Pa. 1990), affid, 946 F.2d 202 (3d Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1171 (1992).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 10(a). To read the full text of Rule 10(a), see supra note 12.
102. 49 F.R.D. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
103. Id. at 281.
104. The court even rejected the plaintiffs' offer to reveal the names under some form of
protective order, because in the court's view no action was pending. Id. at 282; see also Doe v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 93 F.R.D. 483 (D. Colo. 1982) (holding that Doe plaintiff com-
plaint did not commence the action under Rule 10(a)).
105. In addition to an overly broad reading of what Rule 10(a) actually requires, the court
unduly penalized a pleading error. Even if Rule 10(a) prohibited Doe pleading, it would not
render the filing of a Doe complaint a nullity. A defective complaint commences the action but at
the risk of later dismissal. Moreover, the court may order corrective action short of dismissal. See
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Rule 10(a) seems to bar Doe pleading, in reality it does not. Rule 10(a)
simply seeks to distinguish the more formal caption in the complaint
from all others, which for economy need not list every party. Rule
10(a) does not necessarily dictate the substance of the name designa-
tion. For instance, the comparable provision of the Field Code, which
elsewhere permitted fictitious names, also required that the parties be
"named" in the complaint. 106 Nevertheless, even though most courts
today reject Roe v. New York as elevating form over substance, 10 7 the
language of Rule 10(a) still invites procedural disputes.' 08
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure elsewhere cast doubt on the
propriety of Doe pleading. The only mention of a John Doe party in the
entire rules compilation is in an Advisory Committee note to Rule
17(a). Rule 17(a) requires that a suit be prosecuted in the name of
"the real party in interest," but in case of error, the rule gives reasona-
FaIr. R. CIv. P. 12(e) (allowing the court to strike a vague or ambiguous complaint only if a more
definite statement is not filed within 10 days after the court granted the motion).
106. Act of April 12, 1848, ch. 379, § 120(), 1848 N.Y. LAws 521 ("The complaint shall
contain:... [T]he names of the parties to the action, plaintiff and defendant."). Likewise, many
states today have rules identical to Rule 10(a), even though they permit unknown defendant
pleading elsewhere in their rules of procedure. Compare ALA. R. Civ. P. 10(a) ("In the complaint
the title of the action shall include the names of all the parties, but in the other pleadings its is
sufficient to state the name of the first party on each side.... .") with ALA. R. Civ. P. 9(h) "When
a party is ignorant of the name of an opposing party and so alleges in his pleading, the opposing
party may be designated by any name....").
107. One court rejected the argument that Rule 10 barred Doe pleading as "highly mechan-
ical" and "elevat[ing] form over substance." Roe v. Borup, 500 F. Supp. 127, 129 (E.D. Wis.
1980). Another noted its "reservations that failure to comply with Rule 10, which is addressed to
matters of form, will sustain a motion to dismiss. ... Doe v. Boyle, 60 F.R.D. 507, 508 (E.D.
Va. 1973) (dismissing complaint on other grounds), a ffd, 494 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1974). Yet
another explained how the view of Roe v. New York is now antiquated:
The decision in Roe v. State of New York, upon which defendants heavily rely, was ren-
dered in 1970, a time in which instances of parties suing pseudonymously were rare. Since
that time, however, increasing numbers of parties have sought for a variety of reasons to
sue anonymously in order to keep their identities confidential, and in fact, "a practice has
developed permitting individuals to sue under fictitious names" under certain
circumstances.
Doe v. Hallock, 119 F.R.D. 640, 642 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (citing Steinman, supra note 77).
108. As recently as 1992, the Eleventh Circuit, in ruling on the propriety of plaintiff's pseu-
donymity, cited both the "clear mandate" and "explicit requirement of disclosure" in Rule 10(a)
in holding that the parties were required to be named. Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir.
1992); see also Doe v. University of Rhode Island, Civ. A. 93-0560B, 1993 WL 667341, at 2-3
(D.R.I. Dec. 28, 1993) (noting that Rule 10(a) "does not always prevent a [plaintiff] from suing
under a fictitious name"); Agresta v. Philadelphia, 694 F. Supp. 117, 119 & n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1988)
(dismissing "unknown police officers" because the plaintiff did not list them at all in the caption as
required by Rule 10(a), but also noting that the unknown officers would be dismissed because of
their fictitious designation even if plaintiff had listed them in the caption). Cf. Scheetz v. Morning
Call, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 35, 37 n.5 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (rejecting Agresta).
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ble time for the real party in interest to substitute as plaintiff.10,9 To
help explain this rule, the Advisory Committee distinguishes an excep-
tional use of a fictitious plaintiff:
[Rule 17(a)] should not be misunderstood or distorted. It is intended to prevent
forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an
understandable mistake has been made. It does not mean, for example, that,
following an airplane crash in which all aboard were killed, an action may be
filed in the name of John Doe (a fictitious person), as personal representative of
Richard Roe (another fictitious person), in the hope that at a later time the
attorney filing the action may substitute the real name of the real personal repre-
sentative of a real victim, and have the benefit of suspension of the limitation
period.
110
Not surprisingly, some courts have cited this note when questioning the
propriety of Doe pleading."1
Neither the note nor Rule 17(a) has any bearing on actual Doe
practice. First, Rule 17(a) only requires that the party who has a real
interest in the claim prosecute it."' It does not address what name that
person must use. A John Doe plaintiff clearly is a party in interest in
the suit; he merely wants to shield his identity.11 3 Moreover, the John
Doe that the Advisory Committee condemns is merely a creation of the
lawyer's wishful thinking.1 4 The lawyer does not have an actual client.
Such a filing would be frivolous and is already proscribed by Federal
Rule 11.1 5 Nevertheless, the negative mention of a Doe party in the
note to Rule 17(a), especially in the absence of a positive reference
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) advisory committee's note.
111. See Breslin v. City of Philadelphia, 92 F.R.D. 764 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (citing Rule 17(a)
and the advisory committee's note among several bases for dismissing suit in which only Doe
defendants remained); cf. Scheetz, 130 F.R.D. at 37 n.5 (rejecting Breslin).
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). The rule has been criticized for stating only the obvious. See,
e.g., 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 66, § 1541, at 321-22 ("Some commentators have called for
abolition of the real party in interest requirement [in part] because exactly the same results would
be achieved under the applicable substantive law.").
113. If a court is concerned about a potential sham suit, such as that illustrated in the
Advisory Committee's note to Rule 17(a), see supra note 108 and accompanying text, it can ask
the Doe plaintiff to prove that he has an actual interest in the suit by filing such verification under
seal.
114. Even the most liberal Doe practices do not allow a lawyer to create a Doe client in the
hope that he will find a real client to fill John Doe's shoes. California, for example, permits a
plaintiff to name Doe parties in the hope that some person might turn up who fits that description,
but it does not let the lawyer create a plaintiff in the hope that he might turn up an actual client.
See infra notes 117-18.
115. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b); see also supra note 41.
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elsewhere in the rules, casts lingering doubt as to the propriety of Doe
pleading under the Federal Rules.
The Federal Rules fail not only because their literal language is
inconsistent with modern Doe practice, but because they fail to provide
affirmative guidance on how to properly plead John Doe parties. 1 6 As
for the Doe defendants, many plaintiffs simply add to their list of
named defendants some general reference to Doe defendants, such as
"John Does 1 through 100." They do not make any attempt to describe
these John Doe defendants. This type of generic Doe pleading is com-
mon under California state practice, but its benefits are unique to Cali-
fornia's limitations scheme. First, California has an unusually long pe-
riod-three years-in which a plaintiff may serve the defendants,
including a Doe defendant. 117 More significantly, California procedure,
unlike most Doe pleading rules, allows the plaintiff to substitute an ac-
tual person for a generic John Doe, even though at the time he filed his
complaint the plaintiff did not think that any person other than the
named defendants was liable. 18 Few states have such a liberal limita-
tions practice, so generic Doe pleading is useless in the vast majority of
cases filed in federal court.119 It is also burdensome. Scores of extra
116. A very few courts do attempt to set some guidelines for Doe pleading. See, e.g., Estate
of Rosenberg v. Crandell, 56 F.3d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1995) ("an action may proceed against a party
whose name is unknown if the complaint makes allegations specific enough to permit the identity
of the party to be ascertained after reasonable discovery").
117. CAL. CIV. CODE § 583.210(a) (West Supp. 1996). Unlike under the Field Code, where
the plaintiff had to identify the John Doe defendant sufficiently to serve him before the limitations
period expired, see supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text, plaintiffs in California have three
years beyond the limitations period to find, identify and serve the Doe defendants. See
§ 583.210(a). See generally James E. Hogan, California's Unique Doe Defendant Practice: A
Fiction Stranger Than Truth, 30 STAN. L. REv. 51, 59, 84-85 (1971).
118. See, e.g., Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 30 Cal. Rptr. 650 (Cal. Ct. App.
1963) (holding that California "allows the original designation of a defendant by a fictitious name
in a situation where plaintiff knew the true name of the defendant and knew all of the facts giving
rise to a cause of action against him, but was unaware at the time of filing that he had such
a cause of action") (interpreting CAL. CIv. CODE § 474 (West 1979)). Hence, most plaintiffs in
California routinely add scores of John Doe defendants to each complaint, just in case they later
discover some person who might also be liable on the original claim. See Hogan, supra note 117,
at 70 ("[I]t behooves every plaintiff's counsel to frame any complaint filed in California's courts
system [with Doe defendants]. .. ").
119. The Field Code's unknown defendant procedure, still used by most states, see supra
note 27, did not permit generic John Doe pleading. It was not an "expedient to cover the name of
a person not sued, not intended to be sued, and whom the plaintiff only purposes [sic] to make a
defendant if he discovers at some later period that he ought to do so." Town of Hancock v. First
Nat'l Bank, 93 N.Y. 82, 85 (N.Y. 1883) (disallowing use of fictitious name procedure for persons
whom plaintiff knew at time "of filing complaint). Likewise, only a very few states other than
California have extended periods in which the plaintiff may identify and serve the Doe defendant.
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potential John Doe parties create needless uncertainty and complicate
case management. 120 Yet, plaintiffs continue to plead generic Doe de-
fendants because they have no guidance from the federal pleading
rules.
Federal guidelines for handling Doe plaintiffs are equally lacking.
This problem has not gone unnoticed. Ten years ago, Professor Stein-
man urged better guidelines on what plaintiffs must do in order to pro-
ceed anonymously. 21 Her call has gone unanswered. With rare excep-
tions, 22 each plaintiff must guess about the proper procedures for filing
a Doe complaint.1 23 One court may accept the complaint without ques-
tion, while another may insist that the plaintiff first file a formal mo-
See, e.g., Omo R. Civ. P. 3(A) ("A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the
court, if service is obtained within one year from such filing upon a named defendant .... or upon
a defendant identified by a fictitious name whose name is later corrected pursuant to Rule 15(D)
[the Ohio unknown defendant amendment provision]."); Sooy v. Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc., 708
P.2d 1014, 1017-18 (Mont. 1985) (holding that John Doe is a party to the action from its filing so
long as he is served within three years); Souza v. Erie Strayer Co., 557 A.2d 1226, 1227 (R.I.
1989) (interpreting Doe summons provision in Rhode Island statute as tolling the statute of limi-
tations so long as the actual defendant is served within a reasonable time).
120. See infra notes 232-34 and accompany text.
121. Professor Steinman noted the "lack of guidance" both in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and on the local district court level. Steinman, supra note 77, at 35 (1985). In June
1984, she wrote one court in each federal judicial district and each court of appeals asking
whether the courts had any procedures for litigants seeking to proceed pseudonymously. Id. at 85-
86 n.376. None of those responding had any specific local rules. Id. She therefore advocated that
"clear procedures should be established governing pseudonymity requests." Id. See also Milani,
supra note 78, at 1698-1706 (proposing procedures for use of the pseudonymous defendant in
certain stigmatizing tort cases).
122. The federal district court for the District of Columbia has an established procedure for
Doe complaints, although it is not formally embodied in written local rules. See Fidell, supra note
80, at 20. According to the clerk's office, it will accept a case filed in the name of a Doe plaintiff
only if it is accompanied by a motion for leave to proceed as a Doe. Id. That motion must have a
supporting memorandum of points and authorities and a proposed form of protective order. Id.
Before accepting the complaint, the clerk will try to get the matter before a motions judge who
will summarily rule on the motion and set the conditions for filing. Id.
123. Some courts have proposed procedures for future Doe complaints. The court in Roe v.
New York, for example, suggested the means that Doe plaintiffs should use in that court to avoid
dismissal in the future: (1) they should name at least one plaintiff by his true name, (2) they
should somehow identify themselves under oath, or (3) they should seek the court's prior permis-
sion to proceed pseudonymously. 49 F.R.D. 279, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (citing Doe v. Kurtis, 306
F. Supp. 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (Doe plaintiff's true name and address set forth in letters attached
to complaint)); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F. Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969) (complaint verified by the
signature of plaintiff under her true name), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970); Buxton v.
Ullman, 156 A.2d 508 (Conn. 1959) (directing that plaintiff get court's permission before filing
Doe complaint)), prob. juris. noted sub. nom., Poe v. Ulman, 362 U.S. 987 (1960), appeal dis-
missed, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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tion before filing the complaint. 124 These variations on the fundamental
issue of how to file a complaint may cause a plaintiff to lose his claim
altogether.125 Federal rulemakers long ago dictated that pleading be
simple and clear in order to facilitate speedy resolution of an action on
its merits.12 6 Doe cases fall far short of this ideal.
B. Diversity Jurisdiction and Venue: Unknown Domicile of the John
Doe Defendant
When the plaintiff wants to name a John Doe defendant, he faces
not only pleading uncertainty but also doubts about his choice of fo-
rum. Two key elements of the forum selection process assume that the
plaintiff knows the state in which each defendant is a citizen. If he
wants to bring only state law claims in federal court,12 7 the plaintiff
must affirmatively plead complete diversity. 28 Even if the plaintiff has
a federal claim, he must still select a federal district court having
proper venue over the suit, 29 and one of the bases for setting venue is
the defendant's place of residence.130 In 1987, Congress tried to cure
this dilemma in removal cases,' 3 1 but it did not go far enough. Forum
124. Compare the procedures outlined supra notes 122 & 123.
125. Although Rule 5(e) states that the "clerk shall not refuse to accept for filing any paper
presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form as required by these
rules or any local rules or practices," FED. R. Civ. P. 5(e), some clerks still may not accept un-
usual papers, such as a Doe plaintiff complaint. See generally Lindsey v. Dayton-Hudson Corp.,
592 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.) (affirming summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds where
clerk refused to accept timely complaint because plaintiff had designated himself as "John Doe"),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 856 (1979); see also National Commodity & Barter Ass'n v. Gibbs, 886
F.2d 1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 1989) ("Absent permission by the district court to proceed anony-
mously, and under such other conditions as the court may impose (such as requiring disclosure of
their true identity under seal), the federal court lacks jurisdiction over the unnamed parties as a
case has not been commenced with respect to them.").
126. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 13, § 1182, at 12 (stating that the federal "pleading
rules illustrate two of the basic philosophies of the federal rules- simplicity of procedure and
facilitation of the speedy determination of litigation on the merits"); see also FED. R. CiV. P. 1
(mandating that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "shall be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action").
127. Although federal civil rights suits are the most common use of Doe defendants, plain-
tiffs often need to use unknown defendant pleading in diversity suits involving state law claims.
See, e.g., Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc., 550 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1977) (state law personal injury
claims); Bryan v. Associated Containers Transp., 837 F. Supp. 633 (D.N.J. 1993) (state law per-
sonal injury claim).
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1993); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
129. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1993 & Supp. 1995).
130. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(1), 1391(b)(1).
131. See Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1993)).
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selection, like pleading, remains an uncertain proposition in many Doe
defendant cases.
1. Confused Diversity Jurisdiction Standards in Doe Defendant
Cases
Under long-established rules, the party seeking to invoke the
court's jurisdiction, usually the plaintiff, must plead and establish that
the court has subject matter jurisdiction. If he bases jurisdiction on
diversity of citizenship of the parties, he must allege each party's citi-
zenship.1 2 This requirement poses no problem for the John Doe plain-
tiff. A plaintiff who wishes to proceed under a pseudonym can allege
and prove his own citizenship, if necessary under seal or other protec-
tion which will preserve his anonymity. When the plaintiff names an
unknown Doe defendant, however, he cannot meet these pleading re-
quirements. At the pleading stage, the plaintiff does not know the de-
fendant's identity-that is why he is naming a Doe defendant-and,
therefore, cannot in good faith allege this unknown defendant's state of
citizenship.
Federal courts have long struggled with this problem. On one ex-
treme, some courts have tried to solve it by banning Doe defendants.
Most noteworthy is the Ninth Circuit's effort, which began with the
1956 case of Molnar v. National Broadcasting Co.' There, a Califor-
nia plaintiff sued NBC and 10 generic John Doe defendants for injuries
she suffered when she fell in NBC's building. She attempted to base
federal jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship and affirmatively alleged
that the Doe defendants were citizens of Delaware. The court found
these allegations illusory 34 and held that the Doe defendants destroyed
diversity. 13 5 In the same term, the Ninth Circuit also called Doe de-
132. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Rule 8(a) requires that a complaint set forth
"a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends." See also
supra note 13.
133. 231 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1956).
134. The court reasoned that:
If the identity of defendants were known so that the pleader could state they were citizens
of Delaware, she could also state their names and allege what part each had in the [acci-
dent]. But if the allegation that they are citizens of Delaware be, as on the face of the
complaint it is, unfounded guesswork, the jurisdiction of the court is not established.
Id. at 686-87.
135. Id. at 687-88. The court reasoned that:
[N]o one of the Rules of Civil Procedure under which federal courts operate gives warrant
for the use of such a device. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not universally
inclusive of all possible colorings of practice, no justification can be found therein for a
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fendants "dangerous" and rejected their use in all suits originally filed
in federal court, even federal question cases.136 Despite these efforts to
achieve a bright-line rule, the Ninth Circuit ban on Doe defendants
was never completely successful, 13 7 and the court has formally re-
treated from it.138 Nevertheless, the remnants of the ban continue to
confuse practice in that court today.13 9
violation of jurisdictional principles .... The national trial courts are of special jurisdiction.
At the outset of every proceeding . . . jurisdiction should be established by allegation of
essential facts.
Id. at 687.
136. The court, on non-diversity grounds, held that a plaintiff could not sue federal immi-
gration agents by the fictitious designations of "John Doe and Richard Roe":
These John Doe complaints are dangerous at any time. It is inviting disaster to allow them
to be filed and to allow fictitious persons to remain defendants if the complaint is still of
record. Appropriate action has been taken by the trial court on its own motion in some
such cases. Although the fact that the Rules of Civil Procedure contain no express prohibi-
tion upon the subject, there is no authority of which we are aware for the joining of ficti-
tious defendants in an action under a federal statute. These defendants [John Doe and
Richard Roe] should have been eliminated ....
Sigurdson v. Del Guerico, 241 F.2d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1956) (citations omitted); see also Tolefree
v. Ritz, 382 F.2d 566 (9th Cir. 1967) (holding that the trial court properly dismissed fictitious
defendant in federal civil rights action); Hall v. Pacific Maritime Ass'n, 281 F. Supp. 54, 61
(N.D. Cal. 1968) (striking claim for relief from federal labor claim because Doe defendants "are
not allowed" in federal practice).
137. See, e.g., Bonanno v. Thomas, 309 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1962) (noting without comment
the presence of Doe defendants in civil rights suit).
138. By 1980, the Ninth Circuit formally had recognized the propriety of Doe pleading in
at least some federal question cases. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that although "[a]s a general rule, the use of 'John Doe' to identify a defendant is
not favored," plaintiff in a federal civil rights action may be permitted to name John Doe defend-
ants where their true identity is not known prior to filing of the complaint); see also Wilson v.
Gerst, No. 89-16166, 1991 WL 126436, at I (9th Cir. 1991) ("Unknown defendants may be
named in certain circumstances, such as when the identity of the alleged defendants is not known
prior to the filing of the complaint and may be identified through discovery.").
139. Today, some courts in the Ninth Circuit allow Doe defendants in original diversity
cases, while others, relying on the ban, reject them. See D. ARiz. Loc. R. 1.9(d) (citing Molnar
and directing that "the Clerk shall refuse to accept for filing any civil action or proceeding origi-
nally commenced in this Court any complaint wherein any party is designated and sought to be
joined under a fictitious name"); C.D. CAL Loc. COv. R. 3.7.2.1 (directing the clerk to refuse any
complaint, in actions based on diversity, that designates a party by a fictitious name); Swartz v.
Gold Dust Casino, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 543 (D. Nev. 1981) (allowing Doe defendant in diversity suit
where the identity of the alleged defendant is not known at the time of the filing of the com-
plaint). Still others continue to rely on old authority such as Sigurdson, supra note 136, to ban
Doe parties in federal question cases as well. See, e.g., Riley v. Brazeau, 612 F. Supp. 674, 679
(D. Or. 1985) (citing Sigurdson and granting motion in federal securities action to dismiss Doe
defendants because the "Ninth Circuit does not permit the inclusion of John Doe defendants");
Savage v. Holiday Inn Corp., 603 F. Supp. 311 (D. Nev. 1985) (citing Sigurdson and striking
Doe defendant in federal discrimination suit because "plaintiff has conceded that the Ninth Cir-
cuit frowns upon the naming of fictitious persons as defendants").
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Most federal courts have shied away from an absolute ban on Doe
defendants in diversity cases. 140 They follow a case-by-case method and
use a variety of tests to determine whether to allow Doe defendants.
Some courts try to determine whether John Doe represents an actual
person or is a merely "nominal" party.141 Other courts allow the plain-
tiff to attempt to prove that the Doe defendants and the named plaintiff
are of diverse citizenship. 142 Still others appear to ignore any Doe de-
fendants for diversity purposes unless and until the plaintiff determines
their true identity and tries to add them to the suit.
43
Prior to 1987, Doe cases removed to federal court from state court
had all the questions of original diversity cases as well as the added
problem of whether the plaintiff named a phantom Doe defendant
solely to stay in state court.144 Due to this fear of forum manipulation,
courts refrained from banning removal of all Doe defendant actions. In
place of such a bar, they created a variety of tests to determine when a
Doe action could be removed and whether the Doe could remain after
removal. 145 These tests confused removal practices. The removal debate
140. However, some district judges individually impose complete bans on Doe defendants in
their courts in diversity cases. Judge Shadur of the Northern District of Illinois, for example,
actively reviews cases for subject matter jurisdiction and sua sponte dismisses Doe defendant cases
based on diversity. See, e.g., Salzstein v. Bekins Van Lines, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ill.
1990); McAdoo v. Wagoner, 669 F. Supp. 884 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
141. See, e.g., Block v. First Blood Assocs., 691 F. Supp. 685, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Until
[plaintiff] has identified the Doe defendants or stated an actionable claim against these fictitious
parties, at least as to class or category or participation in acts alleged in the complaint, the Doe
defendants must be regarded as nominal and not competent to defeat diversity jurisdiction.").
142. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Central Nat'l Bank, 555 F. Supp. 1026, 1027
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (acknowledging that plaintiff in some cases can plead "in good conscience" the
diverse citizenship of John Doe but holding that plaintiff could not do so for unknown claimants).
It is interesting to note that the author of this opinion is Judge Shadur, who now actively pursues
and dismisses Doe defendants. See supra note 140.
143. Ward v. Conner, 495 F. Supp. 434, 440-41 (E.D. Va. 1980) (postponing "final decision
on the diversity question until the time for serving defendants with process has elapsed and the
citizenship of any served 'John Doe' defendants can be ascertained"), rev'd on other grounds, 657
F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Hannah v. Majors, 35 F.R.D. 179,
180 (W.D. Mo. 1964) (denying challenge to diversity jurisdiction because "no amendment has
been permitted to make anyone really existing a defendant in the place of a Doe defendant"); see
also Rodriguez v. City of Passaic, 730 F. Supp. 1314, 1319 n.7 (D.N.J.) (holding that Doe allega-
tion in civil rights suit is "mere surplusage and will be disregarded by the court"), affid, 914 F.2d
244 (3d Cir. 1990); Dunn v. Paducah Int'l Raceway, 599 F. Supp. 612, 613 n.1 (W.D. Ky. 1984)
("John Does do not destroy diversity where plaintiff alleges diversity in good faith").
144. See, e.g., Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939) ("It is always open to the
non-resident defendant to show that the resident defendant has not been joined in good faith and
for that reason should not be considered in determining the right to remove.").
145. Even the Ninth Circuit, which purported to ban Doe parties in all diversity actions,
had at least five exceptions for removed actions. Courts in the Ninth Circuit generally did not
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came to a crescendo in 1987, when the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc in
Bryant v. Ford Motor Co. 4" and frustrated by the many different rules
and exceptions, imposed an outright ban on removal of any state action
with a Doe defendant. 47
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Bryant,"48 but Congress
acted in the meantime to overturn it.149 In 1988, Congress amended the
removal statute to expressly allow removal of actions with Doe defend-
ants.160 The removal statute now states: "[f]or purposes of removal
under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious
names shall be disregarded."151 This is the only section of the federal
procedural scheme to directly address Doe parties. The change in the
removal provision was a narrow measure, apparently prompted by the
ban in Bryant.152 Neither Congress nor the Judicial Conference, which
remand removed diversity actions when: (1) named defendants proved that the Doe defendants are
wholly fictitious; (2) the complaint contained no charging allegations against the Doe defendants;
(3) plaintiffs unequivocally abandoned their claims against the Doe defendants; (4) the complaint
did not identify the Doe defendants with sufficient specificity; and (5) the Doe defendants were
not indispensable parties. See, e.g., Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1987)
(surveying exceptions and case law), cert. granted, 488 U.S. 816 (1988), cert. vacated, 488 U.S.
986, vacated, 886 F.2d 1526 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1076 (1990).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 605-06 ("[T]he 30-day limit for removal contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) will
not commence until all Doe defendants are either named, unequivocally abandoned by the plain-
tiff, or dismissed by the state court.").
148. 488 U.S. 816, cert. vacated, 488 U.S. 986 (1988).
149. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. 100-702, § 1016(a), 102
Stat. 4654, 4669 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994)). The Ninth Circuit later vacated
its decision in Bryant to reflect the new removal statute. 886 F.2d 1526 (9th Cir. 1989).
150. See § 1016(a), 102 Stat. at 4669.
151. Id. In the same legislation, Congress also added another new provision to the removal
statute that clarified the court's power to remand the case to state court if the plaintiff sought to
substitute an actual defendant for John Doe who destroys the court's diversity jurisdiction: "If
after removal the plaintiff seeks to join additional defendants whose joinder would destroy subject
matter jurisdiction, the court may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the
State court." § 1016(e), 102 Stat. at 4670 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (1994)).
152. See generally Susan E. Foe, Note, Doe Pleading to Be Disregarded in Diversity Juris-
diction: Congress Responds to Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 19 GOLDEN GATE U. L. Rav. 127
(1989). However, the Bryant decision had been argued, but not formally decided, when the Judi-
cial Conference proposed changing the removal statute to accommodate Doe defendants. Bryant
was argued en bane on July 16, 1987 and decided on November 6, 1987, following a 1986 decision
by a panel of the Ninth circuit. The first formal record of the statutory John Doe removal propo-
sal is in a report from a September 21-22, 1987 meeting, in which the Judicial Conference consid-
ered a general bill that was to become the Court Reform and Access to Justice Act. Before this
meeting, the Doe removal provision was not in the proposed reform bill. See Court Reform and
Access to Justice Act: Hearings on H.R. 3152 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
and Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., Ist & 2d Sess.
67 (1987 statement of Eno B. Hunter, Chairman of Comm. on Court Administration of the
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proposed the Doe defendant changes, formally addressed the impact of
Doe defendants on the court's original jurisdiction over diversity
actions. 1
53
This partial solution has confounded courts. In Macheras v. Center
Art Galleries-Hawaii, Inc.,'" the court complained of a "troubling lack
of guidance as to how the Doe defendant issue is to be handled in a
section 1332 [original diversity] action,"' 55 and then analyzed the ef-
fect of a bifurcated rule for removed and original diversity actions. If
the presence of a Doe defeated diversity in an original section 1332
action, then a plaintiff who wanted to use Doe parties would have to
resort to state court, thereby giving the defendant, who now could re-
move a Doe action, the exclusive choice of forum. 56 The court declined
to give defendants this advantage or to impose forfeiture of Doe plead-
ing "rights" as a condition on the plaintiff's filing in federal court.15
7
The plaintiff in such cases already is taking a risk:
A plaintiff who names Doe defendants, files suit in federal court at his peril. If a
Judicial Conference of the United States). The reform bill, containing the Doe defendant removal
provision, was enacted on November 19, 1988. § 1016, 102 Stat. at 4669-70.
153. The only official commentary on the new John Doe provision was the following:
This amendment addresses a problem that arises in an number of states that permit suits
against "Doe" defendants. The primary purpose of naming fictitious defendants is to sus-
pend the running of the statute of limitations. The general rule has been that a joinder of
Doe defendants defeats diversity jurisdiction unless their citizenship can be established, or
unless they are nominal parties whose citizenship can be disregarded even if known. This
rule in turn creates special difficulties in defining the time for removal. Removal becomes
possible when the Doe defendants are identified or dropped, perhaps as late as the start of
trial, or when it becomes clear that any claims against the Doe defendants are fictitious or
merely nominal. At best, the result may be disruptive removal after a case has progressed
through several stages in the State court. At worse, the result may be great uncertainty as
to the time when removal becomes possible, premature attempts to remove and litigation
over removability, and forfeiture of the removal opportunity by delay after the point that in
retrospect seems to have made clear the right to remove. These problems can be avoided by
the disregard of fictitious defendants for purposes of removal. Experience in the district
courts in California, where Doe defendants are routinely added to state court complaints,
suggests that in many cases no effort will be made to substitute real defendants for the Doe
defendants, or the newly identified defendants will not destroy diversity. If the plaintiff
seeks to substitute a diversity-destroying defendant after removal, the court can act as
appropriate under proposed § 1447(d) [enacted as § 1447(e), see supra note to deny join-
der, or to permit joinder and remand to the State court.
H.R. REp. No. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. at 71 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5982, 6031-32.
154. 776 F. Supp. 1436 (D. Haw. 1991).
155. Id. at 1439.
156. Id. at 1439-40.
157. Id. at 1440.
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key party turns out to be nondiverse, the action will be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. If the statute of limitations has expired at this point, plaintiff may
not be able to refile the case in state court. Plaintiff therefore bears the risk of
making a mistake about the citizenship of a Doe party. This is a sufficient con-
cession to be exacted from the plaintiff who chooses the federal forum. There is
no need for the federal court to fashion additional artificial limitations.1 8
The court in Salzstein v. Bekins Van Lines, Inc.159 reached the
opposite conclusion. Because the new statute addressed only removal,
the court refused to extend it to an original diversity action. The court
explained:
Congress' 1988 response to Bryant. . .was limited to legislating in the context
of removal, to prevent a plaintiff from barring a defendant's access to federal
courts by the simple device of naming "Doe" as another defendant. But, the
negative inference of such limited legislation is that it works no change (and
implies none) where the question is where the plaintiff forfeits such access by the
entirely self-controlled decision as to how the complaint should be drawn.160
Thus, the question of a Doe defendant's impact on diversity jurisdiction
may be even more confused today than in 1987, when the Ninth Cir-
cuit set out to clarify the procedure for removal of Doe actions, or in
1988, when Congress tried the same.
2. Uncertain Venue in Doe Defendant Actions
Doe defendants also complicate venue, but not to the same degree
as diversity jurisdiction. For most actions, whether based on diversity
or federal question jurisdiction, venue is proper in the "district in which
any defendant resides, if all defendants reside in the same state."1 61 As
with diversity jurisdiction, the uncertainty arises only where plaintiff
seeks to name a John Doe defendant, not when he designates himself as
158. Id. There would be no statute of limitations risk in a state that tolls a limitations
period during the pendency of the action in another court. See, e.g., 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN.
§ 5103(b) (Supp. 1995) (providing that actions originally fied in federal court but dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction may be "transferred" to Pennsylvania commonwealth court and treated as
though originally filed in that court); see also Easton, supra note 51, at 322 n.102 ("There is
disagreement about whether the filing of a suit in a court that never had jurisdiction tols the
statute of limitations. But when plaintiff properly fies his original complaint in federal court, and
the court loses jurisdiction due to later joinder of non-diverse parties, the plaintiff's argument that
the statute of limitations should toll is much stronger.") (citations omitted).
159. 747 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
160. Id. at 1283 n.4.
161. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(1), (b)(1) (1994). Section 1391(a) governs actions based on the
court's diversity jurisdiction. Section 1391(b) governs actions based on federal questions. Section
(1) of each is identical.
1996]
UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
a Doe plaintiff. It is defendant's place of residence, not plaintiff's, that
serves as a basis for venue under the general venue provisions.Y2 Un-
like the diversity determination, however, the defendant's place of resi-
dence is not essential to venue selection. The venue statute provides
other choices in addition to the defendant's residence, such as the dis-
trict in which a substantial part of the events occurred.6 3 Nevertheless,
the inability to determine a Doe defendant's place of residence limits
the plaintiff's available venue options and creates procedural
uncertainty.
Where the plaintiff sues a single Doe defendant, his lack of knowl-
edge of John Doe's residence necessarily eliminates that as a venue op-
tion. The plaintiff will have to sue where the events occurred. Where
the plaintiff sues named defendants in addition to John Doe, however,
the impact on venue is not as certain. Under the venue statute, place of
residence is a proper venue only if "all defendants reside" in the same
state.'6 Here, the question mirrors the problem in diversity cases,
whether the Doe defendant may be disregarded so that the case can
proceed in an otherwise proper forum, a district in a state where all of
the named defendants live. No court has, as of the date this article was
written, addressed this question. 65 But as the popularity of Doe de-
162. For years, plaintiff's residence was a proper place for venue in diversity actions, but
Congress eliminated it as a venue option when it revised the general venue statute in 1990. See
Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, § 311, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 5089, 5114 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1994)). Under selected special venue provisions, plaintiff's place of resi-
dence remains a proper venue. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (venue for actions against federal
officers).
163. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(a)(2), (b)(2) (providing that diversity and non-diversity based civil
actions may be brought only in a judicial district in which "a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred," or in which "a substantial part of property that is the
subject of the action is situated"). The statute also provides a catch-all provision if venue is not
proper elsewhere by allowing the plaintiff in a diversity action to bring the action in a judicial
district in which the defendants are subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is com-
menced, see § 1391(a)(3), or, in the case at a non-diversity based action, in the district in which
any defendant may be found, see § 1391(b)(3). Finally, in an action against a federal officer or
employee in his official capacity, the statute allows venue in a district where a defendant resides,
where a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred, and where the plaintiff
resides. § 1391(e). Such special provisions will not help plaintiffs in Bivens actions because such
suits are against officers in their individual capacity and are governed by the general venue provi-
sion of § 1391(b) rather than § 1391(e). See Cameron v. Thornburgh, 983 F.2d 253, 256 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (stating that § 1391(e) applies only to suits against government officers in their official
capacities and not to Bivens actions).
164. See §§ 1391(a)(1), (b)(1).
165. Very few cases have considered any issue relating to Doe defendants and venue. See
Fidtler v. Doe, 1994 WL 12116, 1 n.2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 1994) (holding that in a Section 1983
action, that "[b]ecause the residence of the unnamed police officer is not known, 28 U.S.C.
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fendants continues to grow, the uncertainty inevitably will cause proce-
dural disputes and delays.
C. Relation Back: Incongruity of the "Mistake" Standard and Doe
Substitutions
Ironically, the very rule that caused the explosion in federal Doe
defendant practice-the 1966 relation back standard-creates the most
difficulties for Doe defendants today. The primary reason that a plain-
tiff pleads a Doe defendant is to try to avoid a statute of limitations
bar.166 Limitations relief depends on relation back, and an amendment
relates back under Rule 15(c) only where the plaintiff made a mistake
in identifying the defendant. A Doe allegation simply is not a mistake.
When federal rulemakers adopted the mistake standard in 1966, they
did not consider its impact on Doe substitutions. Inattention is no
longer possible. Since 1966, federal courts throughout the country have
had to struggle with the mistake clause in Doe cases. They have failed
to reach a workable solution. Not only is relation back muddled in fed-
eral Doe cases, but the confusion has spilled over and contaminated
both non-Doe cases in federal court and Doe cases in state court.
1. Conflicting Applications of the Rule 15(c)(3) Mistake Standard
to Doe Substitutions
In order to relate back, an amendment that changes a party after
the limitations period must meet either the federal standards for rela-
tion back in Rule 15(c)(3), or in a limited number of cases, the relation
back tests of state law, pursuant to Rule 15(c)(1).267 This state law
§ 1391(b)(1) does not apply"); Berger v. King World Prods., Inc., 732 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Mich.
1990) (holding venue proper in district where all defendants reside even though one defendant was
designated as Jane Doe because all parties agreed to her actual identity and citizenship).
166. See. e.g., Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir.) ("The only purpose the
naming of fictitious defendants could possibly serve is to make it possible to substitute named
defendants after the statute of limitations has run."), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969); McAl-
lister v. Henderson, 698 F. Supp. 865, 869 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (same).
167. In 1991, rulemakers repackaged Rule 15(c): they added a new subsection 15(c)(1)
which addressed relation back under state law, discussed infra notes 211-29; moved the "same
transaction" standard (the original 1938 rule) into its own subsection, 15(c)(2); and put the 1966
changing party provisions-the notice and mistake clauses-in Rule 15(c)(3). To read the entire
text of the current Rule 15(c), see supra note 15. In addition to this reorganization, rulemakers
made two revisions to the change of party provision of Rule 15(c)(3). One expanded the notice
period. See discussion infra notes 169-71. The other clarified that the notice and mistake clauses
apply to both substitution of a new party and the correction of the name of an existing party. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3); FED. K Civ. P. 15 advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment) (revis-
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option is new, part of the 1991 amendment to Rule 15(c), and is dis-
cussed in the next section. As will be seen, most amendments adding
new defendants, including Doe substitutions, are judged by the same
standards, whether under state or federal law. Those standards, now
embodied in Rule 15(c)(3), are: first, that the claim against the new
defendant arise out of the same transaction as a claim in the original
complaint; second, that the new defendant have timely notice of the
original lawsuit; and third, that the new defendant timely realize that
"but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the ac-
tion would have been brought against the [new defendant]."""
True Doe amendments should always arise out of the same facts
as the original pleading and thus meet the first test of Rule 15(c)(3).
Ordinarily, the amended pleading is a verbatim restatement of the orig-
inal complaint except for the name of the defendant. The substitution
merely replaces "John Doe" with the defendant's actual name. Thus,
the same transaction test presents no problems for Doe substitutions.
The second requirement of timely notice requires a factual deter-
mination in each case. If the new defendant did not have timely notice
of the lawsuit, the plaintiff cannot add him, regardless of whether the
plaintiff originally described him as a Doe defendant or merely mis-
stated his name. Until 1991, courts required the new defendant to learn
ing introductory clause to refer to an amendment that "changes the party or the naming of the
party," in place of the former provision that referred only to amendment "changing the party").
This clarification addressed a point of confusion that followed the 1966 rule. Although the 1966
revision of Rule 15(c) was aimed at both forms of amendments, some courts lost sight of this aim
and took opposing views on the effect of the 1966 rule. A few continued to adhere to the tradi-
tional view of relation back and restricted post-limitations amendments "to situations in which the
plaintiff has actually sued and served the correct party, the party he intends to sue, but merely
mistakenly used the wrong name of the defendant." People of the Living God v. Star Towing Co.,
289 F. Supp. 635, 641 (E.D. La. 1968); see also In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, Inc.,
928 F.2d 1448 (6th Cir. 1991) (affirming the Marlowe rule that new parties cannot be added
after the limitations period); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1064 (6th Cir. 1973) (hold-
ing that 1966 amendment applies only to "correction of misnomers" and does not change the rule
that "an amendment which adds a new party creates a new cause of action and there is no rela-
tion back to the original filing for purposes of limitations"). Some courts took the other extreme
and held that where the amendment merely seeks to correct a misnomer, the amendment may be
made without reference to the notice and mistake requirements. See, e.g., Wentz v. Alberto Cul-
ver Co., 294 F. Supp. 1327, 1328 (D. Mont. 1969) (finding a "difference between correcting a
misnomer and changing a party" and holding "that a misnomer may be corrected under the
amendment power expressed in the first sentence [same transaction clause] of Rule 15(c)"). Con-
tra Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1978) (citing Wentz and other such "misno-
mer" cases and finding that the "history of the 1966 amendment to the Rule indicates to the
contrary, as does the weight of authority"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979).
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(B).
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of the lawsuit before the limitation period expired. 69 This short notice
period often prompted courts to deny relation back of any amendments
adding a defendant, Doe substitution or otherwise. In 1991, rulemakers
expanded the notice period °70 to include the extra time for service after
the limitations period -120 days after filing of the original com-
plaint.' 7 ' Under this rule, a diligent plaintiff can satisfy the notice ele-
169. The actual wording of the 1966 version of Rule 15(c) required the defendant to have
the requisite notice and knowledge "within the period provided by law for commencing the action
against him." 39 F.R.D. 82 (1966). For 20 years, courts and observers debated whether this
phrase meant solely the limitations period or whether it also included the additional time after
filing the complaint for service of process under Rule 4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (allowing at
least 120 days for service). Some courts held that Rule 15(c) included the extra time for service.
E.g., Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 410 (6th Cir. 1982); Kirk v. Cronvich, 629
F.2d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 1980); Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 571 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440
U.S. 940 (1979). Other circuits held that the new defendant must have the specified notice within
the limitations period. E.g., Watson v. Unipress, Inc., 733 F.2d 1386, 1390 (10th Cir. 1984);
Trace X Chemical Inc. v. Gulf Oil Chemical Co., 724 F.2d 68, 70-71 (8th Cir. 1983). In 1986,
the Supreme Court temporarily settled this debate and held that the time period under Rule 15(c)
did not include the extra period for service. Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 31 (1986) (the
"linchpin is notice, and notice within the limitations period"). Commentators criticized Schiavone
as imposing a meaningless double standard. When the plaintiff correctly named the defendant, he
did not have to give that defendant any form of notice within the limitations period (he had the
extra time allotted for formal service under Rule 4), but if the plaintiff made any mistake in
naming the defendant, he had to ensure that that defendant had notice within the limitations
period. See Joseph P. Bauer, Schiavone: An Un-Fortune-ate Illustration of the Supreme Court's
Role as Interpreter of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 720
(1988); Robert D. Brussack, Outrageous Fortune: The Case for Amending Rule 15(c) Again, 61
S. CAL. L. REv. 671 (1988); Lawrence Epter, An Un-Fortune-ate Decision" The Aftermath of the
Supreme Court's Eradication of the Relation Back Doctrine, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 713 (1990).
But see Nathan M. Gundy III, Note, Schiavone v. Fortune: A Clarification of the Relation Back
Doctrine, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 499, 503, 529 (1987) (recognizing "flaws" in the Court's decision
but approving it as a "much needed clarification").
170. In most cases the 1991 change lengthens the notice period, but it also shortens the
notice period in a narrow set of cases-where plaintiff files suit several months before the limita-
tions period expires and defendant receives the requisite notice after the 120-day period but before
the limitations period expires. Any amendment made after the limitations period will not relate
back under new Rule 15(c) because defendant did not have notice within 120 days; whereas it
would have related back under the old rule because the defendant had notice within the limita-
tions period. See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 210 (2d
ed. 1995).
171. Rulemakers agreed that the strict timing requirement of Schiavone, supra note 169
was "inconsistent with the liberal pleading practices" of the Federal Rules and changed Rule
15(c) to define the notice period as the time provided under Rule 4 for service, which currently is
set forth in Rule 4(m). FED. R Civ. P. 15(c) advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment). Rule
4(m) directs that the plaintiff serve all defendants within 120 days but allows some flexibility:
If service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days
after the filing of the complaint, the court, upon motion or on its own initiative after notice
to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the action without prejudice as to that defendant or direct that
service be effected within a specified time; provided that if the plaintiff shows good cause
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ment of Rule 15(c)(3) if, within 120 days of filing the complaint, he
moves to amend the complaint and serves the new defendant with the
motion to amend. 172 This lengthened notice period will dramatically re-
duce the number of cases in which the court will be able to rely on
untimely notice grounds in order to deny relation back of Doe substitu-
tions. They can no longer avoid the thorny problem of reconciling the
mistake clause with Doe pleading. 1
7
The federal courts that have reached the question of mistake in
the Doe context generally fall into one of three camps.174 The first
group takes a simple and literal reading of the mistake language and
holds that a plaintiff's lack of knowledge of the correct defendant is not
a mistake concerning his identity.17 5 These courts, led by the Seventh
Circuit, effectively bar any Doe substitutions after the limitations pe-
riod. On the other extreme are a number of courts in the Third Circuit
and elsewhere that allow Doe substitutions by broadly interpreting the
mistake prong.1 76 They redefine the standard to include any instance in
which the plaintiff omitted the proper defendant from the original com-
plaint. The third, and best, approach ignores the actual mistake lan-
guage and instead looks to whether the complaint Doe allegations were
for the failure, the court shall extend the time for service for an appropriate period.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m). In amending Rule 15(c) to incorporate the Rule 4(m) period, rulemakers
clarified that the Rule 15(c) notice period "allows not only the 120 days specified in [Rule 4(m)],
but also any additional time resulting from any extension ordered by the court pursuant to that
rule." Rule 15(c) advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment); see also Ford v. Hill, 874 F.
Supp. 149 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (denying relation back of Doe substitution on other grounds, but
finding timely notice where plaintiff served defendant with the amended complaint more than 120
days after filing of the original complaint but within the time extended by the court under Rule
4(m)).
172. The motion itself serves as notice of the lawsuit and unequivocally puts the new de-
fendant on notice that he is an intended defendant. See, e.g., Cruz v. Wilmington, 814 F. Supp.
405 (D. Del. 1993) (holding that substitution of named police officers for Does within 120 days
automatically meets the Rule 15(c)(3) requirements).
173. Prior to 1991, courts avoided addressing the mistake clause in Doe cases by finding
untimely notice. See Saffron v. Wilson, 481 F. Supp. 228, 256 (D.D.C. 1979) (noting and avoid-
ing a "host of problems" as to meaning of mistake in the Doe context); see also Welch v. Louisi-
ana Power & Light Co., 466 F.2d 1344 (5th Cir. 1972) (remanding Doe case on notice grounds);
Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.) (denying relation back of Doe substitution on
notice grounds), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 987 (1969); Stephens v. Balkamp, Inc., 70 F.R.D. 49
(E.D. Tenn. 1975) (same).
174. See generally Douglas v. County of Tompkins, No. 90-CV-841, 1995 WL 105993, at
7-8 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1995) (surveying "split" in the courts on "whether unknown identity con-
stitutes a mistake of identity under Rule 15(c)(3)(B)"); Bloessner v. Office Depot, Inc., 158
F.R.D. 168, 170-71 (D. Kan. 1994) (same).
175. See discussion infra part III.C.l.a.
176. See discussion infra part III.C.l.b.
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sufficient to put the new defendant on notice that he was the original
intended defendant.17 7 The danger of these three approaches is not just
that they conflict with each other, but also that all three, in varying
degrees, undermine the purpose of the mistake clause.
a. Strict Reading of "Mistake" to Forbid Doe Substitutions
The Seventh Circuit was the first court of appeals to directly con-
sider and reject reconciliation of the mistake language with the Doe
scenario. In Wood v. Worachek,178 plaintiff brought a Section 1983 ac-
tion against the Milwaukee chief of police and certain named police
commissioners and officers. He also included as defendants the arrest-
ing officers whose names he did not know and could designate only as
John Doe and Richard Roe. After the limitations period, he sought to
add four specific officers for John Doe and Richard Roe. The Seventh
Circuit denied relation back, even though the officer at issue179 had re-
ceived timely notice of the suit. 80 The court denied relation back be-
cause the plaintiff had not made a mistake within the meaning of Rule
15(c):
Rule 15(c)(2) [now 15(c)(3)(B)] permits an amendment to relate back only
where there has been an error made concerning the identity of the proper party
and where that party is chargeable with knowledge of the mistake, but it does
not permit relation back where, as here, there is a lack of knowledge of the
proper party. Thus, in the absence of a mistake in the identification of the proper
party, it is irrelevant for the purposes of Rule 15(c)(2) whether or not the pur-
ported substitute party knew or should have known that the action would have
been brought against him. The record in this case clearly indicates that the
plaintiff did not mistake the identity of the proper party defendant, and he is
therefore precluded from availing himself of the benefits provided by Rule
15(c)(2). 181
177. See discussion infra part III.C.1.c.
178. 618 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1980).
179. The district court held that the claims against all four new officers were barred by the
statute of limitations. Id. at 1228. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit addressed the dismissal of only
one officer. Id. at n.l. The plaintiff urged the court to consider the dismissal of all four officers,
but the court held that the plaintiff had not properly preserved for appeal the issue as to the other
three officers and refused to consider them. Id.
180. The court questioned whether the notice-the plaintiff had deposed the officer before
the limitations period ran-was sufficient to ensure that the defendant "not be prejudiced in main-
taining a defense on the merits," but based its denial of relation back on the mistake requirement.
Id. at 1230.
181. Id. (citing Sassi v. Breier, 584 F.2d 234 (7th Cir. 1978)). Like Wood. Sassi was a
Section 1983 claim against named and unknown Milwaukee police officers. The Sassi court denied
relation back of the plaintiff's attempted substitution of actual officers on notice grounds because
there was nothing in the record to rebut the new defendant officers' affidavits that they had no
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Although the Seventh Circuit purports to follow the literal letter of the
rule, its reading of the mistake clause does not comport with the goal of
Rule 15(c).
In Wood, the court held that whether the new party knew he was
the intended defendant in the suit is "irrelevant." Yet that is precisely
the aim of the mistake clause. The rule requires a mistake because that
is a means by which to assure that the defendant know that the plain-
tiff intended to bring the action against him. Doe allegations provide an
alternative, if not better, method to put the defendant on notice that
"the action would have been brought against him" as required by Rule
15(c)(3)(B). A well-pleaded Doe allegation eliminates any speculation
by describing the particular defendant whom the plaintiff intends to
sue and explaining why the plaintiff did not sue the defendant by
name-he did not know defendant's name. The Wood rule ignores this
value of Doe allegations.
The Seventh Circuit's limited reading of the mistake clause can
cause unduly harsh results even in non-Doe cases. The impact of such a
limited reading is illustrated by Wilson v. United States.182 Wilson was
injured while testing boats for the Navy and brought suit against his
employer, General Electric, under the Jones Act. He made a mistake in
drafting his complaint. The United States Navy, not General Electric,
owned the equipment, and General Electric won summary judgment on
this ground. Wilson moved to substitute the United States as defend-
ant, and by the time he filed the amended complaint, the limitations
period had expired. The First Circuit denied relation back, relying in
part on the Seventh Circuit's decision in Wood, because Wilson's lack
of knowledge of the proper defendant was not a mistake within the
meaning of Rule 15(c)(3)(B).1 83
knowledge of the suit and did not know that they were intended defendants. Sassi, 584 F.2d at
235. Since Wood, the Seventh Circuit has reaffirmed its strict reading of the mistake clause in
Doe cases. See Worthington v. Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying the Wood
rule to deny Doe substitution).
182. 23 F.3d 559 (1st Cir. 1994).
183. Id. at 563. The First Circuit has not yet addressed whether relation back of a Doe
amendment is consistent with Rule 15(c). Prior to Wilson, at least one district court in the First
Circuit allowed relation back of a Doe substitution in a Section 1983 action involving defendant
police officers, notwithstanding the preexisting authority in the Seventh Circuit. See Ocasio Ortiz
v. Betancourt Lebron, 146 F.R.D. 34 (D.P.R. 1992). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has endorsed
the Seventh Circuit view of mistake in a non-Doe case, but it has not yet applied it to Doe substi-
tutions. See Western Contracting Corp. v. Bechtel Corp., 885 F.2d 1196, 1207 (4th Cir. 1989).
District courts in the Fourth Circuit have extended the Seventh Circuit view to Doe cases and
denied relation back of Doe substitutions. See Bruce v. Smith, 581 F. Supp. 902, 907 (W.D. Va.
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Wilson obviously did not confuse General Electric with the United
States government, but he may have mistook which entity owned the
boats. In other words, Wilson may have made a "mistake concerning
the identity of the proper party"-the boat owner. If his complaint al-
leged that General Electric owned the boats, and if the United States
had the requisite notice of the complaint, then it very well could have
understood that it was the intended defendant because it owned the
boats. The First Circuit, however, foreclosed any such analysis by
adopting the Wood rule.1'
b. Broad Re-definition of "Mistake" to Allow Doe
Substitutions
Doe cases have wreaked havoc on the mistake clause in the other
extreme as well. Beginning with a 1972 John Doe case in Nevada fed-
eral court, Williams v. Avis Transport of Canada, Ltd.,185 a number of
courts have used an overly broad reading of the mistake language. In
Avis, Williams had an accident while driving a Chrysler station-wagon,
leased from Avis, and equipped with Goodyear tires. He brought a
products liability action in Nevada state court against Avis and "Does
I through X," claiming that Avis leased the car with defective tires.
Avis removed the action to federal court and then brought in Chrysler
and Goodyear by impleader. Williams next tried to add claims against
Chrysler and Goodyear, which responded that the statute of limitations
1984) (relying on Wood). In the Sixth Circuit, the court of appeals has yet to rule on the issue,
and district courts are split on application of the Seventh Circuit's Wood rule to Doe substitutions.
Compare Ford v. Hill, 874 F. Supp. 149, 153-54 (E.D. Ky. 1995) (relying on Worthington v.
Wilson, 8 F.3d 1253 (7th Cir. 1993), to deny relation back of Doe substitution in absence of a
"mistake") with O'Brien v. City of Grand Rapids, 783 F. Supp. 1034, 1038-39 (W.D. Mich.
1992) (noting Wood and intercircuit conflict in Doe cases but granting relation back of Doe
amendment). The only circuit to directly address the Wood rule in a Doe case is the Second
Circuit, which followed Wood. See Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep't, 66 F.3d 466 (2d Cir.
1995) (citing Wood and denying relation back of a Doe substitution because "the new names were
added not to correct a mistake but to correct a lack of knowledge").
184. 23 F.3d at 563. Even if the court had reached the issue, however, it would have denied
the new claim on the grounds that the United States did not have timely notice of the filing of the
complaint and that the plaintiff delayed in filing the amended complaint for five months after the
court granted leave to amend. Id. at 61-62. Nevertheless, the First Circuit's endorsement of Wood
in Wilson creates bad precedent. The court in Ford v. Hill, 874 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. Ky. 1995), for
example, relied upon Wilson to deny a Doe substitution even though the plaintiff timely served the
defendant with the amended complaint that unequivocally told him that he was the intended John
Doe defendant. Id. at 153-54.
185. 57 F.R.D 53 (D. Nev. 1972).
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barred Williams' claims against them. Williams sought relation back
under Rule 15(c).1 86
The court split its decision. It allowed relation back only as to
Goodyear and based the difference on notice. 187 Avis had notified
Goodyear, but not Chrysler, of the suit within the limitation period.
The court therefore found that the amendment as to Chrysler failed
under the notice prong of Rule 15(c).1 8 Goodyear, on the other hand,
had timely notice of the suit, so the court next considered the mistake
clause. The court did not analyze whether the naming of the Doe de-
fendant was a "mistake"; instead, it simply redefined the mistake lan-
guage: "[a] mistake within the meaning of the rule exists whenever a
party who may be liable for the actionable conduct alleged in the Com-
plaint was omitted as a party defendant." 189
The Avis test-whether the plaintiff omitted a defendant-is far
too broad. Every amendment that seeks to add a defendant would meet
this test, rendering the mistake clause superfluous. The plaintiff could
add any defendant, so long as the defendant had notice of any lawsuit
concerning activity in which "he may be liable."190 The "may be lia-
ble" qualification in the Avis test does not protect the defendant's inter-
est in repose. Statutes of limitation give repose to alleviate fear of lia-
bility. The whole point of repose is to relieve a potential defendant of
the uncertainty concerning activity for which he fears the plaintiff may
seek to hold him liable. If he has no such fear, there is no need for
repose.
Courts have relied upon the Avis test in non-Doe cases to justify
relation back even where the new defendant was entitled to repose. In
Taliferro v. Costello,191 for example, the court used the Avis test to
186. Williams also argued that the court should apply the Nevada state rule of relation
back, which he argued liberally allowed Doe substitutions without regard to the limitations in
Rule 15(c). Id. at 55-56. The court rejected this contention:
No federal statute or rule specifically countenances the naming of fictitious parties in a
lawsuit, and the policy expressed in the Ninth Circuit decisions is so strongly opposed to
the practice that this Court is constrained to reject the contention that the substitution of a
real party for a "Doe" defendant under circumstances which do not satisfy the require-
ments of F.R.C.P. 15(c) relates back to the commencement of the action for purposes of
the statue of limitations. It is a procedural matter, not one of substantive law.
Id. at 56.




191. 467 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
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form a new mistake standard-the "joinder test"-that offers no pro-
tection of the defendant's repose. There, Tom Taliferro and his wife
brought a Section 1983 action against Frank Costello, the deputy sher-
iff of the city of Philadelphia. After the limitations period, they sought
to add the city of Philadelphia to the suit. The court allowed the addi-
tion of the city, relying on Doe cases as "strong support" for a broad
reading of Rule 15(c):19 2 "Where an amendment seeks to add a new
defendant, [the mistake clause] of Rule 15(c) seems designed to insure
that prior to the expiration of the limitation period, the new defendant
knew (or should have known) that his joinder was a distinct
possibility." 193
The Taliferro joinder test, like the Avis test, renders the mistake
prong of Rule 15(c) meaningless. To be sure, in an obvious mistake
situation, or where the complaint describes a Doe defendant, the in-
tended defendant, once he knows of the suit, should understand that he
was the intended defendant to that suit. Once he realizes that he was
an intended defendant, he will then also understand that his joinder is a
distinct possibility. The flaw of the joinder test is that it tries to reverse
this logic. That a defendant appreciates that he might be joined in a
suit does not mean that he also knows that the plaintiff actually
thought he had named him as an original defendant. 1"
Even in the Taliferro case itself, the broad joinder test caused the
wrong result. The Taliferros' error was not the type that should justify
relation back. Admittedly, their plight was worthy of sympathy. They
filed pro se and too narrowly interpreted their available legal claims.
195
192. Citing Avis and other cases that allowed Doe substitutions to relate back, including
Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, 550 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1977), see infra notes 200-03, the court con-
cluded that "[gliven the frequently expressed hostility to John Doe complaints, these decisions
provide strong support for a holding that Rule 15(c) applies when an amendment adds a new
defendant." 467 F. Supp. at 35 n.3.
193. Id. at 36. Just four years before Taliferro, another court in the Third Circuit reached
the opposite result as it considered and rejected the "expansive definition" of Avis as rendering the
mistake requirement "redundant" of the notice prong. Francis v. Pan Am. Trinidad Oil Co., 392
F. Supp. 1252, 1259 n.13 (D. Del. 1975). Similarly, a few courts in the Third Circuit continue to
reject Avis after Taliferro. See Great Northeastern Lumber & Millwork Corp. v. Pepsi Cola
Metro. Bottling Co., 785 F. Supp. 514 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (rejecting Avis rule as going "too far").
194. Indeed, courts have misapplied the Taliferro joinder test, or some other variation on
the Avis test, to allow addition of defendants who had affirmative reason to believe that the plain-
tiffs did not intend to sue them. See, e.g., Davis v. Buffalo Psych. Ctr., 613 F. Supp. 462
(W.D.N.Y. 1985) (citing Taliferro in employment discrimination suit to allow late addition of
defendant which plaintiff knew and previously named in related EEOC charge but did not name
in original complaint), vacated in part on other grounds, 623 F. Supp. 19 (W.D.N.Y. 1985).
195. In their amended complaint, the Taliferros, through their new lawyer, wanted to rely
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However, Rule 15(c) does not-and should not-allow amendments af-
ter the limitations period to cure every kind of mistake. The mistake
should be of the type that reasonably puts the potential defendant on
notice that the plaintiff intended to sue him in the first place. The
Taliferros did not meet this standard-they did not intend to sue the
city when they filed their complaint. As far as the city was concerned,
the Taliferros could have made this choice for any number of reasons,
including not only mistakes but also deliberate strategic decisions. Re-
pose and Rule 15(c)(3)(B) are supposed to protect potential defendants
from having to speculate in every case why plaintiffs did not sue them
and whether they should expect to be joined.196
The Avis and Taliferro analyses are not well-suited for Doe cases.
They do nothing to assure that the new defendant understands from
the original Doe pleadings that he is an intended defendant. Doe alle-
gations do not always effectively put a potential defendant on notice
that he is an intended defendant. A simple listing of generic Doe de-
fendants, without more, does not tell the defendant that he is the John
Doe. Such notice, however, would be provided by particularized allega-
tions that describe John Doe and his involvement in the events giving
rise to the suit. In Avis, for example, if Williams described one of the
Doe defendants as the unknown manufacturer of the tire, Goodyear
may have known it was an intended defendant." 7 If on the other hand,
Williams had listed John Doe defendants only generally, 9 8 then Good-
both on an "official policy" basis for the city's liability under Section 1983, which the Supreme
Court had just the year before recognized in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978), see supra notes 38 and 40, as well as claims that arguably existed against the
city even before Monell-state claims under pendent jurisdiction and claims arising directly under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 467 F. Supp. at 36.
196. By contrast, in Wilson v. United States, 23 F.3d 559 (lst Cir. 1994), the U.S. govern-
ment, assuming it had notice of the complaint itself, likely would not have had to speculate why it,
as owner of the boats in question, was not named as defendant. See supra notes 182-84. Plaintiff
apparently wanted to sue the owner of the boat, but mistakenly identified General Electric as the
owner. See 23 F.3d at 560. Mistaken identification of the owner of the particular boat in question
should have been enough to give the true owner, the government, reason to believe that it was the
intended defendant.
197. See Avis, 57 F.R.D. 53. Because the court did not consider the adequacy of the Doe
allegations, the opinion does not disclose whether the identity of the tire manufacturer was actu-
ally unknown to Williams and whether the Doe designations in any way described Goodyear or its
alleged role in the accident. Likewise, the opinion does not state whether Goodyear timely saw the
actual complaint so that it could appreciate the Doe allegations, or just heard of the suit from
Avis.
198. Nevada, the state in which Williams originally brought his action, does not permit
generic Doe designations, at least as of 1991. In that year, the Nevada Supreme Court clarified
that a plaintiff cannot just list Doe defendants as a precaution against the possibility of not having
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year, although knowing that it was potentially liable, may not have
known that it was an intended defendant and the amendment would
contravene the repose element of the statute of limitations. The Avis
court, however, never addressed these questions because its broad read-
ing of the mistake clause rendered an in-depth analysis of the Doe alle-
gations unnecessary.""
c. Evaluation of the Notice Effect of Doe Allegations
Very few courts evaluate the adequacy of the actual text of Doe
allegations and the quality of the notice given to the defendants. No
court of appeals has formally adopted an in-depth analysis of the Doe
allegations as the proper means to address a Doe substitution under
Rule 15(c). The Third Circuit, however, came close to that endorse-
ment in Varlack v. SWC Caribbean, Inc.200 There, Varlack lost part of
his arm as a result of a fight with an employee at an Orange Julius
restaurant. He sued SWC Caribbean, which owned the restaurant, and
an " 'unknown employee' of Orange Julius Restaurant."20 1 After the
limitations period expired, Varlack tried to substitute the night manger
of the restaurant, a man named Cannings, for the unknown employee.
The Third Circuit held that the relation back criteria of Rule 15(c)
governed the timeliness of Doe substitutions and found that Varlack's
identified all wrongdoers. Nurenberger Hercules-Werke GMBH v. Virostek, 822 P.2d 1100, 1106
(Nev. 1991) (holding that plaintiff must include the Doe in the caption, plead the basis for identi-
fying the Doe by a fictitious name, specify the Doe's connection with the acts in the complaint,
and exercise due diligence in ascertaining the true identity of John Doe).
199. In Heinly v. Queen, 146 F.R.D. 102 (E.D. Pa. 1993), the court both cited the joinder
test and looked at the notice effect of the Doe allegations and, in so doing, demonstrated the
futility of the joinder test. Heinly was shot during an arrest and brought a Section 1983 action
against named defendants and ten John Does, whom he described as members of the special as-
sault team that arrested him. Heinly identified the officers in discovery and sought to add six
officers by name after the limitations period had expired. The court relied on the Taliferro joinder
test to justify relation back of the substitution, but also noted that the Doe allegations were suffi-
cient to put the officers on notice that they were the intended defendants. Id. at 107-08. If the Doe
allegations were sufficient notice, then the joinder test added nothing. The officers understood that
their joinder was a possibility because they knew that they were the intended defendants. On the
other hand, the joinder test would have permitted relation back even absent any Doe allegations.
All persons involved in an arrest should realize that their joinder to a Section 1983 suit based on
that arrest is a possibility, regardless of the naming of Doe defendants. See Sendobry v. Michael,
160 F.R.D. 471, 473 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (allowing Doe substitution, relying in part on Heinly for
joinder test, and holding that naming of Doe defendant is "immaterial" because a "party who
participated in conduct described in a complaint should reasonably expect to be named regardless
of whether the caption refers to that party as 'John Doe' or as an 'unnamed defendant' ").
200. 550 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1977).
201. Id. at 174.
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amendment met all three standards.0 2 As to the mistake clause, the
court stated:
Cannings testified that he knew there was a suit against "an 'Unknown' Em-
ployee of Orange Julius Restaurant." He also admitted that the phrase "Un-
known Employee" referred to him, even though it didn't use his name, and that
if his name had been captioned he would have been one of the persons sued. We
think this testimony was manifestly a sufficient basis on which the district court
could conclude that the final condition for relation back under Rule 15(c) was
satisfied.
2 0 3
The Third Circuit did not evaluate the adequacy of the Doe allegations
themselves because it did not need to-Cannings admitted that he un-
derstood that he was the intended unknown employee defendant.
In Campbell v. Bergeron, °4 the district court did evaluate the Doe
allegations and held that they were adequate to put a reasonable person
on notice that he was the intended defendant. °5 Campbell suffered a
serious eye injury while in jail and brought a Section 1983 action
against the sheriff, whom he identified by name, and John Doe, a dep-
uty sheriff, whom Campbell could not name but described through his
actions on the night of the arrest.20 6 Soon after Campbell served the
sheriff, the sheriff told the deputy, a man named Pattan, about the suit
and the allegations contained in the complaint. During discovery,
Campbell identified Pattan as the deputy and sought to add Pattan by
his true name. Pattan claimed Campbell had moved to amend too
late.20 7 The court allowed the amendment to relate back:
[T]here can be no doubt that this complaint described Deputy Pattan in every-
thing except his correct name and that anyone having familiarity with the inci-
dent and with the complaint would know that the "John Doe" specified was actu-
202. Id. at 174-75.
203. Id. at 175. The court in Taliferro v. Costello relied on this holding as support for its
broad reading of the mistake clause to allow relation back at all Doe defendants. 467 F. Supp. 33
(E.D. Pa. 1979); see supra note 192. However, Varlack never attempted to reconcile the language
of the mistake clause with the content of the Doe allegations.
204. 486 F. Supp. 1246 (M.D. La. 1980), af'd, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981).
205. Id. at 1251.
206. The complaint alleged that Campbell had requested deputy John Doe to move him to
another cell and that John Doe refused. Id. at 1250.
207. Louisiana has a "prescription" provision rather than a statute of limitations. Id. at
1251. It requires the action to be brought in one year but also interrupts prescription if a suit is
timely filed against one joint obligor or tortfeasor. Id. Ordinarily, filing of the action against the
sheriff would have tolled the prescription period against the deputy. However, the court found that
the sheriff could not be liable under Section 1983 because he was not personally involved in the
alleged conduct and that therefore there was no interruption of prescription as to the deputy. Id.
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ally Pattan. Thus, anyone who received a copy of the complaint knew or should
have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of Pattan, the action
would have been brought against him. 08
This focus on the Doe allegations themselves is the best of the
three approaches to relation back of Doe substitutions. 20 9 It captures
the intent of the mistake clause without redefining it. Nevertheless,
even this approach presents the potential for misapplication in non-Doe
cases. Although it inflicts less damage on the mistake clause than the
Avis and Taliferro joinder tests, it still ignores the mistake language,
which may suggest that the mistake clause is unimportant. 210 In non-
Doe cases, the mistake clause cannot be ignored. Where Doe allega-
tions do not alert the intended defendant, the mistake in identity re-
quirement protects repose. Thus, even the courts that follow the spirit
of the rule threaten to weaken its protections. Rule 15(c)(3), as cur-
rently drafted, simply cannot adequately handle Doe substitutions.
208. Id.
209. Other courts have applied this approach to both deny and grant relation back to Doe
substitutions. For example, in Ames v. Vavreck, 356 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1973), see supra
notes 670-75, the court allowed the substitution based on the plaintiffs' clear intent to add the
individual officers as reflected in their Doe allegations. 356 F. Supp. at 942; see also Douglas v.
County of Tompkins, 1995 WL 105993, at 10 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 1995) (denying relation back
where "there were no descriptive details in the original complaint as to the Doe and Roe defend-
ants from which [the new defendants] could even have arguably inferred that they were the un-
known defendants therein"); Brown v. Sheridan, 150 F.R.D. 462, 464-65 (N.D.N.Y. 1993) (al-
lowing relation back of amendment naming specific employees of Office of Mental Health where
they fit the description of John Does in the original complaint); Ocasio Ortiz v. Betancourt
Lebron, 146 F.R.D. 34, 41-42 (D.P.R. 1992) (allowing relation back based in part on "the speci-
ficity of the allegations contained in the original complaint" and noting that "the fact that plain-
tiffs included John Doe defendants in their original Complaint vitiates the argument that officers
present during the search were unnamed for tactical reasons or for lack of evidence"); Sitarz v.
Bucher, 652 F. Supp. 95 (D.N.M. 1986) (holding that Section 1983 complaint designation of ten
John Does, whom plaintiff identified as officers from possibly several different law enforcement
agencies, was too "broad" to put nine officers on notice that plaintiff originally intended to sue
them); Saffron v. Wilson, 481 F. Supp. 228 (D.D.C. 1979) (finding single Doe designation
describing a specific Secret Service supervisor insufficient to put eight Secret Service supervisors,
representing entire chain of command, on notice that they were intended defendants).
210. In Ramirez v. Burr, 607 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Tex. 1984), the court did away with the
mistake requirement altogether. There, a local government employee challenged her discharge
under a variety of theories and later sought to amend her complaint to add specific individuals for
the "unnamed board members" she originally had designated as defendants. The court found that
the new defendants had adequate notice under the first clause of Rule 15(c) and then restated the
mistake clause by simply omitting the word "mistake": "Rule 15(c) also requires that the 'party
to be brought in by amendment... knew or should have known ... the action would be brought
against him.' "Id. at 174 (alteration in original).
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2. Limited Utility of the Rule 15(c)(1) State Law Option for Doe
Substitutions
In 1991, the rulemakers added another relation back option to
Federal Rule 15(c) that directed federal courts to grant relation back
of an amendment when "relation back is permitted by the law that
provides the statute of limitations applicable to the action." '211 This new
rule, Rule 15(c)(1), addresses a choice of law issue that has long troub-
led federal courts and scholars -whether the relation back criteria of
Federal Rule 15(c) should apply at all where state law provides an-
other relation back standard.212 The general view was that the federal
rule should govern,21 8 but some courts distinguished the case of a more
211. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1); see also id. advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment).
212. Although the choice of law question is commonly called an Erie issue, after the
landmark 1938 decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, the Supreme Court has clarified
that the Erie doctrine does not control the applicability of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the court is a
far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie Choice: the court has been instructed to
apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this
Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in question trans-
gresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). Under the "constitutional restriction," Congress may
make rules for federal courts but the rules must be arguably procedural, at least in diversity suits.
Id. at 472 ("For the constitutional provision for a federal court system (augmented by the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause) carries with it congressional power to make rules governing the practice
and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate matters which, though
falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of clas-
sification as either."). Congress delegated this rulemaking power to the federal judiciary in the
Rules Enabling Act but clarified that that power was to make rules only that govern matters of
"practice and procedure" and that do "not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). A rule is valid under the Enabling Act even if it impacts substantive
concerns so long as that effect is merely "incidental" to its fulfillment of legitimate federal poli-
cies. See Burlington N. R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 & 8 (1987) (holding that "[riules which
incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights do not violate [the Rules Enabling Act] if reasona-
bly necessary to maintain the integrity of that system of rules").
213. When the state relation back rule is more restrictive than the federal rule, the clear
weight of authority was that Rule 15(c) should govern. See, e.g., Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566,
570 n.5 (2d Cir.) (noting that "[s]trong federal policies underlie Rule 15(c)" and that application
of the federal rule in lieu of a more restrictive state rule "will not significantly impair state inter-
ests or encourage forum shopping"), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979); Welch v. Louisiana Power
& Light Co., 466 F.2d 1344, 1345 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that Rule 15(c) applies and remand-
ing for determination of notice even though "[u]nder Louisiana law such an amendment would
not relate back and would be barred by the statute of limitations"). Even when faced with a less
restrictive state relation back rule, the majority of federal courts applied the federal rule, often
with little discussion. E.g., Brown v. E.W. Bliss Co., 818 F.2d 1405, 1408-09 (8th Cir. 1987)
(holding that Federal Rule 15(c) " 'regulates matters which can reasonably be classified as proce-
dural' so it 'satisf[ies] the constitutional standard for validity' " and applying the federal rule to
deny relation back even though Missouri law would allow the amendment) (quoting Burlington N.
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liberal state rule and argued that the balancing of policies favored ap-
plication of the state rule to allow, rather than deny, the claim.2 14 The
Supreme Court fueled this debate in 1986, when in Schiavone v. For-
tune,215 a diversity suit, it applied Federal Rule 15(c) in lieu of a more
liberal state rule, in order to deny an amended claim.216  In 1991,
rulemakers tried to end the confusion by adopting Rule 15(c)(1) and
giving federal courts express authority to apply state law."' Despite its
superficial appeal, this new state law option will not help federal courts
avoid the "mistake" quandary in Doe cases.
In the few cases where state law clearly allows relation back of
Doe substitutions,18 the state law option of Rule 15(c)(1) makes the
R.R. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 8 (1987)).
214. See Covel v. Safetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427, 431-32 (D. Mass. 1981) (noting the "espe-
dally significant" distinction between a restrictive state rule and the liberal Massachusetts rela-
tion back rule (requiring no notice) and concluding that "it cannot be fairly said either that the
objectives of the more liberal relation-back provisions of Massachusetts law would be protected, or
that a policy-whether state or federal-of facilitating decision on the merits would be served" by
applying Federal Rule 15(c)). The federal policy of liberality argues for keeping claims, not deny-
ing them. The limits of Rule 15(c)(3) are designed to protect state statutes of limitations. Where
the states themselves have decided that the limitations policies must give way to other concerns,
such as liberality in pleading and preservation of claims, there is no limitations policy for Rule
15(c)(3) to protect. For these reasons, some courts applied the more liberal state rule. See Mar-
shall v. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d 39, 45 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying liberal Massachusetts amendment
rule in lieu of Federal Rule 15(c)). But see Comment, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-The
Erie Doctrine-State Relation Back Provision Found Controlling Over Rule 15(c)-Marshall v.
Mulrenin, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 952 (1975) (arguing that First Circuit wrongly decided Marshall).
See generally 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 63, § 4509, at 152.
215. 477 U.S. 21 (1986).
216. Id. at 29. The Court interpreted and applied Federal Rule 15(c) without considering
the more liberal New Jersey relation back rule. See id. at 29-32. The Third Circuit opinion in
Schiavone expressly noted "the Erie question" but declined to address it because the plaintiff
conceded in the district court that the New Jersey rule was "procedural only." Schiavone v. For-
tune, 750 F.2d 15, 18-19 (3d Cir. 1984). After Schiavone, some courts that previously had applied
a more liberal state rule in lieu of Rule 15(c) felt compelled to apply the federal rule. See, e.g.,
Pessotti v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 774 F. Supp. 669, 679 (D. Mass. 1990) (following the "implicit dic-
tum" of Schiavone and applying Federal Rule 15(c) in diversity action), affid, 946 F.2d 974, 980
n.6 (1st Cir. 1991) (declining to reach the Schiavone issue because relation back was not available
under either federal or state rule).
217. FED. R. Clv. P. 15(c)(1) advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment) ("If Schiavone
. . . implies the contrary, [Rule 15(c)(1)] is intended to make a material change in the rule.");
see also Carrington, supra note 55, at 312 ("Partly in response to trenchant criticisms of both
Schiavone and the present rule [1966 version of Rule 15(c)] . . . , rulemakers are presently
[1989] trying to repair Rule 15(c). As this task proceeds, consideration has been given to a con-
cern that, at the margins of its potential reach, Rule 15(c) arguably extends beyond the proper
bounds of procedure as functionally defined.").
218. Only a few states have clarified the relation back effect of Doe substitutions in their
rules or codes of procedure. Both Alabama and Mississippi have rules of civil procedure that
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federal court's decision easier.219 The federal court can simply apply
the state rule and allow the substitution. In the vast majority of Doe
cases, however, Rule 15(c)(1) either will have no effect on the federal
court's decision or will complicate its analysis even more. As an initial
matter, the "state" law220 option of Rule 15(c)(1) is not available in all
cases. It allows resort to other law only where that other law supplies
the statute of limitations.221 To be sure, state law provides the statute
of limitations in most John Doe defendant cases, even when the action
is based on a federal statute; federal civil rights actions, for example,
borrow state statutes of limitation.2 22 Still, some federal actions in
specifically address and allow relation back of Doe substitutions, even without notice to the de-
fendant. ALA. R. Civ. P. 15(c) ("An amendment pursuant to Rule 9(h), Fictitious parties, is not
an amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted and such amendment relates
back to the date of the original pleading."); Miss. R. Civ. PRO. 15(c) (same). For a thorough
discussion of the Alabama relation back provisions as they apply to Doe substitutions, see Jerome
A. Hoffman, ARCP 15(c): Relation Back of Amendments Adding, Changing or Substituting Par-
ties or Names of Parties, 46 ALA. LAW. 84 (1985). A few other states achieve this same result by
interpreting their otherwise silent Doe pleading rules as providing a relation back effect, indepen-
dent of Rule 15(c). E.g., Santiago v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 539 F. Supp. 1149, 1155 (D.P.R.
1982) (recognizing that Doe pleading rule, P. R. R. Civ. P. 15.5, provides for relation back inde-
pendent of Rule 15(c) notice provisions); Sooy v. Petrolane Steel Gas, Inc., 708 P.2d 1014, 1018
(Mont. 1985) (holding amendment under Montana Doe pleading provision automatically relates
back such that the Doe defendant is considered a party from the filing of the original complaint);
Viviano v. CBS, Inc., 503 A.2d 296, 306 (N.J. 1986) (holding that the New Jersey Doe pleading
provision operates independently to automatically relate back Doe substitution amendment). Fi-
nally, although Missouri has no rule or statute expressly authorizing Doe pleading, its courts hold
that Doe substitutions relate back to the original complaint. Maddux v. Gardner, 192 S.W.2d 14,
18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945) (holding that "[s]uit was begun when the petition was filed against John
Doe" and allowing Doe substitution even though the true defendant was not timely served).
219. See, e.g., Bryan v. Associated Container Transp., 837 F. Supp. 633, 642-43 (D.N.J
1993) (using Rule 15(c)(1) to justify application of the more liberal New Jersey Doe relation
back rules and allowing relation back even where new defendant had no timely notice of the
pending lawsuit).
220. The Rule 15(c)(1) option is not limited to state law. It also encompasses any federal
law that provides a relation back standard distinct from that set forth in the other two paragraphs
of Rule 15(c). See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(5) (1994) (special relation back for federal tort
claims in which the United States has been substituted as defendant).
221.
If federal jurisdiction is based on a federal question, the reference may be to the law of the
state governing relations between the parties. In some circumstances, the controlling limita-
tions law may be federal law. Whatever may be the controlling body of limitations law, if
that law provides a more forgiving principle of relation back than the one provided in this
rule, it should be available to save the claim.
FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1) advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment) (citations omitted).
222. Both Section 1983 and Bivens actions borrow state statutes of limitation. See cases
discussed supra note 43; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1) advisory committee's note (noting
applicable statute of limitations will usually come from state law).
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which Doe defendants are named use federal statutes of limitations and
therefore require examination of the federal relation back standards.
223
More significantly, Rule 15(c)(1) authorizes resort to state law
only where "relation back is permitted" - not where it is prohib-
ited-by the other law.224 The federal court must compare the federal
and state rules because the rulemakers intended the state law to apply
only where "that law affords a more forgiving principle of relation
back" than the federal standard. 25 In order to make this comparison,
the federal court must grapple with the meaning of the federal mistake
clause in Doe cases and the three differing approaches taken by federal
223. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 286 (1994) (providing a federal six-year limitations period for
patent infringement actions).
224. Rulemakers specifically directed the federal court to allow relation back of an amend-
ment whenever the state relation back rule provides a "more forgiving" standard. FED. R. Civ. P.
15(c) advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment), supra note 221; see also Rae v. Klusak, 810
F. Supp. 983, 984 n.1 (N.D. Il. 1993) (noting that Rule 15(c)(1) "was inserted to give an addi-
tional escape hatch if a state statute of limitations were [sic] more liberal than Rule 15(c)(3)"
and holding that the federal standards apply in lieu of more restrictive state standards) (emphasis
in original).
225. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1) advisory committee's note (1991 Amendment). Federal poli-
cies of liberal pleading and amendment justify a federal court's rejection of a state relation back
rule if it is, in fact, more restrictive than the federal rule.
Application of [Rule 15(c)] . . . would maintain the uniformity of practice in the federal
courts and promote the goal of deciding cases on their merits rather than on the basis of
inadvertent noncompliance with procedural and quasi-procedural technicalities. Further-
more, the availability of relief under Rule 15(c) is closely related to the federal policies in
favor of simplified pleadings, liberal amendments, permissive joinder of parties and claims
and broad discovery.
19 WRIGHT ET AL, supra note 63, § 4509, at 149-50; see also Loudenslager v. Teeple, 466 F.2d
249, 250 (3d Cir. 1972) (noting that use of a more restrictive state relation back rule would
frustrate the Supreme Court's policy of facilitating decisions based on the merits). See supra note
213. Relation back of Doe cases, however, presents one choice of law factor that non-Doe cases do
not: the likelihood of forum shopping. See Ingram v. Kumar, 585 F.2d 566, 570 n.5 (2d Cir.
1978) (noting lack of forum shopping in non-Doe case in holding that it would apply Federal Rule
15(c) in lieu of a more restrictive state rule), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 940 (1979). Unlike the typical
non-Doe case of mistaken identity, the plaintiff in a Doe defendant case knows from the outset
that he does not know the correct defendant and may not be able to timely serve that defendant.
If the federal rule allows for relation back of Doe substitutions, the plaintiff may choose the
federal forum where he has a chance of adding the true defendant after the limitations period.
Such potential for forum shopping, however, should not invalidate a federal rule for relation back
of Doe substitutions, assuming that it is appropriately narrow. Even though discouragement of
forum shopping is one of the "twin aims of the Erie rule," the Erie analysis is not the appropriate
test for a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965).
Instead, when a situation is covered by a federal rule, a court must apply the rule unless it violates
the Enabling Act statute or the Constitution. See supra note 212. The same strong federal policies
that support the application of Federal Rule 15(c) apply equally in Doe cases, and if the protec-
tions of the notice and mistake clauses are properly applied to Doe substitutions, any impact of the
federal rule on state policies would be merely incidental to these federal goals.
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courts. Of the three, all but the Seventh Circuit view would be less
restrictive than a state rule clearly rejecting relation back of Doe
substitutions.226
The comparison in most cases will require the federal court to
struggle with the mistake clause on the state as well as federal level
before it can rule on a Doe substitution. Even though the vast majority
of states have Doe pleading provisions, few have any special provision
for relation back of Doe substitutions. Instead, they have only their
own copies of Federal Rule 15(c), including its mistake clause.227
226. A few states have clearly rejected relation back of Doe Amendments. See, e.g., Kerr v.
Doe, No. 0117897, 1994 WL 146649 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 1994); Click v. Pardoll, 359 So.
2d 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 367 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1979); Hailey v. Interstate
Mach. Co., 459 N.E.2d 346 (111. App. Ct. 1984); Thomas v. Process Equip. Corp., 397 N.W.2d
224 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986). Still others allow no form of Doe pleading at all. See cases cited
supra note 27.
227. All states have followed to some degree the example of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, with some states adopting the federal rules almost verbatim. See WRIGHT, supra note
30, § 62, at 406 ("The excellence of the [Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] is such that in more
than half the states the rules have been adapted for state use virtually unchanged, and there is not
a jurisdiction that has not revised its procedure in some way that reflects the influence of the
federal rules.").
Not all states have kept up to speed with the many changes in Federal Rule 15(c). Some still
model relation back on the original version of Rule 15(c), which went into effect in 1938. See, e.g.,
LA. CODE CIv. PROC. ANN. 1153 (West 1984) art. (2); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.190(c); MASS. R. Civ. P.
15(c); MICH. R. Civ. P. 2.118(D); NEv. R. CIv. P. 15(c); N.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c); UTAH R. CiV. P.
15(c)(2). Most jurisdictions base their rule on the version of Federal Rule 15(c) that went into
effect in 1966. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-15(c) (1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-215(c)
(1994); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 802.09(3) (West 1994); ALASKA R. Civ. P. 15(c); Amiz. R. Civ. P.
15(c); COLO. R. Civ. P. 15(c); DEL. R. Civ. P. 15(c); IDAHO R. CIv. P. 15(c); IND. R. CIV. TRIAL
P. 15(c); IOWA R. Civ. P. 89; Ky. R. Civ. P. 15.03(2); MINN. R. CIv. P. 15.03(c); MONT. R. CIv.
P. 15(c); N.J. CT. R. 4: 9-3; N.M. R. Civ. P. 1-015(c); N.D. R. Civ. P. 15(c); OHIo R. Civ. P.
15(C); ORE. R. Civ. P. 23(c); P.R. R. Civ. P. 13.3; S.C. R. Civ. P. 15(c); S.D. R. Civ. P. 15-6-
15(c); TENN. R. Civ. P. 15.03; VT. R. Civ. P. 15(c); WASH. R. Civ. P. 15(c); W. VA. R. Civ. P.
15(c). Some enterprising states have updated their rules to match the 1991 change in the timing
requirement of Federal Rule 15(c). See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2015(c) (1995); ARK.
R. Civ. P. 15(c); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. Civ. P. 15(c); ME. R. Civ. P. 15(c); Mo. R. Civ. P. 55.33(c);
Wy. R. CIv. P. 15(c). Finally, a few states have independently modified their copies of Federal
Rule 15(c). Tennessee, for example, has a rule that exactly mirrors the 1966 version of Federal
Rule 15(c), except that in place of the mistake clause it states: "but for a misnomer or other
similar mistake concerning the identity of the proper party." TENN. R. CIy. P. 15.03. Massachu-
setts kept the 1938 version of Federal Rule 15(c) and clarified that it allowed amendments chang-
ing parties without any additional criteria. MASS. R. Civ. P. 15(c) ("Whenever the claim or de-
fense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment (including an amend-
ment changing a party) relates back to the original pleading.") (emphasis added); see also id.
reporters' notes (1973 Amendment) ("Massachusetts practice is more liberal than Federal Rule
15(c)."). Moreover, Alabama and Mississippi have rules explicitly permitting relation back of Doe
defendants. See supra note 218.
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Therefore, most states find themselves in the same predicament as the
federal courts: they have a relation back rule that is inherently incon-
sistent with and silent as to Doe practice.228 Accordingly, Rule 15(c)(1)
does not solve the problem of relation back of Doe substitutions in fed-
eral court.229 Often, Rule 15(c)(1) will only complicate the court's
228. At least 20 jurisdictions expressly allow Doe pleading but provide for relation back of
Doe substitutions only through the Rule 15(c) mistake standard: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Col-
orado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. Com-
pare supra note 27 (describing state Doe pleading provisions) with supra note 227 (describing
state versions of Rule 15(c)). Courts in some of these states have held that Doe substitutions
relate back if they meet the criteria of Rule 15(c), but they have not tried to reconcile the "mis-
take" requirement with Doe pleading. See, e.g., Farmer v. State, 788 P.2d 43 (Alaska 1990);
Harvill v. Community Methodist Hosp. Ass'n, 786 S.W.2d 577 (Ark. 1990); Marriott v. Gold-
stein, 662 P.2d 496 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983), overruled on other grounds by Dillingham v. Greeley
Publishing Co., 701 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1985) (en banc); Harper v. Mayor of Savannah, 380 S.E.2d
78 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Chacon v. Sperry Corp., 723 P.2d 814 (Idaho 1986); Nolph v. Scott, 725
S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1987); DeVargas v. State ex rel. N.M. Dep't of Corr., 640 P.2d 1327 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1981), cert. denied, 642 P.2d 166 (N.M. 1982); Kiehn v. Nelsen's Tire Co., 724 P.2d 434
(Wash. Ct. App. 1986); Northern Util. Div. v. Town of Evansville, 822 P.2d 829 (Wyo. 1991).
Only a few states have directly questioned whether Doe substitutions qualify as a mistake under
their version of Rule 15(c). See, e.g., Berns Const. Co. v. Miller, 491 N.E.2d 565, 573-74 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1986) (suggesting that Doe substitutions must meet standards of Indiana Rule 15(c),
which is identical to pre-1991 federal rule, but also implicitly endorsing Seventh Circuit's Wood
rule, which provides that lack of knowledge is not a mistake), affd, 516 N.E.2d 1053 (Ind. 1987);
Leaon v. Washington County, 397 N.W.2d 867, 871 n.1 (Minn. 1986) (observing that Doe substi-
tutions could be governed by Minnesota Rule 15.03, which is identical to 1966 federal rule, but
noting and expressly reserving the question of whether "a John Doe designation is the kind of
change of parties contemplated by Rule 15.03").
229. Nor does Rule 15(c)(1) solve the relation back conflict problem in the few states that
use a service-triggered limitations rule. See supra note 59. This difficult conflicts question is two-
pronged. First, in the "service" states, absent formal service on the actual defendant, there is no
timely complaint to which the amended claim can relate back. Rule 15(c)(3) and the state rela-
tion back rules modelled upon it have no application unless there is a timely complaint. Yet, the
notice and mistake clauses of these rules by design do not require formal service. They set a
relaxed standard for the quality of the notice to the defendant. This aspect of Rule 15(c)(3),
unlike Federal Rule 3, is specifically tailored to address state statutes of limitation and service
requirements and is in direct conflict with a state rule that requires formal service prior to the
limitations period. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 750 (1980) (applying state
service rule to determine compliance with limitations law because "[tihere is no indication that
[Federal Rule 3] was intended to toll a state statute of limitations"). On the other hand, the
second aspect of Rule 15(c)(3)-timing of the defendant's notice-does not conflict with a state
service commencement rule. The intent of this time limit was to equalize treatment of defendants,
whether or not they were first correctly named in the suit, see supra notes 169 and 171, and it
does not purport to set the length of limitation periods. See Lindley v. General Electric Co., 780
F.2d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 1986) ("[Rule 15(c)] was not designed to determine the length of the
limitations period to be applied.") (quoting Rumberg v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 424 F. Supp. 294,
301 (C.D. Cal. 1976)).
Federal courts can reconcile the federal relation back rule and state service rules by using a
1996]
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analysis by requiring it to decide the mistake issue twice-once under
federal precedent and then again under state law.
IV. PROPOSED FEDERAL PROCEDURE FOR JOHN DOE PARTIES
The problems confronting Doe pleaders under the current federal
procedural scheme can be cured with relative ease by formally recog-
nizing Doe parties. The current difficulty with Doe practice essentially
is one of silence in the rules, not any affirmative barrier.280 Through
five changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Judiciary
Code, Doe parties can become a formal part of federal procedure. Only
then will Doe practice achieve the clarity that the courts have struggled
for in vain for thirty years.
A. Pleading of Doe Parties
The rules must first address proper pleading of Doe parties. For
the Doe defendant, the federal rules should require plaintiff to plead
and describe specific unknown persons rather than merely list generic
Doe defendants in the complaint caption. A number of federal policies
bifurcated analysis that reflects the dual functions of Federal Rule 15(c)(3). The court should
look to the relation back rule for the quality of notice and then to the service rule for the timing of
the notice. Indeed, this is the approach taken by states that have both forms of rules. Minnesota,
for example, has a service-triggered commencement rule, see MINN. R. Civ. P. 3.01, and a relation
back rule that exactly mirrors the 1966 version of Federal Rule 15(c). See MINN. R. CIv. P. 15(c).
Its courts reconcile the two provisions by requiring the new defendant to have the relaxed notice
and knowledge within the period for service, usually the limitations period. Cf. Carlson v. Henne-
pin County, 479 N.W.2d 50, 55 (Minn. 1992) (allowing addition of a defendant who was not
formally served within the limitations period, so long as he had the Rule 15(c)(3) notice within
that period).
230. To be sure, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are silent as to many procedural
issues and need not address every nuance of practice. See Molnar v. National Broadcasting Co.,
231 F.2d 684, 687 (9th Cir. 1956), supra note 135 (noting that "the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are not universally inclusive of all possible colorings of practice" but holding that Doe
defendants destroy diversity). However, the rules do address similar situations that occur in re-
ported cases far less frequently than the increasingly popular Doe pleading. For example, Federal
Rule 25 provides for substitution of parties in cases where the claim is not extinguished after the
original party dies or becomes incompetent. FaD. R. Civ. P. 25(a)(1)(b). A Westlaw search of
district court decisions showed only six decisions in 1993 citing Rule 25(a)(1). Search of Westlaw,
DCT database (April 11, 1996) (search terms: Rule /2 25(a)(1) & DA(1993)). No 1993 opinion
cited Rule 25(b), and a search with no date restriction at all revealed only two decisions that cited
the rule. Search of Westlaw, DCT database (April 11, 1996) (search terms: Rule /2 25(b)) (elim-
inating decisions citing local rules, criminal rules, or agency rules with same number). By con-
trast, nearly 200 decisions in 1993 had "John Doe" in the title as a party, and many more pre-
sumably used other forms of pseudonymous names. See supra note 2.
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support this restriction.281 Foremost is the federal court's need to pro-
tect substantive policies of statutes of limitation. Although plaintiffs re-
sort to Doe pleading because they need limitations relief, a federal
court should not ignore the underlying aims of the state limitations
statute. Basic principles of federalism mandate that a federal court up-
hold the substantive policy of states, including the aim of repose. When
a plaintiff ultimately seeks to add the true defendant in the place of
John Doe, the federal court in most cases must insist that the defend-
ant have had timely notice that he is the intended defendant. Particu-
larized, not generic, Doe allegations will help serve this aim.
23 2
Particularized Doe defendant allegations also will facilitate case
management. They will eliminate uncertainty about the basic structure
of the case. Whenever plaintiff names any new defendant, he funda-
mentally alters the case. Everything must pause while the new defend-
ant prepares his defenses and motions and gets up to speed on discov-
231. These federal policies also would support application of a federal particularized plead-
ing rule if challenged by a plaintiff who seeks to invoke the generic Doe pleading permitted under
California state practice. See supra note 117. The Ninth Circuit has held that a federal court
must apply the California Doe procedure in diversity suits, but its holding does not extend to
pleading. See Lindley v. General Elec. Co., 780 F.2d 797 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186
(1986). The court instead addressed only Rule 15(c) and held that the California practice was
essentially a form of tolling and not a relation back rule that would conflict with Federal Rule
15(c). Id. at 801. Unlike relation back, a federal particularized Doe pleading rule would conflict
with California's generic pleading standards, thus requiring an analysis under the Hanna constitu-
tional and Rules Enabling Act tests. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965). See supra
note 212. The federal pleading rule would pass both tests. There are few matters that are more
procedural and thus within the proper realm of federal control than pleading. See Hanna, 380
U.S. at 472 (noting that the Constitutional provision for a federal court system gives "congres-
sional power to make rules governing practice and pleading in those courts") (emphasis added).
The federal system has the power to set pleading standards under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure which differ from state pleading rules, whether they be good faith pleading require-
ments under Federal Rule 11, joinder limitations under Rule 20, or particularized pleading stan-
dards under Rule 9(b). See, e.g., Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters.,
498 U.S. 533, 552 (1991) ("There is little doubt that Rule II is reasonably necessary to maintain
the integrity of the system of federal practice and procedure, and that any effect on substantive
rights is incidental."). In addition, much of the substantive element of California's Doe scheme is
protected through the tolling aspect of California law. The federal court could allow addition of
the true defendant even where he had no notice of the original suit, so long as the plaintiff serves
him within three years of filing the original complaint, as provided by California's statute of limi-
tations law. Therefore, the effect on state substantive policies is only "incidental," and the pro-
posed rule comports with the Rules Enabling Act. See supra note 212.
232. In some cases, the court need not resort to evaluation of the Doe allegations. Where
the plaintiff identifies the John Doe and, within the Rule 4(m) period for service, serves the true
defendant with a motion to amend the complaint to properly name him, the motion to amend
itself gives the defendant the required notice. See FED. R Civ. P. 4(m), 15(c). The motion states
outright that the new defendant is the John Doe.
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ery. Case strategy changes. The new defendant may join forces with
the other defendants or assert his own claims against them. With ge-
neric Doe pleadings, these changes are always possible, making any
planning difficult. Particularized Doe allegations will narrow the pos-
sibilities and thereby help the court and other parties plan for the con-
tingencies created by the addition of a new party. They can tailor dis-
covery,133 motions, and amendments around the plaintiff's alleged
intent to locate and add another specific party.23 4
The proposed specificity requirement for Doe allegations need not
place an impossible burden on the plaintiff. He obviously cannot iden-
tify the defendant, but he can distinguish the defendant in some way.
After all, he has chosen to sue this unknown person. The description
may simply be of the conduct that the plaintiff contends is wrongful.
The key is to put the intended defendant on notice, if he were to read
the complaint, that he is John Doe. In this regard, state pleading codes
provide some useful guidance. Although the original Field Code un-
known defendant provision did not require any specificity, 3 5 New York
and other states have augmented this rule to require the plaintiff to
describe the Doe defendant.236 These states require the plaintiff to af-
233. Particularized pleading will help the plaintiff in his own efforts to identify the John
Doe. It will force the plaintiff to conduct pre-filing research sufficient enough to describe the
defendant, thereby preparing him for formal discovery after the filing of the suit, when time will
be of the essence. In addition, particularized Doe allegations, unlike generic Doe pleading, may
force any named co-defendants to investigate and disclose the John Doe defendant's true name.
The new automatic disclosure provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 require a defend-
ant to make a reasonable inquiry and disclose relevant information, but that duty is limited to
"facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1); see also id. advisory
committee's note (1993 Amendment) ("Before making its disclosures, a party has the obligation
...to make a reasonable inquiry into the facts of the case. The rule does not demand an exhaus-
tive investigation at this stage of the case, but one that is reasonable under the circumstances,
focusing on the facts that are alleged with particularity in the pleadings.").
234. Within the court's general power to control its own docket, it may set limits to ensure
that even the defined Doe defendant does not unnecessarily delay the litigation. For example, in its
scheduling order under Rule 16, it could limit discovery and set deadlines for identification of the
Doe defendant. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (providing that in the initial scheduling order the court
may limit the time "(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings ... and (3) to complete
discovery"); see also Glaros v. Perse, 628 F.2d 679, 685 (1st Cir. 1980) (confirming that district
court was not "obliged to wait indefinitely for [plaintiff] to take steps to identify and serve the
'unknown' defendants"); Veteto v. Miller, 829 F. Supp. 1486, 1497 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (dismissing
Doe defendants after plaintifs failure to identify them despite "extensive" discovery over "many
years").
235. See supra note 27.
236. New York modified the Field Code in 1876 to add a requirement that plaintiff describe
the Doe defendant. See Act of June 2, 1876, ch. 448, § 451, 1876 N.Y. Laws 1, 85 ("Where the
plaintiff is ignorant of the name or part of the name of a defendant, he may designate that defend-
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firmatively allege that the name of the defendant is not known and to
describe John Doe to the extent possible, including his role in the al-
leged wrongful conduct.
23 7
On the Doe plaintiff side, state rules provide no pleading mod-
els.238 A pleading rule for Doe plaintiffs should not attempt to do too
much. Whether plaintiff's privacy interests are sufficient to warrant
pseudonymous protection necessarily requires a case-by-case factual
determination. The standards for this analysis are best left to the courts
to develop and apply in their discretion.2 3 9 Therefore, the pleading rule
should not dictate the circumstances under which a plaintiff or in some
cases the defendant, may proceed under a pseudonym, but instead
merely require the pseudonymous party to inform the other parties and
the court of his basis for filing as John Doe. The substance of these
allegations should reflect the discretionary factors of the current state
of the law on pseudonymity.2 40 If the court or the other parties disagree
with the alleged propriety of the Doe designation, they can challenge
ant ... by a fictitious name, or by as much of his name is known, adding a description, identifying
the person intended."); see also Hogan, supra note 117, at 62 n.42. Current New York procedure
requires plaintiff to designate "so much of [the defendant's] name and identity as is known." N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. L. & R 1024 (McKinney 1976). See also Wis. STAT. § 807.12 (1977) ("When the
name or part of the name of any defendant. . . is unknown to the plaintiff, such defendant may
be designated a defendant by so much of the name as is known or by a fictitious name. . . adding
such description as may reasonably indicate the person intended."); COLO. R. Civ. P. 9(a)(2)
("When a party is designated in the caption as one 'whose name is unknown' the pleader shall
allege such matters as are within his knowledge to identify such unknown party and his connection
with the claim set forth."); P.R. R. Civ. P. 15.4 ("Whenever a plaintiff does not know the true
name of a defendant, he shall so state in the complaint, setting forth the specific claim he alleg-
edly has against said defendant."). See also supra note 198 (discussing Nevada's new particular-
ized standards for pleading Doe defendants).
237. See statutes and rules cited supra note 236.
238. Indeed, only a few states even acknowledge the possibility of a pseudonymous plaintiff
in their general pleading codes. Illinois, for example, allows parties, presumably including plain-
tiffs, to appear by fictitious names "[u]pon application and for good cause shown." ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. ch. 735, § 5/2-401(e) (Michie 1993). In 1990, Texas, in an effort to combat secrecy
in litigation, adopted standards for confidentiality including the sealing of court records which,
although not aimed at pseudonymous plaintiffs, may apply to them. TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a. See
generally Lloyd Doggett & Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Access to Public Courts: Discouraging
Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 Tax. L. Rav. 643 (1991).
239. Many rules, including portions of Rule 15, appropriately leave development of such
discretionary standards to the courts. See, e.g., FED. R Civ. P. 15(a) (amendments to pleadings
shall be "freely [granted] when justice so requires").
240. See supra notes 89-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the discretionary
factors a court must weigh.
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the Doe complaint just as they would challenge any other defect appar-
ent from the complaint allegations.24'
Pleading a John Doe complaint would only start the case. It would
not dictate that the plaintiff is entitled to proceed as a John Doe be-
yond the initial pleading stage.2 42 A case that may be appropriate for
pseudonymity at the pleading stage, while the defendant challenges the
legal merits of the claim, may not be appropriate in later phases, when
241. Rule 12, for example, already provides motions by which the defendant can challenge
the sufficiency of the complaint. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12. Others, such as the media, can challenge
the pseudonymity through intervention procedures, or amici briefs. See FED. R. Civ. P. 24. The
author's proposed procedure, which lets the defendant and the court decide if they want to chal-
lenge pseudonymity, would conserve judicial resources more than a rule that would require the
plaintiff to file a motion in every case. Professor Steinman, for example, proposed that the plaintiff
file a motion for leave to proceed pseudonymously, at the time he files the complaint or shortly
thereafter. Steinman, supra note 77, at 86-87. She suggested that the motion be accompanied by a
brief "citing pertinent legal precedent" and affidavits "containing the facts supporting pseudony-
mously, and the facts necessary to establish standing and the existence of a case or controversy."
Id. at 86. This author's proposed pleading rule, combined with the constraints of Federal Rule 11,
would serve much of the same purpose as the procedure proposed by Professor Steinman. The
plaintiff must allege the basis for proceeding under a pseudonym, and if and when defendant or
the court challenges the procedure, the plaintiff will then file his legal authority. The fact that the
defendant is the party who files the motion will not put the burden of persuasion on defendant.
The plaintiff, who is departing from the norm of open disclosure, must bear the burden of per-
suading the court that he merits pseudonymous protection. The proposed pleading rule merely lets
plaintiff initially satisfy that burden through pleading, rather than a separate motion. See also
discussion infra at notes 242-45.
One commentator has recently proposed a far more demanding procedure: that the plaintiff
notify defendant of his intent to proceed under a pseudonym before he files his complaint. See
Milani, supra note 78, at 1707-08. Such notification would allow the defendant the opportunity to
try to protect his own privacy interests and himself proceed under a pseudonym. Id. at 1707. This
approach, however, complicates procedure and requires earlier notice than otherwise required
under most statutes of limitation and service rules. Moreover, it is unnecessary in many Doe
plaintiff cases. Professor Milani is concerned about the defendant's privacy in cases accusing him
of a stigmatizing tort, but the proposed early notification procedure applies to all Doe plaintiff
cases. In addition, the defendant's concern in these cases is to shield his identity from the public,
not the plaintiff, who obviously knows who he is suing. As noted by Professor Steinman, this need
can be satisfied, in many but not all cases, by the defendant moving to seal the record. Steinman,
supra note 77, at 87. This motion can precede or accompany the defendant's answer, in which he
will designate himself as John Doe. The plaintiff's own privacy concerns, as well as Rules of
Professional Conduct that limit comments to the media and prohibit actions taken to harass
others, hopefully will curb plaintiff's deliberate seeking of publicity before defendant can move to
seal the record. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rules 3.6 & 4.4.
242. In this sense, the joinder rules are analogous. They merely set pleading standards inde-
pendent of the other implications of joinder of claims. For example, Federal Rule 18 provides a
broad right to join "as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as the party has against the
opposing party." FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a); see also id. advisory committee's note. It, however, does
not mandate that the claims be tried together. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (noting court's authority
to order separate trial of claims). Nor does it impact the court's jurisdiction over the claims. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 82 (providing that the Federal Rules do not extend or limit jurisdiction or venue).
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the defendant needs discovery of information concerning the particular
plaintiff.243 Balancing of the competing interests should continue as
necessary throughout the litigation.244 Likewise, the court should con-
sider the degree of pseudonymity needed and decide whether the court
alone should know the plaintiff's true identity or whether the defendant
and his attorney may also know it.
24 5
The fictitious name pleading allegations, whether for the Doe
plaintiff or the Doe defendant, would themselves be subject to Federal
Rule 11, which requires the plaintiff to conduct a reasonable inquiry
and to certify both the factual and legal contentions in the com-
plaint.246 Therefore, the plaintiff cannot, under Rule 11, allege a Doe
defendant unless he first tried to identify that defendant. Similarly, the
plaintiff cannot use the Doe pseudonym unless he has a good faith basis
in the law for seeking privacy protection. 47 If the plaintiff does not
heed these warnings and abuses the Doe pleading provisions, he would
violate Rule 11 just as he would by filing any other unfounded
pleading.
The new Doe pleading rules could appropriately fit in a number of
the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including: Rule 8, re-
garding general pleading; Rule 9, regarding special pleading; Rule 10,
243. In James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993), for example, the trial court allowed
the plaintiffs to use pseudonyms during pleading and discovery but demanded that they use their
real names at trial. 6 F.3d at 235. On an interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed because
the district court did not balance the relevant factors, not because the court had separate rulings
for pre-trial and trial. Id. at 238-42.
244. In every case, the court should consider what measures it should take to protect the
plaintiff, public, and the defendant throughout the litigation. As Professor Steinman proposes:
[A]t every'stage of the proceedings, the court should employ a balancing test that weighs
the rights and interests of each litigating party and the interests of the public. The courts
should not permit pseudonymous litigation on demand nor categorically disallow it. Very
early in the litigation the public will have relatively little interest in the litigants' names.
Despite the fact that pleadings and other filings that identify the litigants are historically
part of the public record, their accessibility, apart from any judicial decision in the case,
does not promote the first amendment [sic] values and policy grounds that form the foun-
dation of public rights of access. Consequently, prior to judicial action, a balancing test
that reflects the low level of public interest in access and disclosure is appropriate: it should
suffice that the litigant show a legitimate interest that is rationally served by pseudonymity.
Steinman, supra note 77, at 36 (footnotes omitted).
245. Such considerations should include how to determine the res judicata effect in this and
later litigation. See supra note 90.
246. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2)-(3). Rule 11 recognizes that the plaintiff may need fur-
ther investigation or discovery to get evidentiary support for some factual allegations, but it re-
quires the plaintiff to specifically identify in the complaint any allegations in need of further inves-
tigation. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3).
247. FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(b)(2).
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governing the form of pleadings; Rule 15, providing for the amendment
of pleadings; Rule 17, governing parties; Rules 20 or 21, governing the
joinder of parties; and Rule 25, regarding the substitution of parties.
Because the proposed Doe pleading rules would require particularized
pleading, Federal Rule 9, which governs items that must be alleged
with particularity in federal complaints, provides the most logical place
for the fictitious name pleading standards. A new ninth paragraph of
Rule 9 should provide:
(i) Fictitious Names of Parties. Any pleading which designates a defending
party by a fictitious name shall allege that the actual name of the defending
party is unknown and shall describe such defending party, including the defend-
ing party's connection to the claim set forth. When a party seeks to designate
itself by a fictitious name in a pleading, the party shall allege the grounds for
proceeding by a fictitious name, as determined by the applicable law, and in
cases in which the court's jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship of the
parties, the pleading party shall allege its own citizenship.
In addition, Federal Rule 10(a) needs some clarification given its con-
fused history in Doe cases and should be amended to read:
(a) Captions; Names of Parties. Every pleading shall contain a caption set-
ting forth the name of the court, the title of the action, the file number, and a
designation as in Rule 7(a). In the complaint the title of the action shall include
the names of all the parties, whether such names are actual or fictitious as pro-
videdfor in Rule 9(i), but in the other pleadings it is sufficient to state the name
of the first party on each side with an appropriate indication of other parties.
These two simple changes to the rules governing pleading in federal
courts would eliminate much of the confusion surrounding modern fed-
eral Doe practice.
248
B. Relation Back of Doe Defendant Substitutions
The failing of the current relation back standard in Rule 15(c)(3)
in Doe cases is that the initial pleading a Doe defendant is not a "Mis-
take." Elimination of the mistake clause altogether, however, is not the
answer. Rule 15(c) otherwise adequately balances the competing inter-
ests of the plaintiff and defendant. In non-Doe cases, the mistake re-
248. The 1966 Advisory Committee's note to Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure should remain unchanged. See supra notes 109-15 and accompanying text. The note ap-
propriately condemns an abuse of Doe practice that would not be permitted under the new Doe
pleading rules-a lawyer pleading a Doe party in the hope of eventually finding a client who will
fill the shoes of John Doe.
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quirement gives the potential defendant some basis for assessing why
he was not named in the suit. It directs his attention to the complaint.
If the potential defendant can determine from the complaint that the
plaintiff made a mistake in identifying him as the defendant, then he
should reasonably understand that he was the intended defendant.
Thus, in a non-Doe case, the mistake requirement serves the same pur-
pose as particularized Doe allegations in a Doe case. It therefore should
be retained.
Instead, the Doe scenario should be added to the mistake clause of
Rule 15(c)(3).149 The rule simply needs to acknowledge Doe pleading
as an additional means by which the potential defendant may learn
that he is the intended defendant. The language of this acknowledge-
ment depends on the Doe pleading standards. If the pleading rule is
appropriately narrow and requires plaintiff to describe the defendant,
as does proposed Rule 9(i), then Rule 15(c) would require only minor
modification. A new clause to the main body of Rule 15(c)(3) will ac-
complish this result:
(3) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against
whom a claim is asserted if the foregoing (2) is satisfied and, within the period
provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint, the party to be
brought in by amendment (A) has received such notice of the institution of the
action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the mer-
its, and (B) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the
identity of the proper party or the alleged lack of knowledge as to the proper
party's identity as provided for in Rule 9(i), the action would have been brought
against the party.25
This version thus returns the mistake clause to its original function and
provides clarity for Doe amendments.
Rule 15 need not make any special mention of the time during
which the plaintiff should identify and move to substitute the actual
defendant. The 120 day notice requirement should spur diligence by
the plaintiff. Although the defendant could receive the requisite notice
249. Other rules, such as the proposed new Doe pleading provision of Rule 9(i), could ap-
propriately set forth the relation back standards for Doe substitutions. Rule 17(a), for example,
provides a relation back rule specific to that rule. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (substitution of the real
party in interest "shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of
the real party in interest"); see also supra note 108. However, given that Rule 15(c) already sets
forth the other tests for relation back-same transaction and timely notice-and that those tests
will apply also to Doe substitutions, Rule 15(c) is the most appropriate place for the Doe relation
back standard.
250. To read the full text of Rule 15(c), see supra note 15.
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in any number of ways, the plaintiff's own motion to substitute the ac-
tual defendant is the best way to ensure that the defendant gets the
required notice. The motion itself, so long as the plaintiff serves it on
the defendant within 120 days, will both notify the new defendant of
the lawsuit, thus satisfying Rule 15(c)(3)(A), and tell him that he is
the intended John Doe defendant, thereby satisfying Rule 15(c)(3)(B).
Besides the 120 day notice requirement in Rule 15(c), the court other-
wise has the power under Rules 15(a) and 16 to reject late amend-
ments that disrupt the litigation and prejudice the existing parties. 5
Finally, whether plaintiff has delayed in his efforts to identify John Doe
would be relevant to whether plaintiff had good cause for his failure to
serve the Doe defendant within 120 days as required under Rule
4(m). 252
C. Diversity Jurisdiction and Venue of Actions with Doe Defendants
The proposed Doe pleading practice would heighten the need for
clarity concerning the proper treatment of Doe defendants in determin-
ing diversity and venue. Congress already has recognized the benefits of
a single rule governing the effect of Doe defendants on removal.
253 It
chose to disregard Doe defendants in removed actions unless and until
the plaintiff names and seeks to add them to the suit.25 The same rule
should also extend to original diversity and venue decisions in Doe
cases.
A single rule unifying the treatment of Doe defendants for all
three forum decisions would reduce procedural uncertainty and treat
the parties more fairly. Courts already try to simplify forum selection
251. In ruling on a motion to amend under Rule 15(a), the court must consider any undue
delay by the plaintiff and any resulting prejudice to the other parties. See supra note 49. Rule 16
lets the court limit the time during which the parties may amend the complaint. See FED. R. Civ.
P. 16(b); see also supra note 234.
252. The 120 day service directive in Rule 4 is not at odds with the proposed Doe practice.
Rule 4(m) mandates that the court give the plaintiff extra time to serve defendants where he
shows good cause for his failure to timely serve all the defendants. See supra note 171. Therefore,
Rule 4 is sufficient on its face to accommodate Doe practice so long as courts use their discretion
and do not rigidly apply a 120 day deadline for service of Doe defendants. See Brown v. Nichols,
8 F.3d 770, 774 (11th Cir. 1993) (vacating dismissal of Doe defendants whom the plaintiff had
not served seven months after filing of the complaint and remanding for a finding of good cause
under the prior version of Rule 4(m)); Clorox Co. v. Inland Empire Wholesale Grocers, Inc., No.
CV-93-4528-JMI (EX), 1994 WL 687095, 1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 1994) (deciding sua sponte to
direct parties to name and serve the Doe defendants within 120 days of filing of the complaint but
allowing the plaintiff to extend that deadline "due to the status of discovery or other reasons").




by using the same rules where feasible. For the most part, the rules for
determining diversity in removed actions are the same as those for orig-
inal actions.255 Similarly, the majority of federal courts use the same
"domicile" standard to determine both an individual's citizenship for
jurisdiction purposes and his residence under the venue statute.25 The
same rule for removed and original diversity actions would even the
playing field. A bifurcated rule would give named defendants the exclu-
sive choice of federal forum in Doe cases. 257 The plaintiff would have to
file all original Doe suits with state law claims in state court even if the
named defendants were diverse from plaintiff. Yet, the Doe defendants
could remove the same case to federal court once they are identified.
Similarly, a different rule for venue would mean that these same
named defendants, once they removed a Doe action, could not then
move to transfer the removed action to a federal district court in their
home state. 58
The single rule now governing removed actions-that courts
should disregard Doe defendants unless and until the plaintiff moves to
substitute an actual person for John Doe 259-is the best rule to govern
255. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1994); 14A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723, at 306-19 (1985). A federal court's diversity jurisdiction on re-
moval is more narrow than in original actions in one important respect-defendants may not re-
move an action from a court of a state in which they are citizens even if they are diverse from the
plaintiff because, presumably, a "home state" defendant does not need the benefit of a neutral
federal forum against the out-of-state plaintiff. See § 1441(b).
256. Many courts interpret the "resides" language of the venue statute to mean an individ-
ual's domicile, which is the test courts use to determine the parties' citizenship for the diversity
jurisdiction. See 15 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT Er AL FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3805, at
34-35 (1986) ("[T]he great bulk of authority. . . applies the same test of domicile in determining
'residence' for venue purposes as is applied in determining 'citizenship' for jurisdictional
purposes.").
257. See Macheras v. Center Art Galleries, 776 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (D. Haw. 1991) (re-
jecting ban on Doe defendants in original diversity action because different rules for original and
removed actions would confine plaintiffs to state court while "giving defendants a forum selection
advantage, entirely unrelated to the basis of jurisdiction[:] . . . . the unilateral power to deter-
mine the forum.").
258. A federal court may transfer an action to any other district in which venue is proper.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a) (1994). In a removed action, a Doe defendant would not frustrate
the initial venue determination because the removal statute provides that the proper venue is the
district which encompasses the state court from which the action is removed. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)
(1994). Only when the named defendants then want to transfer to their own home district will the
presence of the unnamed Doe defendants frustrate the court's venue determination in a removal
case.
259. The proposed provision expressly provides that the effect of the Doe defendant on the
court's diversity jurisdiction should not be reached unless and until the plaintiff seeks to formally
join the true defendant to the action. This aspect is not currently part of the Doe provision in the
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all three forum determinations.2 60 First, the current rule cures problems
unique to removal and should not be abolished in removal cases.26 1 Fur-
thermore, whether John Doe, once named, will in fact destroy diversity
or venue is mere speculation. 6 2 If the new defendant destroys diversity,
the court has two options. It can simply deny the motion to amend, or
grant it and then dismiss the action. 3  In a removed action, the court
removal statute. The proposal would cure a brewing conflict concerning whether a court in a
removed action may consider the citizenship of a Doe defendant when the parties contend they
actually know the John Doe's citizenship. In Tompkins v. Lowe's Home Ctr., 847 F. Supp. 462
(E.D. La. 1994), the court held that defendant Lowe's could not remove the action under Section
1441(a) where it knew that the Doe defendant was its own employee and not diverse from plain-
tiff. See also Brown v. TranSouth Financial Corp., 897 F. Supp. 1398, 1401 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 14,
1995) ("[W]hen a plaintiff's allegations give a definite clue . . . by specifically referring to an
individual who acted as a company's agent, the court should consider the citizenship of the ficti-
tious defendant."). By contrast, in Brouillette v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., Civ. A. No. 923170, 1992
WL 365295 (E.D. La. Nov. 25, 1992), the court applied a literal reading of Section 1441(a) and
refused to consider the likely citizenship of the Doe defendant. There, a Louisiana plaintiff argued
that John Doe "must surely reside in the Baton Rouge area" but the court said such argument
was of "no import" because Section 1441(a) dictated that it disregard John Doe's citizenship. Id.
at 1. Such speculation and disagreement creates needless procedural uncertainty. Unless and until
the plaintiff actually chooses to name the Doe defendant by amendment, John Doe is not a party
and should not destroy diversity or venue.
260. To be sure, this rule may increase the number of diversity actions in federal court
while some critics argue for abolition of diversity jurisdiction altogether. See generally Report of
the Federal Courts Study Committee, April 2, 1990, at 38-43 ("substantial majority" of congres-
sional study committee recommending that diversity jurisdiction be "virtually eliminated"); Diver-
sity of Citizenship Jurisdiction, 1982: Hearing on H.R. 6691 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties and The Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (hearings on the abolition or curtailment of diversity jurisdiction). Never-
theless, with the exception of cases in which any named defendant is from the forum state, see
supra note 255, the proposed Doe defendant rule will not increase the pool of cases which could
properly end up in federal court beyond that already permitted by the removal rule. The change
would just increase the chances of these cases going to federal court by providing that choice to
the plaintiffs as well as defendants. Moreover, one of the problems with federal diversity jurisdic-
tion may be the very limits imposed to curb exercise of diversity jurisdiction. Each limit creates
needless procedural disputes. Even more judicial resources are wasted when those "limits" are
subject to different rules for different cases, an ill which the author proposes to cure. See Adrienne
J. Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOK. L. Rv.
197, 220 (1982) ("With many of the preliminary, time-consuming, issues removed from dispute,
the total amount of court time spent on diversity cases may not undergo the enormous increase
some fear, since these simplified individual cases would require less judicial time.").
261. See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text.
262. The risk that John Doe belatedly will disrupt the court's authority to hear the case is
real but one that Congress already has deemed insignificant in the removal context. See supra
note 153.
263. The court may have to dismiss the action even if it denies the motion to amend if the
new defendant is a necessary and indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See FED. R. CiV. PRO. 19(a) & (b) (defining necessary and indispensable parties).
Whether the plaintiff can resort to state court at this point, after the limitations period has ex-
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has the additional option of granting the motion to substitute the non-
diverse defendant and then remanding the action to state court.
2 " If
the new defendant disrupts the plaintiff's venue choice265 and the new
defendant objects to venue,266 the court has the option of transferring
the case to another federal court.267
Although the current removal rule's treatment of Doe defendants
is itself proper,2 68 its provision more appropriately belongs in Section
1332,269 which defines the limits of diversity jurisdiction for both origi-
nal and removed diversity actions. Section 1332(c) already provides
special rules for determining the citizenship of corporations, liability
insurers and legal representatives of estates, infants, and incompe-
tents.270 These rules govern diversity determinations in both original
and removed actions.271 Therefore, it is a logical spot to include a spe-
cial rule on Doe defendants. A new section (c)(3) of Section 1332
should now read:
pired, will depend on state tolling rules, which in turn may depend on whether the federal court
allowed formal joinder of the actual defendant before dismissing the action. See supra note 158.
264. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (1994); supra note 151.
265. Often, venue will not be disturbed. Venue will be at issue only if the plaintiff based
venue on the place of residence of the named defendants and if the new defendant does not "re-
side" in the same state as the original defendants.
266. Venue is a defense that may be waived, even through inadvertence. See, e.g., FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(g), (h)(1). That defendant is joined late does not act as a waiver of his objection to
venue. Rule 19, for example, which addresses the addition of necessary parties to an action, pre-
serves the newly joined defendant's right to object to venue. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a) ("If the joined
party objects to venue and joinder of that party would render the venue of the action improper,
that party shall be dismissed from the action.").
267. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1994) (providing for transfer to "cure" improper
venue).
268. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994). But see supra note 259.
269. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994).
270. Section 1332 (c) currently provides:
(c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title-
(1) a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of any State by which it has been
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business, except that in any
direct action against the insurer of a policy or contract of liability insurance, whether in-
corporated or unincorporated, to which action the insured is not joined as a party defend-
ant, such insurer shall be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as
well as any State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State where it has
its principal place of business; and
(2) the legal representative of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed to be a citizen
only of the same State as the decedent, and the legal representative of an infant or incom-
petent shall be deemed to be a citizen only of the same State as the infant or incompetent.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1)-(2).
271. § 1332(c).
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(c) For the purposes of this section, section 1335, and section 1441 of this title-
(3) The citizenship of unknown defendants"'2 designated by fictitious names
shall be disregarded unless and until they are identified by their actual names
and formally joined in the action.
The reference to Doe defendants in current section 1441(a) will be-
come redundant and may be eliminated.
The venue rule should be amended in a similar manner as the di-
versity provision. The venue statute, like the diversity statute, already
has special venue rules for corporations, aliens, the federal government,
and foreign states . 73 A new Section 1391(g) should now read:
(g) The residence of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded
unless and until they are identified by their actual names and formally joined in
the action.
V. CONCLUSION
With these five rule and statutory changes, Doe parties can be-
come in the rulebooks what they already are in practice-recognized
litigants. Doe parties are now a fact of life in federal practice. They
ensure that claims may be brought and heard on their merits. Without
Doe defendants, the plaintiff may not be able to hold the proper party
responsible for the wrongs he suffered. Without the option of himself
proceeding as a John Doe, the plaintiff may not bring a controversial
claim that is important to society as a whole. Litigants and courts have
recognized these legitimate and important functions of John Doe, and
it is time that the Federal Rules also meet John Doe.
272. Plaintiffs who proceed by fictitious names must still allege their citizenship just as any
other plaintiff. For the author's proposed Rule 9(i), see supra part IV.A.
273. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(c)-(f) (1994) (concerning corporations, aliens, the federal gov-
ernment, and foreign states, respectively).
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